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Ein Javan. 
 
Ich liebe Tapferkeit und bin von starcken kräften, 
 
Mein Hollandt braucht mich wohl, in allerleij geschäften 
 
Ich fechte für sein heil mit schwerden kries und schild 
 
Biß Java ruhig steht und füs sein Zulist [list] gestillt. 
 
- 
 
Casper Schmalkalden1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Caspar Schmalkalden was a German VOC soldier, during his second voyage for the Company (1646-1652), he travelled to Java. See C. 
Schmalkalden, Die wundersamen Reisen des Caspar Schmalkalden nach West- und Ostindien 1642-1652: Nach einer bisher 
unveröffentlichten Handschrift bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Wolfgang Joost Weinheim (Michigan: Veb F.A. Brockhaus Verlag, 1987): 
105. 
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Picture 1 Seventeenth century VOC map of Java and Madura. While drawn in 1695, the East Javanese hinterland data 
suggests it to be derived from sketches made in the late 1670s.2 
                                                          
2 Maps prior to Hurd’s campain tend to only give details on the Pasisir; Hurdt was the first to march inlands. Isaac de Graaff, “Kaart van het 
Eiland Java en Madura, met de verdeeling in districten en bezette posten in de Mataram.” In  Atlas Amsterdam, ed. Isaac de Graaff 
(Amsterdam: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, circa 1695, completed in 1705). Nationaal Archief, VEL1157 (accessed via 
http://proxy.handle.net/10648/af9922d2-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84, on 24-03-2014). 
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Picture 2 Map of coastal Central- and Eastern Java, including the tip of Madura: from Semarang to Surabaya. Made 
around 1695, but likely based on the campaigns in the late 1670s.3  
                                                          
3 Isaac de Graaff, “Landkaart van Cheribon tot Golongong en de negory Madoera, van Samarang tot Grouda Langs de Kust, en van Mataram 
tot Blietar.” In  Atlas Amsterdam, ed. Isaac de Graaff (Amsterdam: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, circa 1695, completed in 1705). 
Nationaal Archief,  VEL1163 (accessed via http://proxy.handle.net/10648/af992610-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84, on 24-04-2014). 
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 1. Introduction: Walis, warrior charismas, and mandalas 
 
This thesis concerns hallowed men like Trunajaya. To introduce him, I will narrate his death. After 
bringing the great Javanese realm of Mataram to its knees and enmeshing the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) in a bloody four-year conflict, he perished on the mountaintop now bearing his 
name.4 A witch-hunt of many months preceded his capture, during which most former allies 
abandoned him. His demise in 1679 was almost as rapid as his rise in 1675. After chasing him from 
stronghold to stronghold, the VOC had finally left the warrior on his last legs.5  
 But while stepping out of his hiding place on the mountain’s crown, the persona that had 
attracted so many to fight along his side still stood tall and proud. Like “the holiest of priests”, he 
appeared in his “Portuguese garment of black satin, a black turban with golden rings on his head and 
a long black staff in his hand”.6 Dressed in black, the warlord embodied the mythical “young 
conqueror” that he proclaimed to be five years earlier. Yet, all he conquered was lost and soon 
merely his legacy would remain. He could only point the finger at himself: “itu betah punya salah”; it 
was his own fault.7 
Indeed he built the hierarchy of insurgents, and he led it crumble. The remnant of his power 
was the very personality that he still portrayed, or lived for that matter. An amalgam of Walisanga 
legends, Majapahit roots, Madurese nobility and multiple conquests, his myth had propelled people 
of many backgrounds to join the uprise against the ruler or Sunan of Mataram. Now, the Sunan had 
his opponent on his kris’ end; caught between him and the VOC as shown on the cover. But even 
while he tore Trunajaya’s body apart and fed it to his servants, the man’s mystical impact would not 
perish.8 
Above and beyond all else, this impact was one of a socio-religious identification among 
martial gangs. My aim is to examine how the VOC sources described and comprehended these 
fraternizations. Men can fight for glory, gain and nation. But often they are chiefly stirred by 
                                                          
4 This is the mountain now known as the Gunung Trunajaya by locals and located at Limbangan, Kendal, Central Java. See J.J. Briel, “Letter 
LXV (28 December, 1679).” In  De Opkomst van het Nederlansch Gezag in Oost-Indië: Verzameling van Onuitgegeven Stukken uit het Oud-
Koloniaal Archief Deel Zeven, eds. J.K.J. De Jonge (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1873): 289.;  and  H.J. De Graaf, “Gevangenneming en dood 
van raden Truna-Djaja, 26 Dec. 1679- 2 Jan. 1680.” Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen 85, no. 2 
(1952): 308. 
5 J.J. Briel and  J. Couper, “Letter LXII-LXVI (28 December, 1679-12 January, 1680).” In De Opkomst van: 279-296.   
6 The quotes are translated from “allerheyligsten priester” and “Portugees gewaat van swart sattyn, een swarte tulbant  om zyn hooft met 
goude bantjes en een swarte lange  stock  in  zyn  handt.” See Briel, “Letter LXV”: 289-293 and De Graaf, “Gevangenneming”: 299-300 
7 As will be clarified later, Trunajaya means “young conqueror”; the name of birth of Trunajaya was likely Nila Prawata. His statement was 
made in Malay: “Itoe beta ponja sala, dat bet syn eygen schult was”, literary ‘this stand [capture], [I] have fault’. Trunajaya does explain he 
sought agreement with the Sunan before, and wanted to return the stolen regalia. See Briel, “Letter LXV”: 291. 
8 This depiction of Trunajaya’s death relies on the Babad Tanah Jawi and the Serat Kanda. He was first stabbed by the Sunan, after which 
bupatis (local governors) and servants cut him further. Then, subordinates ate Trunajaya’s liver and the Surabayan brothers Jangrana and 
Angga-Jaja were forced to smear the blood over their faces. The body’s head was cut off and all female servants wiped their feet on it 
before going to sleep. Bruised and battered, the head was pulverized on a rice-block the day after. De Graaf, “Gevangenneming”: 304. 
Notice that Walisanga is written without a space between; as is done in Indonesian too and Susuhunan is shortened to Sunan for 
convenience.  
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something different. Groups of warriors tend to constitute a cult centring around leading figures, 
usually of a saintly character. Fighters hurdled along chieftains, appealed by both their worldly and 
mythical allure.  
The symbolic unity this brings to bands of warfare commonly forms the backbone of any 
larger institution of martial power; be it armies or realms. As such, the socio-religious identification 
within war-bands is not only key to understanding war itself, but the society in which it is fought too. 
Fighting men do not merely seek social glories; they equally shape and define them through the most 
fundamental martial ties. Even up to the point that preserving the war-band itself becomes the 
reason to fight. The warlord stood on top of these fraternizations and can be defined as ‘a territorial 
ruler, aristocrat or town representative raising troops he can allocate to military enterprisers’.9 On 
their turn, war-bands can be seen as groups of warriors abiding to such lords, however partially it 
may be.   
 The war-bands investigated here roamed Central and East Java between 1677 and 1679. 
Those two years were chaotic and bloody; stirred up by contested successions and insurgence. A 
mixed group of warriors were involved; originating from Makassar, Madura, Ambon, Java itself, and 
varying regions of Western Europe. Even though I draw a heuristic line between the indigenous 
warriors (pejuang) and the European ones, there never existed two clearly defined opposite camps 
during these tumultuous times.10 Smaller war-bands could easily shift from one side to the other. 
Attempts to muster these itinerant troops resulted in a complicated military labour market. To win a 
war, attracting most soldiers was crucial. 
 Earlier work has stressed the difficulties of doing so within the divided Javanese society. 
Courtly intrigues limited the degree to which the kraton’s war force could be counted on.11 Charney 
claims these prajurits or court soldiers were even less reliable than mercenaries from outside Java.12 
Some limited means were available to demand obedience from local war forces. Anderson, 
Moertono and Wolters, for instance, describe a spiritual and material ‘Cult of Glory’ surrounding 
                                                          
9 This definition is inspired by Redlich’s and Parrott’s one of European warlords. The ‘businesses of war’ on Java and in Europe were of 
course not the same, especially after the latter’s military boom in the 1670s. Yet, the abstract definition of a warlord does suffice for both 
contexts, certainly when taking into account that local rulers could operate largely independently in both parts of the world.  Parrott 
designates the warlord “as the party contracting with the military enterpriser for the raising of troops”.  Since Javanese warfare was 
characterized by warlords avoiding contracts, I shaped a slightly different connotation to the description. Parrott’s notion of ‘military 
enterpriser’ and ‘general contractor’ were left on the shelf since no Javanese equivalents of them could be found in the period under 
investigation (1677-1679). See D. Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 22-23. 
10 Pejuang is an Indonesian word for ‘warrior’ or ‘combative’. It is used to distinguish the indigenous alliances from the Asian legion in 
Batavia. It also avoids the connotation of ‘indigenous’ fighters, soldiers or warriors; which implies sedentary domestic forces rather than 
itinerant ones. Being of Malay origin, the term ‘pejuang’ was not used within the Javanese language and should thus be taken as a heuristic 
device. A Javanese equivalent is avoided since the term is not restricted to Javanese troops.  
11 The kraton is the Javanese court. 
12 Notice that prajurit were usually those soldiers without distinction, as Bertrand tells about the ‘nobles of the sword’: “Un fonctionnaire 
royal de haut rang ne pouvait faire carrier sans prouver régulièrement sa valuer militaire. Inversement, un simple soldat (prajurit) qui avait 
démonstré son courage au combat pouvait se voir offrir un apanage et un titre par le souverain.” See R. Bertrand, État colonial, noblesse et 
nationalisme à Java: la Tradition parfaite (XVIIe -XXe siècles). (Paris, Karthala, 2005): 73.  
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warlords and Sunans. Yet, monopolies on sacred power did not exist and cults could easily fall 
apart.13 Mustering men was a dynamic process with constant shifts in demand and supply.  
Although Charney and Moertono touch on some issues of military exchange, there is much 
more to tell about the Javanese war business.14 Fraternizations, myths and warrior charismas are 
marginalized within Charney’s account and simplified as a ‘theatre state’ in Moertono’s one.15 The 
notion of a ‘military labour market’ can be extended to tackle these topics more convincingly. For 
Java this has never been fully attempted, but for the Indian subcontinent it has. Therefore, I like to 
draw a parallel across the Indian Ocean, taking the historiography on Mughal warfare as a starting 
point. State-formation in both areas has been described in strikingly similar terms, so setting their 
way of warring side by side is only called for.16 
 On the Indian subcontinent, Mughal emperors could achieve dominance over large spans of 
land by gradually controlling the warriors in outer regions.17 Dirk Kolff’s work has been seminal in 
explaining this process; showing how this type of market generated socio-religious identities on its 
own terms. A gap persisted between identification within the aristocratic lineage hierarchies of the 
court and the heterogeneous, meritocratic order on the battle lines. The open distribution of loot 
and agrarian profits of the latter went beyond ethnic and religious boundaries; enabling the 
                                                          
13 B. Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture.” In Culture and Politics in Indonesia, eds C. Holt et al. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1972): 1-69; S. Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century (Sheffield: 
Equinox Publishing, 2009): 72, 79, 89; and O.W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1999): 18-19, 93-95. 
14 Charney describes these Southeast Asian -not Javanese specifically- courtly intrigues as part of “complex organizations in which labor and 
land, the bases of power, were internally divided among competing elites, and among whom the ruler was often simply the primus inter 
pares. (…) It was for this reason that the great warrior kings of the region emerged during interregnums, when governing or social 
institutions had broken down or weakened sufficiently to release large supplies of manpower now available to be harnessed by a warrior-
cum-king”. Calling for mercenaries could thus avoid such fleeting supplies of manpower. Yet, mercenary practices were intervened by the 
naval power of the VOC that limited the ability of the Sunan to ship in warriors from other islands. Despites these statements, Charney 
never made the attempt to investigate “many of the inner workings of political and social institutions and their organization of manpower”. 
This will be done in this thesis. Moertono also noticed how “the base characteristic of the army lay (…) in the closely knit cores of trusted 
followers of the commander”. A ‘Cult of Glory’ was abided to that both had a material and a spiritual side. Most rebels seemed to have 
aimed for solidifying these close ties as “the purpose of an uprising seemed almost always to set up an independent government, complete 
with all ceremonial paraphernalia and a full set of dignitaries”.  See M. Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare 1300-1900 (Michigan: The 
University of Michigan, 2004): 130, 213, and 224; Moertono, State and Statecraft: 72, 79, 89; O.W. Wolters, History, Culture: 18-19, 93-95; 
and L. Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch Tiger: The Dutch East Indies Company and the Northeast Coast of Java, 1680-1743 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
1996): 36-37. 
15 These academics proposed a ritual or theatre state based on the work of C. Geertz.  One implication of their view is that the intervention 
of European powers is described as unnatural to the indigenous traditions and hierarchies. However, the close interaction and integration 
of VOC soldiers into Javanese political and martial struggles undermines this assumption. See  Anderson, “The Idea of Power”:  1-69;  C. 
Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980); S. Kartodirdjo, 
Protest movements in rural Java: A study of agrarian unrest in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1973): 64-79; and  B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke, vol II (The Hague : W. van Hoeve Ltd, 
1957): 9, 76,79, 88, 97-99 
16 This is not to claim an encompassing history of ‘Indian’ or ‘Indianized’ civilizations. Rather, it is to propose a more flexible outlook on the 
manner in which the armed events laid the foundation of the larger Javanese kingdoms or mandalas, as that of Mataram or Majapahit. The 
history of these realms has paralleled that of ‘Indian’ ones. As Subrahmanyam observed: “historiographically at least, state formation in 
Southeast Asia and India appears to be portrayed in startlingly similar terms. In the Southeast Asian case, the static and cyclical notions of 
the state are to be encountered as much as in pre-colonial India …”. He mainly refers to the stress put on charismas rather than 
institutions. Sanjay Subrahhmanyam, “State Formation and Transformation in Early Modern India and Southeast Asia,” In India and 
Indonesia during the Ancient Regime , eds. P.J. Marshall, R. Van Niel et al.  (Leiden: Brill, 1989): 91-109. 
17 Be it ghazis, Naukar, Raiputs or Sepoys. 
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attraction of a mingled and diverse crowd.18 When successful, warlords assembled a large amount of 
soldiers, thereby threatening the power-base of the official state.19 
Both conscription and ascription were resorted to; troops could be forced into military 
service for a longer time or mustered for temporary projects. Unlike expected, the temporary troops 
still attributed statuses to their group. Even when jumping from one fight to another, a strong socio-
religious group identity persisted.20 Market competition was at the core of identification. The 
constant attempt to attract the most warriors and thereby establish political dominance created a 
‘tussle’ in which religion could become a central tool for military rivals.21 
Perhaps the most dominant notion in this regard is the ideal of the frontier-warrior: the 
Ghazi. The legend of the Ghazis is one describing warriors of faith offering their services for the holy 
war. Yet, in many pre-modern contexts, ghazis are commonly referred to as charismatic chiefs of 
war-bands wandering in search of booty rather than sanctity. What is more, the concept of the ghazi 
warrior often subscribes to “an eclectic image” feared by the more “orthodox strands” of religion.22 
The intricacies of the image varied, however. Linda Darling conducted an encompassing 
survey on the Ghazi throughout the Muslim world and discovered that the definition of the term 
differed among the communities of the frontier societies. The notion comprised anything from tribal 
looters, orthodox theorists to antinomian Sufis.23 Conflicting contents were thus given to a single 
term, allowing opposite ideologies to apply the same name. From this viewpoint, the ghazi frontier-
warriors were many, not one. 
                                                          
18 As is shown by authors as D. Kolff and J. Gommans, South Asian war-bands could attract warriors of different backgrounds and hurdle 
them together under the martial banner. Even when warring was only a seasonal activity by peasants after having harvested their crops, 
regional affinities could easily submerge in the heat of battle and while roaming the lands. J. Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers 
and Highroads to Empire 1500-1700 (London: Routledge, 2002); and Dirk Kolff, Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military 
Labour Market of Hindustan, 1450-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 42-56,  especially 44 and 47. On the Raiputs it is 
said that "the act of leaving their fields and families behind was also a religious expression of social dissociation, coming very near to the 
Hindu ideal of the world-renouncing sannyasi". On the ghazis it is stated how “their camaraderie stemmed from a togetherness of deeds 
sealed in various plundering expeditions and raids". 
19 Kolff aims “to place the market for peasant soldiers itself at the centre of my enquiry” can be said to show the genealogy of several  
communities. Notice that the demand and supply effect could go in both ways. The demand from the court was determined by the total 
amount ('supply') of active war-bands. Among other reasons, war-bands started roaming because of unfulfilled demands for (agricultural) 
sustenance which in some cases could be due to misguided state politics. Kolff's indications of such processes van be found in Kolff, Naukar, 
Rajput: 169 and 191. See also idem.: 58, 127, and 195. 
20 It should be remembered, however, that “[n]o single identity covered all aspects of a man's life. (…) As no identity covered all fields of 
action or all spheres of life, it had to be complemented by others.” Moreover, “these identities were chosen, not acquired by birth or 
ascribed”. See ibid.: 58, 65, 67, 121, 132, 148, 153, 182, 194-195. 
21 Everything depended on the shifts in the balance of power between the parties and the unending negotiating process that from time to 
time reformulated ‘the terms of the alliance’. Frequent were the frictions between the landholding and service parties and the crown 
prince versus the 'rebel son'. See ibid.: 123 and 126. 
22 Notice the use of capitals to distinguish the Ghazi myth from the ghazi warrior. Within the Mughal Empire, they can be contrasted with 
the mirza or Rajput who were settled and tied to the palaces. Still, the empire also needed “to accommodate as many as possible of these 
migratory, armed bands”. They had wide-ranging connections through extensive business relations, potentiating them as effective stooges. 
These relations could, however, also be employed by the Mughal’s opponents. This made it vital to attract them to one’s side, yet this was 
troubled by the ascetic Ghazi faith stressing renunciation. See Gommans, Mughal Warfare:  40, 43, 49-51 67 and 88.  
23 She also stresses finding a balance between the agency of the historical figure studied and the legacies dedicated to him or her. 
Anooshar himself states that “those who are interested in how Darling's 'tribal looters, orthodox theorist and antinomian Sufis' became 
ghazis may wish to apply the findings and methodology of this [my] book if they find it appropriate or useful”. See A. Anooshar, The Ghazi 
Sultans and the Frontiers of Islam: The Ghazi Sultans and the Frontiers of Islam: A Comparative Study of the Late Medieval and Early 
Modern Periods (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008): 10; and L. Darling, “Contested Territories: Ottoman Holy War in Comparative Context.” 
Studia Islamica 91 (2000): 133-163. 
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 On the other hand, imitation of legends did tie these mystical warriors together. Normally, 
art and literature were intrinsic to the self-conception and identification of the fighters. A 
‘cosmopolis’ of a preferred warrior charisma existed. Discourses of sacred kingship and charismatic 
sainthood were abundant in it, be it produced contemporary or in hindsight. For instance, the myth 
of the millennial sovereign –relying on astrology, divine intercession and magic- marked the rule of 
both Safavid Iran and Mughal India. Similar warrior charismas endured on large stretches of land.24 
They built on rites and were rooted in cults. Rituals and myths have been portrayed as 
temporary means to prepare for battle. Yet, cults were much more long-lasting than that. They 
crafted a mystical world of mingled religions and magnificent magic. The warlords heading the cults 
conducted such spiritual powers into an itinerant force desired by Mughal rulers. Bearing titles 
referring to saints and legends, they led ascetic lifestyles centred on mercenarism as much as praying. 
Their world renunciation went hand in hand with armed expertise.25 
Colonialism and institutionalization gradually turned warrior ascetics into ascetic soldiers, a 
process recalling Weber’s contrast between personality and ‘institutionalized life orders’. The mystic 
warrior was a child of its time; essential to a world filled with religious sects and lacking the 
regulatory impact of structured hierarchies.26 But areas counted as much as eras. To use charisma 
effectively entailed an appropriation to local circumstances. It demanded an eclectic mix of religion 
and locality.27 Those mixtures also occurred on Java. 
 
 
                                                          
24 Sacred kingship could be constructed by subsequent generations and could equally substantiate spiritual power despite lacking physical 
one. Context thus matters a lot, for “sacred authority must be understood by paying close attention to its social dimension”. The concept 
of cosmopolis can be used to see how different contexts overlapped. The concept is based on Pollock’s work; it can be taken as constituted 
through a discourse of Ghazis and sacred kingship spread by the widely-used languages of Arabic and Persian. Both leave a uniformising 
impression on the societies they pass through and are adapted in; the implement similar narratives in different vernaculars. Thereby a 
linguistic pattern causes social parallels; for the ideal warrior will at some point shape the battles of real wars. Anooshar, The Ghazi Sultans: 
3-4, 9-11, and 165; and A. Moin, The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam (New York: Columbia UP, 2012): 8, 14, 
24, and 225. 
25 R. Gerard, Violence and the Sacred (London: Athlone Press, 1988); L. Harlan, The Goddesses’ Henchmen: Gender in Indian hero Worship 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); A. Hiltebeitel, Draupadi among Rajputs, Muslims and Dalits: Rethinking India’s Oral and Classical 
Epics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); and William R. Pinch, Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
26 Turner perceives “important parallels between Max Weber’s account of the routinization of charisma in military bureaucracies and Elias’s 
analysis of the decline of militarized feudalism”. He criticizes Elias’ Civilizing Process to ignore “the historical and comparative importance 
of religious cultures and institutions” in military conflicts and social violence. Rather, he opts that warrior charisma “is conceptually part of 
an analytical framework that understands the dynamics of large-scale changes in religious institutions and the foundations of authority as 
outcomes of the violent impact of the sacred on the profane”.  See Pinch, Warrior Ascetics; and Bryan S. Turner, “Weber and Elias on 
religion and violence: warrior charisma and the civilizing process.” In The Sociology of Norbert Elias, eds S. Loyal and S. Quilley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 2004) 257 – 276. 
27 Take, for instance, Bayly who writes on “recently sedentarized  ex-pastoralists and martial predator groups” in the South Indian 
hinterlands who crafted a “mixed and volatile cultural order in which traditions that would now be identified as those of formal Islam, 
Hinduism, and Christianity were all being formed , received and transmitted at the same time”. Moin equally debates the ideas of a 
“vernacular Islam” and “syncretism”, a hibernation of religion and locality, when treating Timur’s influence in the Safavid Empire. S. Bayly, 
“Cult saints, heroes, and warrior kings: South Asian Islam in the making”, In Religion and Public Culture , eds. K. E. Yandell & J. J. Paul 
(London: Routledge/Curzon, 2000): 194-196, 200, 201-202 and 206; and Moin, The Millennial Sovereign: 26, 56-60, and 90. 
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On the island, the most salient legend is that of the Walisanga or nine saints. Continuous 
adaptation of the myth was crucial in applying it to construct martial cults. As such, Javanese authors 
over time and space have persistently altered the composition of the holy men. Each new polity, 
dynasty or warlord could thereby underline the saints with whom they associated genealogically, 
geographically or historically. Three walis have been particularly popular in the late seventeenth 
century: Sunan Giri, Sunan Kudus and Sunan Kalijaga. Two others played a central role in the court 
chronicle of Mataram, the Babad Tanah Jawi: Sunan Bayat and Sunan Ampel Denta.28 
In general, the Walisanga are perceived as Islamic harbingers, the ones who converted the 
island. But some hints are given on their actual lives too. Sunan Giri set up an Islamic school, the Giri 
Kedaton, that would turn into a centre of resistance over the next two centuries. Sunan Kudus was 
known for attacking Majapahit, conquering a Hindu state in Pajang and was supposedly related to 
Jaka Tingkir; the progenitor of Mataram. Sunan Kalijaga influenced Jaka Tingkir directly and is 
remembered for the two mosques he built.29 Yet, their true significance comes from their legacies 
and the authority their descendants could achieve.  
Even the esteemed titles of Pangéran and Susuhunan were first coined for these holy men. It 
took decades before a secular connotation became attached to the designations. But when it did, 
nobles immediately erased the religious sides of them. The power it casted over the titleholder was 
to be reserved for the royals. Wali descendants who still dared to call themselves Pangéran were 
ridiculed; showing how the new generation of political actors had replaced the religious harbingers. 
But outside of the court, the Wali legend was still beloved and honoured. The Giri saints thwarted 
Mataram, and Sunan Bayat’s grave site in Tembayat remained a locus of insurgence.30 At the same 
time, the kraton resorted to the Wali lore to stabilize their authority in the periphery of their realm.  
                                                          
28 It should be realized that the Sunans did in general not write themselves. In fact, illiteracy gradually became a status symbol showing that 
nobles did not have waste their time to administrative pickles. Of course the court did command chronicles to be written by courtiers to 
show their genealogical links to previous rulers and respected figures. See J. Fox, “Sunan Kalijaga and the Rise of Mataram: A Reading of the 
Babad TanahJawi as a Genealogical Narrative,” In Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought & Society, ed. P. Riddell and A. Street (Leiden: Brill, 
1997): 187–218.  Shifts within dynasties occurred too, just consider how Sultan Agung’s admiration of certain walis turned into Amangkurat 
I’s antipathy towards them and in particular towards Sunan Giri. See H.J. De Graaf, De Expeditie van Anthonio Hurdt, Raad van Indië, als 
Admiraal en Superintendent naar de Binnenlanden van Java. Werken van de Linschoten Vereeniging deel 72 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1971): 3 and 49; and D.A. Rinkes, Nine Saints of Java (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1996). 
29 The last powerful Panembahan of Giri was killed in April 1680. Sunan Kalijaga is still influential today, Sukarno for instance referred to 
him within his ideologies. How sensitive the topic is today, became clear when Suharto banned Muljana’s book on the initial Islamization of 
the archipelago. Muljana stresses the Chinese descent of the Wali Sanga, relying on alternative sources to the Babad Tanah Jawi. This 
undermined Suharto’s ill treatment of the Chinese community. See H.J. De Graaf and T.G. Pigeaud, Islamic states in Java 1500-1700. Eight 
Dutch Books and Articles by Dr H.J. de Graaf (Leiden: KITLV, 1976): 7-8; N. Florida, Writing the Past, Inscribing the Future: History as 
Prophesy in Colonial Java (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1995);  S. Muljana, Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu-Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-
negara Islam di Nusantara (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005/1968); S. Al Qurtuby, Bongkar Sejarah atas Peranan Tionghoa dalam Penyebaran 
Agama Islam di Nusantara Abad XV & XVI ( Yogyakarta: Inspeal Press, 2003); and M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001): 45, 46 55, 96, 97, and 99.  
30 As Moedjanto has stressed, entitlements were an essential feature of constituting royal rule and geneology. The use of the saintly titles 
was hence a way to construct a powerful mandala though increasing the statuses of central rulers. As De Graaf writes: “Het ligt daarom 
voor de hand, dat na de islamisering de pas omhoog gekomen vorsten, die aanvankelijk allen pati genoemd werden, hun aanzien hebben 
trachten te verhogen door de verwerving van geestelijke titels”. These titles never constituted a separate warrior caste, however, as 
Houben and Kolff observed. The label of Sénapati Ingalaga or ‘honourable commander in battle’ does come closest to a martial class. It was 
carried by multiple warlords among whom Sultan Agung prior to getting his Sultan title. See H.J. De Graaf, ”Titels en namen van Javaanse 
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In the seventeenth century, courtly interests and Wali legends thus both clashed and 
complemented each other. Evident parallels can thus be drawn to the Ghazis on the Indian 
subcontinent.31 This stresses once more that the era under concern was primarily one of Late 
“Islamization”, rather than Early Modernity.32 All around the Indian Ocean, religious motivations to 
escape the grudge of central capitals persisted. Adopting these Islamic convictions at the court, could 
transform potential enemies into partners. Sultan Agung -the most renowned ruler of Mataram (r. 
1613-1645)- succeeded in doing so when visiting the holy graveyard Tembayat and Amangkurat II 
assigned a descendant of the Walisanga to bless his inauguration and edit the court chronicles. Both 
sought to turn religious rebellion in support and thereby increase their status as divine lords or 
wahyu kaprabon.33 
That rulers turned to Islam to bring their subjects to obedience is almost natural in the 
realms they governed. Both in Java and northern India, hierarchies were limited and fragile. Wolter’s 
mandalas can be both applied to the Mughal Empire and Mataram.34 Unlike states, mandalas are not 
defined by their rigid borders, but rather by their strong centres. The periphery was instead 
ambiguous and could consist out of numerous tributary polities with relative autonomous local 
leaders. The ties between these leaders and the overlord were personal not administrative, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
vorsten en groten uit de 16de en 17de eeuw.” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 109 , no.  1 (1953): 62-82, 67-69, and 74-78; V.J.H 
Houben and D.H.A. Kolff, “Between Empire Building and State Formation; Official Elites in Java and Mughal India.” In India and Indonesia 
during the Ancien Regime; Comparative History of India and Indonesia vol. III, eds. P.J. Marschall et al.  (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989): 185; G. 
Moedjanto, Konsep Kekuasaan Jawa: Penerapannya oleh Raja-raja Mataram (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1987): 17-24; and Ricklefs, A History:  
53, 55, 96, 97, and 99.  
31 Gommans, Mughal Warfare: 46. 
32 From this perspective, one could consider Java as part of the Late Al-Hind. Al-Hind is that region east of the Middle East; the stretches 
beyond Mesopotamia still largely inhabited by kāfirs around the tenth century. Wink applied it as a heuristic concept indicating a greater 
‘Indian realm’ or cosmopolis. This is a usage based on the work of Ronald Inden and deemed controversial due to the neglect of the 
distinction between Hind and Sind. Yet, as a heuristic tool ‘Late al-Hind’ does function. While his use of the term has met criticism, it can be 
broadened to emphasize a movement of ‘Islamization’ that rings more bells than the movement towards modernity stressed by the more 
conventional periodization. Accordingly, the Malay world might be taken as the most eastern span of Al-Hind. Notice that Ricci and Pollock 
dismiss this term “Islamization” as vague and misleading. Their proposed concept of cosmopolis would highlight the more complicated 
dynamics of Islam as a spreading religion. Although, agreeing with their viewpoints. I would also argue that an expanding Islamic 
cosmopolis could be described as a form of Islamization in itself. Sunil Kumar, “Review Andre Wink, al-Hind.” Studies in History 10 (1994): 
147. 
33 Amangkurat II’s scribe and holy man was known as Panembahan Natapraja or ‘Pangéran Adilangu I from Demak’ and was a direct 
descent of Sunan Kalijaga. His task was to supplement Amangkurat II’s martial victories, boosting his kadigdayan or invincibility, with the 
godly gift of sovereignty or wahyu kaprabon. J. Ras, “Geschiedschrijving en de legitimiteit van het koningschap op Java.” Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde 150, no. 3 (1994): 531-532. 
34 Notice that I prefer the term ‘mandala’ over ‘negara’ to stress the comparison with the Indian subcontinent. Mandala is a tem describing 
political realms defined primarily by their centre rather than their periphery. In other words, borders were not rigid and regions removed 
from the capital could easily shift alliances. Hereby, a power dynamic emerged quite different from the current nation-states. As Houben 
and Kolff showed, this dynamic can be found in both a patrimonial and prebendalist form in respectively Mataram and the Mughal Empire. 
They naturally refrain from the term mandala (which only gained it current meaning in 1999) but do notice how the Javanese priyayi and 
the Mughal umara both combined aspects of the ideal warrior-administrator” and were used to keep the divergent realm together while at 
the same time completely subjecting to the monarch. In Java, the patrimonial ties between the monarch and his rulers strongly favoured 
personal relationships that could easily break apart when individual rulers passed away or deserted. See R. Bertrand, L'Histoire à Parts 
Égales: Récits d'une Rencontre Orient-Occident (XVIe-XVIIe siècle) (Paris: Seuil, 2011): 323-346 ; Houben and Kolff “Between Empire 
Building”: 165-194 ; and Wolters. History, Culture. 
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hence likely to shift. Wink stresses how the governmental relations were weakened by fitna; a drive 
to secession and upheaval.35 
The continuous courtly incorporation of local elites usually led to many compromises. Over 
time, “regional élites grew excessively powerful economically, and asserted themselves vis-à-vis the 
central power”. A process of fitna would then easily break the realm apart. For men like Ibn Khaldun 
or Emperor Jahangir, fitna forced alliances opposing the leaders of polities; as to prevent all-
dominating rulers and realms.36 Besides testing the faith of individual believers, fitna was thus also 
perceived as a check on authoritarianism. Still, central rulers could resort to nepotism, warfare and 
myth to prolong their rule and quiet down the secessionist urges of their subordinate courtiers and 
elites. 
Gaining the upper hand in the military labour market was crucial to reach this aim; for 
control was not only lacking over the outer areas, but also over the warriors residing or roaming 
there. A complicated ‘war business’ developed in which political networks, geographical frontiers and 
warrior charismas could tip the scales. For this reason, it is worth investigating to what degree the 
zamindari landlords can be juxtaposed to the Pangérans, how the Central Javanese-East Javanese-
Pasisir relations were similar to those of arid and monsoon India, and how both Ghazis and 
Walisanga were able to mould ethnic and religious identities.37 With this purpose in mind, some 
particularities of Java need to be mentioned. 
In comparison with South Asia, Houben and Kolff have stressed the limited immigrant élite 
on Java.38 Nonetheless, mobility certainly impacted the island and the warfare on it. Two factors 
were of specific influence on the Javanese military labour network: the infrastructure and the 
                                                          
35 Like Wink has stressed, fitna functioned as a “normal political mechanism of state-formation or annexation and, as it were, the negative 
basis of universal dominion”. The last clause refers to the Hindu belief in an ideal dharma crossing over ethnic identities and establishing 
universal dominion. The dharma realm was considered unachievable, however. In its counter-world of the here and now, such 
homogenizations were to be upset by successions and ethnic divisions to oppose monopolies of power. Alliances in and outside the 
mandala kept political balance, preventing certain polities to gain the upper hand. In fact; “objectively, fitna implies no more than the 
forging of alliances, it is thus (…) not primarily determined by the use of military power”. Even though, Wink can be easily criticized for 
asserting a constant vision on insurgence throughout many ages- a common sin of Orientalism- his effort to limelight the religious motives 
of political resistance is very informative. See A. Wink, “Sovereignity and universal dominion in South Asia.” Indian Economic Social History 
Review 21 (1984): 270, 274, 279, and 282. 
36 Jahangirnama, for instance, carefully avoids using the term fitna with the aim to “downplay the threat to imperial order posed by 
princely rebellions”. See M. D. Faruqui, The Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504-1719 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 189; 
S. Subrahmanyam, “State Formation and Transformation in Early Modern India and Southeast Asia.” in India and Indonesia during the 
Ancien Regime; Comparative History of India and Indonesia vol. III, eds. P.J. Marschall et al.  (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989): 95-96; and Wink, 
“Sovereignity and universal”: 277 and 283.  
37 Careful attention needs to be paid here to the role of heredity, however. The Central Javanese-Pasisir relations reveal crucial aspects of 
the influence rebellious turmoil had on the religious ideology created at the court. Carey indicated the cultural (ranging from architecture 
to music) and political ties between the centre and periphery of the empire. His survey shows large progressive influences of the latter on 
the former, which brings to question how the shifting relations between these regions changed the cultural and religious expressions of the 
‘Asabiyyah’ sought for by the Sunan. See P. Carey, “Civilization on Loan: The Making of an Upstart Polity: Mataram and Its Successors, 
1600-1830.” Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (1997): 711-734; idem., “Core and Periphery, 1600-1830: The Pasisir Origins of Central 
Javanese "High Court" Culture.” in Regions and Regional Developments in the Malay-Indonesian World, ed. Bernhard Dahm (Wiesbaden: 
Otto Harrassowitz, 1992); and Gommans, Mughal Warfare: 68-69, 90-91, and 96-97. 
38 They claim: “[w]hereas in Java the ruling élite, though from different parts of the island, was almost exclusively Javanese, in most of India 
the aristocracy was made up of various religious and ethnic elements.”Houben and Kolff, “Between Empire Building”: 171-183. 
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demographic spread.39 The first was largely limited to the larger rivers, roads and northern coastal 
waters. Inland mobility was restricted by volcanoes, mountains, jungles and flooding. At the same 
time, villages tended to be rather isolated. The three to four million Javanese were “clustered in 
pockets of population” across hundreds of kilometres.40 Moving from one place to another would 
often be an adventurous pursuit. Still, many did move.  
The motivations for migration contrasted. Inhabitants could be attracted to pilgrimage, 
assisting a rebel leader, or could be imposed to attend a kraton gathering. Quite often, however, the 
decisions were stirred by the dynamics of the military market. Determining where to move usually 
involved an acceptance of either the state hierarchy or the forces fighting against it. Individuals 
travelled in different directions, and war-bands marched to the beat of different drummers and 
gamelan sets. The reasons of lesser notables to “endorse or reject royal authority” thus explain more 
than just the ”political history” of Java.41 The trends in mobility were equally shaped by it. A martial 
history of Java should therefore attend to marches as much as battles and courtly intrigues. 
In this light, the movements from the coast or deep woods to the royal hinterlands were 
particularly important. Compared to Demak and even Prajat, Mataram was located far inlands. 
Although secure from hostile maritime forces, the control of the Pasisir and Eastern Java was equally 
limited. Amangkurat I made several attempts to subdue the coastal areas through disposal of bupatis 
and the introduction of new taxes. But the Sunan was never the “natural” ruler of the north coast. 
Nor was he of the thick forest east of the Brantas. Rivalries between these areas never faded out. As 
a consequence, particular cultural and political interactions developed between the core and 
periphery of Mataram, or -to use the Javanese division- the nagaragung (core-regions), the 
mancanagara (outer-regions) and the pasisir (coastal regions).42 
Beyond the nagaragung, local rulers or bupati needed to be employed. Nepotism was 
involved, since many of them tended to be ex-courtiers and thus affiliated with the kraton. But even 
when friends and family were send to the periphery, autocracy was in vain. The wide-spread belief in 
                                                          
39 Some readers might be reminded of Schrieke’s “primary factors” of the” Javanese people” and the “Javanese landscape”. Notice, 
however, that Schrieke emphasizes immobility rather than mobility. My statement should, moreover, not be taken to assert a changeless 
society, these characteristics instead were two main axes through which change occurred.  Mobility and infrastructure, often propelled by 
military events, made Java very dynamic indeed. For Schrieke’s division see Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. 2:  99-101. 
40  One major difference between the Mughal mandala and the Mataramese one is the sheer population size. For the Mughal mandala this 
could be estimated at 150 million in 1700. Indications for Java are harder to get, but Reid has estimated that the total population of the 
entire island must have been around four million in 1600 and five million two centuries later. Ricklefs even suggests these numbers to be 
too high. It can hence be deduced that Mataram had about two percent of the Mughal population. See J. F. Richards, “The Mughals and 
their Contemporaries.” In The New Cambridge history of India: The Mughal Empire, Gordon Johnson, ed. C. A. Bayly (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993): 1, 190;  Ricklefs, A History: 19, idem., Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the 
Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries (Norwalk : East Bridge Signature Books, 2006): 3, 36; idem., War, Culture, and Economy in 
Java, 1677-1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993): 5 and 7; and Schrieke, 
Studies vol II: 139. 
41 The most noticeable kraton gatherings were the Garebegs. See Ricklefs, War, Culture:  9. 
42 Anderson, “The Idea of Power”: 1-69; Carey, “Civilization on Loan”: 711-734; Houben and Kolff, “Between Empire Building”: 179; 
Nagtegaal, Ridging the Dutch Tiger: 16, 26-33, 36-39 and 25; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 7 and 9. 
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sacred power did not entail acceptance of the Sunan’s authority. The Sunan was not the supreme 
leader the VOC men sometimes assumed he was. In fact, “the mobilisation of economic or 
manpower resources” could only be achieved through persuading, pressuring or threatening local 
rulers “with more direct control of resources”. Albeit several means were available to the Sunan, one 
was specifically resorted to; military power. Military marches to and fro the periphery at times 
resembled religious processions in an aggressive search for supporters.43 
In the vein of Ricklefs; “at bottom, what held this state together was force or the threat of 
force”. The Javanese army consisted of both professional soldiers and peasants. The former were 
closely tied to the court and well equipped. The latter wandered around, changing from one side to 
another and drafted temporarily by different warlords. What is more, they heavily outnumbered the 
soldiers. The Sunan’s force can be expected to have been around 300.000 in normal times.44 But 
underneath this number hides a motley crew. Conscribing these men required tactics that had to 
take account of the dominant trends in martial supply and demand. Active persuasion and local 
presence were needed to compete with other armed forces. 
All in all, the most salient characteristics of this labour market did remain the same in the 
seventeenth century. Ricklefs and De Graaf, for instance, noticed central locations repetitively used 
for rebellions as well as a consistent courtly inability to control border areas. The frictions between 
the coast and the inlands kept returning. And so did the reliance upon religiously tinted 
identifications, which in this century were largely steered by Islam. Most importantly, the hierarchical 
social structures propelling the martial demand were essentially left unchanged. It is rather the social 
mobility within them that was facilitated by continuous insurgence.45 That very mobility became a 
feature of the hierarchy and accomplished opportunities within the military labour market. New 
fights entailed desertions but also fresh vacancies. 
                                                          
43 Houben and Kolff noticed a stronger tendency for local control in Java: “in Java the local power base of the priyayi was essential to the 
functioning of the realm, whereas in Mughal India the umara lacked such a power base.” But what they conclude from this is less 
convincing: “[t]he military corollary of these structural differences was that in Java feudal levies and native armies were of primary 
importance, while in India the central phenomena were mercenaries and a relatively open military labour market”. As this thesis shows, 
migrating war-bands certainly played a key role in Javanese military affairs. See Anderson, “The Idea of Power”: 19, 25; Bertrand, État 
Colonial: 86-90; Houben and Kolff, “Between Empire Building”: 179-180, and 183; Nagtegaal, Ridging the Dutch: 36-39; W. Remmelink, “De 
Worsteling om Java.” In De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie, eds. Gerrit Knaap en Ger Teitler (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2002): 342; idem., The Chinese War and the collapse of the Javanese state, 1725–1743 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994): 12-31; and  
Ricklefs, War, Culture: 8. 
44 That is about a third of what the VOC delegate Van Goens suggested. See Ricklefs, War, Culture: 8 and 13-14.  
45 The social structures propelling the martial demand were characterized by rebelling peripheries. As Ricklefs states on regional rulers: 
“outside of the capital city, regional families were often powerful”. Specific locations were especially prone to counteract central power; 
chiefly at the Central-Eastern coast (Pasisir) and in East Java (Blambangan, contemporary Banyuwangi, formally this is part of the Pasisir 
too). Not coincidentally, these regions also harboured many migrant communities. What is more, Blambangan was the place Islam and 
Hinduism clashed most violently after the sixteenth century. Margana and Kwee found similar patterns among the migrant communities 
found in this area during the first half of the eighteenth century. Schrieke underlines a similar potential for mobility throughout the early 
modern times. This explains continuity in infrastructure and demarcations of provincial borders. See Houben and Kolff, “Between Empire 
Building”: 181; K. H. Kian, The Political Economy of Java’s Northeast Coast, c. 1740-1800 : Elite Synergy (Leiden : Brill, 2006); S. Margana, 
Java’s last frontier; the struggle for hegemony of Blambangan c.1763-1813 (Leiden; Leiden University, 2007); Ricklefs, War, culture: 3, 6, 7, 
226; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II:  102-120.  
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 Insurgences, in this sense, were indirectly fuelling a motor that kept the mandala running. A 
look at the organization of the Amangkurat II’s war-bands evidences the market’s durability. The 
Sunan was constantly in search for supporters. He seemed to have used a clear strategy to gather 
them. This particularly comes forward when he adjusted the VOC war plans for attacking Kediri. 
During negotiations on 29 October 1677 between the Sunan and the lower lords, Speelman laid out 
his strategy for a direct attack from Surabaya. The Sunan urged to start the campaign inlands instead, 
leaving more opportunities for achieving new coalitions.46 
The VOC’s interference thus did not alter the fundamental scheme of campaigning. It mainly 
exerted influence on minor tactical concerns. Not only were European clothes and drilling methods 
partly adapted; technologies equally transmitted.47 Conversely, the close operations with Asian war-
bands and the pre-eminence of these soldiers certainly did shape Dutch warfare as well. In fact, one 
cannot escape the relevance of the “Javanese military labour market” for the Dutch inland offensives. 
 The Company and the Sunan shared aims. From Ricklefs’ viewpoint, both parties had a similar 
“culture of war” and a comparable quest to instil a “stable new order in Java”.48 Even though the 
notion of this order differed, the means used to fight for it could overlap. An overarching question 
emerges on the mutual understanding between the two parties on conducting war and attracting 
alliances. Were similar tactics used to gather mobile warriors to one’s side and was the appreciation 
of fraternization akin? 
Since the VOC entered a labour market unlike European ones, misinterpretations were 
commonplace. At times, the Company men were left whistling in the dark. In this thesis, I consider 
what their sources still reveal about war-bands and the mandala plus military labour markets in 
which they operated. I discuss how they framed the martial activities of warlords like Trunajaya or 
Amangkurat II and, indirectly, the Company itself. For this purpose, I take a closer look at the VOC 
sources written in the midst of conflict.  
When it comes down to it, the conflict of the late 1670’s was also one between two martial 
cultures. Therefore, I set off my inquiry by contrasting the Javanese and VOC ways of warring 
(chapter 2). Secondly, I describe how those contrasts were highlighted within different 
historiographical strands (chapter 3). Thirdly, I reflect on the elaborate reports of two VOC admirals 
to consider how they bridged the gap between their conscribed and controlled Batavian troops and 
the spontaneous alliances with ‘indigenous’ warriors or pejuang. Questions will be asked on their 
                                                          
46 De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 18 and 41. 
47 To what extent they did is a much more controversial issue that led to debates on technological development avant la lettre; before the 
so-called first-, second and third world nations were categorized in a developmentalist sense. Although it is useful to map out military 
technologies to gain an impression of military potential, entering in discussions on innovation levels and development stages will be as 
deceiving as developmentalism was halfway the twentieth century. See Ricklefs, War, Culture: 223-228. 
48 Ibid., 226. 
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background, concerns and preconceptions (chapter 4). Subsequently, the epistemic character of their 
writings is judged upon in the conclusion. Having found the limits of the VOC’s scope, I analyse the 
clues of a larger Javanese military endeavour that was not fully understood by the Dutch, yet 
indicated in their writings. 
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 2. Ways to War: The chaos between 1677 and 1679 
 
a. War on Java 
The Javanese calendar took the start of the seventeenth century to spell disaster. A centurial 
downfall would bring an overhaul of hierarchies, a turn of power. Volcano eruptions, famines and a 
lunar eclipse increased anxieties about a looming destruction and made hay for prophets of doom. 
That Trunajaya was ravishing East Java can only have brought expectations from bad to worse. And 
indeed the Mataram kraton did fall that very year. For the Javanese year 1600 is the Gregorian 
1677.49 
 The disaster striking Central Java was rooted in the disputes over Madura. This island is 
separated from Java by a small strait, small enough to allow continuous Javanese influences from at 
least the 10th century on. Mataram got its grip on it when Sultan Agung conquered the island around 
1624. He ousted the only remaining Madurese lord and confined him to the kraton with the title 
Cakraningrat I. After years in exile, his grandchild was born: Nila Prawata, as Trunajaya originally was 
called. When Nila Prawata reached his twenties he returned to his homeland; not to rule but to 
rebel.50 
 And so it happened that five decades after Agung’ victorious march to Madura, a just as 
devastating one was charging at the Mataramese capital from the other direction. Trunajaya 
employed tactics similar to those bringing triumph to the Javanese subordinator of his family. While 
traversing the lands he attracted warlords and troops. They were aroused by oaths and rituals, 
armed with spears, shields, krisses and guns and helped him block provision lines, fight skirmishes 
and siege towns. A military pattern lays bare that can be judged characteristic for the area. Partly, 
this is one of warrior charismas: where Agung craved his lineage, so did Trunajaya combine the 
Islamic influence of his warlord Raden Kajoran with more secular appraisals of personality.  
 As Andaya proved for the Bugis and the Makassarese, a “holistic conception of warfare” 
tended to prevail in the Indonesian archipelago. Concepts of state, solidarity and honour intertwined 
with those of war tactics and weaponry. Sulawesian documents stressed how martial conflicts served 
“the maintainance of proper relationships within the human community and between states”. The 
VOC, on the other hand, “were principally concerned with demonstrating the effectiveness of their 
                                                          
49 More precisely, the AJ 1600 started in March of AD 1677. Schrieke observes “messianic expectations” at work here. Ricklefs even claims 
the “populace at large almost certainly expected major changes”. Yet, only hints can be found of this. In the light of Moin’s observations on 
Millennial Sovereignty on the Indian subcontinent, large-scale influences of cosmological prophecies can certainly be expected. As for the 
cosmological court traditions, see M.C. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: a history of the division of Java (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974): 420-1 and 176. Similar predictions occurred for other Sunans too in different times: Bertrand, État Colonial: 
98-100. Next to these, see Ricklefs, War, Culture and Economy: 33, 41; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 94-95. 
50 This royal family turned out much less faithful than the Sultan might have expected. Notice that no absolute certainty remains about 
Trunajaya’s original name; but Nila Prawata is the most likely one. See K. Van Dijk, H. de Jonge, and E. Touwen-Bouwsma, “Introduction.” In 
Across Madura Strait: the dynamics of an insular society, eds. van Dijk et al. (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995): 1-6; and H.J. De Graaf, “De 
opkomst van raden Truna-Djaja.” Djawa XX, no. 1 (1940): 56-87. 
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military campaigns against local kingdoms”. Their way of war centred on “cost and effectiveness”; 
the efficient operations, the profitable contract signed and “light losses among the European soldiers” 
due to the “native allies” backing up the army.51 It nearly appears these allies were cannon fodder. 
 To show that “native allies” or pejuang troops did come to serve similar purposes in both 
archipelagic and European armies, this chapter will study how both armies engaged in battles. A 
threat connecting the ‘Asian and European’ textual traditions can be found in the manner wars were 
fought in the late 1670s. Both documented similar military actions. Therefore, I will start by 
unravelling the conventional side of warfare; that of ‘blood and iron’. Adaptations to local war tactics 
indirectly exposed the broader connotations warfare had in the Indonesian archipelago. This will 
show how the Company’s interest in “native allies” went beyond mere concerns of cost efficiency.  
Demand and supply, be it the Sunan asking for the VOC or the VOC asking for warlords, 
created intricate networks of martial associations. Armies overlapped; leaving the Company to enter 
the holistic world of which the pejuang forces were part. Hence, an overview is required to see how 
Trunajaya fought and was fought against, as well as how those battles were organized and prepared 
for. At first sight, a clear pattern of engagement is visible. Certain conventional ideas on fixed battle 
formations were seemingly abided to. They were based on Indian models that had spread around the 
Indian Ocean. Mataram, for instance, was stated to use the Makara array at the start of battles.52 
 
 
Picture 3 Makara Vyuha, a battle formation used in Java and recorded by Raffles in 1817. The numbers inside the battle 
formation refer to the type of elite warriors and units of troops used.53 
                                                          
51 L.  Andaya, “Nature of War and Peace Among the Bugis-Makassar People.” South East Asia Research 12, no.1 (2004):  53-54. 
52 T. S. Raffles, The History of Java (London: Black, Parbury, and Allen, 1817). 
53 Ibid. 
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Nonetheless, despites the mention of Makara in Javanese chronicles and European accounts 
alike, the military activities appeared chiefly characterized by improvisation and chaos rather than 
order and organization. Warriors sooner ran amuck than charge in array.54 These very battle 
formations served more as ideals than applied practices. Military command consisted out of 
noblemen appointed ad hoc during times of distress. Favoured courtiers and royals thus took charge 
on an arbitrary basis and sometimes without any relevant tactical knowledge. Moreover, distrust 
usually led to a constant shuffling of positions to avoid subordinates from accumulating power.55 
And in certain cases shuffling meant death. Potentially hostile warlords were eliminated. 
Trunajaya murdered Makassarese traitors and Sultan Agung appears to have assassinated his failing 
commanders during the first siege of Batavia in 1628.56 At some points, Mataram ran in trouble 
because few competent and trusted Javanese commanders remained. Hence, Amangkurat II also 
approached non-Javanese warlords as the Makassarese; who had shipped to Java after the fall of 
Makassar a few years earlier. After contacting Karaëng Galesong -the most powerful Makassarese 
warlord on Java- in writing, the latter suddenly gained the royal title of Prabu Jayalelana. The Sunan 
had high hopes for Galesong conquering Kediri. 57 
Amangkurat II’s preferences even mattered for the selection of VOC officers. During the 
initial negotiations in the late 1677’s, the Sunan made clear he only wanted the Company’s support 
when their Ambonese captain Jonker would join. He equally sought Speelman to enlist, but the latter 
could not. Subsequently, Tumĕnggung Suranata and others were called on to gather troops for an 
offence that would not start till the next Northeast monsoon. Dissatisfaction on the available 
commanders seemingly delayed Amangkurat’s campaigns. For insurgents as Trunajaya, the 
inconsistent supply of warlords led to even more uncertainty. No regular officer class thus existed; 
only local armies brought together by temporary figureheads. This left Speelman to lament even the 
“most experienced of the inexperienced Javanese commanders”.58  
                                                          
54 In itself, running amuck was a very effective tactic. Yet, by its very nature, it was not one conducted in an organized matter. It’s power is 
shown by the attack Panembahan Mas of Giri launched in 1680 against the VOC and Mataram forces: “ (…) they did not bother with 
shooting or wounding in the struggle but, at the constant cry amokan (stab them to death) of the aged Panembahan, who personally gave 
out his commands on every side, they fell upon our men from all sides at once, with such violence that after the loss of six Europeans and 
ten Javanese of the Susuhunan fell into so much confusion that they grew panicky and took flight, thereby at the same time completely 
disorganizing two of our white companies and putting a third to flight (…)”.  See Supreme Government of Batavia, “2 June 1680.” Dagh-
register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India Anno 1680, ed F. De Haan (The 
Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1912): 321-332. 
55 Nagtegaal makes a similar observation, stating: “[t]he fluid nature of the Javanese state promoted social mobility. Wartime in particular 
was a period in which existing rulers would vanish and others would seize their opportunity. When regents were being appointed, 
aristocratic origins would appear to have been less important than being on good terms with the new Susuhunan. Again, we see the key 
role played in the Javanese state by personal relations.” See Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 44; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol.II: 132-
133. 
56 Bertrand, L’Histoire à Parts: 426-428; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 55. 
57 The Sunan sent the letter after possibly being advised to do so by Tumĕnggung Martalaja. This title was worn by a Balinese commander 
too: Tumĕnggung Djaja-Lelana. Amangkurat II instructed the lords of Madiun and Wira-Saba (Madja-Agung) to join the Makassarese. See 
De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 22 and 68. 
58 See C. Speelman, “Letter XXIII (10 July, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 123 and De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 18-19. 
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Picture 4 Sultan Agung’s army attacking Batavia in 1628. Notice the murders within the Mataramese camp in the bottom 
right corner as well as the tent encampments. Sieges were organized, but troubled by inefficient provision lines and 
limited tactics for attacking the cities. 59 
 
Consequently, elaborate plans for the battle grounds were rare. Similarly, the armies on Java 
seemed more like clustered groups of war-bands rather than uniform companies of troops. Each 
commander could calls his own shots and pick his own routes; with his followers trailing behind. 
Consequently, massive field battles were rare compared to the skirmishes of one warlord versus 
another. In rage, small groups faced each other. Nagtegaal goes as far as claiming the leaders and 
nobles were the only ones motivated to fight: “when the leader died or surrendered the battle was 
almost always over, and everyone went home”.60 Besides some scarce references to Hurdt’s 
campaign, however, his conclusion seems without foundation. And even if command could quickly 
evaporate in battle, intricate unions and hierarchies did exist during its prologue. The extensive 
exercise of mustering and moving troops evidence this.  
In fact, battlegrounds were not all that important to begin with. Sieging towns was what 
really mattered. Once a larger settlement was captured, the surrounding region could often be 
claimed too. Aiming to conquer the enclosing fields would be a task burdened by “an evaporating 
rural population” -fleeing to the forest before the first shots were fired- and requiring more 
manpower than warlords could grant. When victorious, aggressors seized and subjected a town by 
capturing or resettling some of the inhabitants, installing new leaders and even tearing down its 
                                                          
59 Aart Dircksz Oossaan, Sander Wybrants and anonymous (after 1680), “Belegering van Batavia door de sultan van Mataram.” The Hague: 
Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 511 K 23: 358 (accessed via http://www.atlasofmutualheritage.nl/nl/object/?id=6775, on 24-03-2014) 
60 Remmelink gives an analysis on these arbitrary assignments in his account on chaos leading to the Chinese War. See Nagtegaal, Riding 
the Dutch: 59 and 63; and Remmelink, Chinese War: 20-21.  
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walls. Fortification was crucial to avoid this or achieve a stronger position to negotiate terms of 
surrender.61 
The Javanese had a long tradition of constructing defences, one that Ricklefs would not judge 
inferior to that of the Europeans. Towns with brick walls, wooden fortifications, temporary stockades, 
trench works, moats and stakes existed for a long time on the island. The forts (benteng) generally 
had palisades or mud walls and several outworks; usually palisaded areas (pagar). The stronger 
European firearms did urge adaptations of course, but minor alterations in the defence works usually 
sufficed.62 Constructing fortifications was demanding, however, and needed to be schemed out by 
leaders.  
The attack on strongholds had its methods too. Charney recognizes two common ways of 
assaulting a besieged fortification:  a noisy and a quiet one. If confidence grew high, the army “would 
announce their impending assault with cannonades, yelling, the beating of drums, gongs” as to 
“terrorize the enemy into submission or weaken their resolve in their defence”. The quiet one 
instead attested fear and involved careful approaches usually mantled by night or thunderstorms.63 
But for truly understanding the assault, you need to look beyond the siege itself.  
There is a preamble that greatly affected the anticipations of any army. That is, the transport 
and march towards the enemy. In bad times, half of the army could perish before any offence 
occurred. Keeping up provision lines was thus crucial. Carriers made up a large part of the warforce, 
and soldiers could not do without carts, oxen and buffalos.64 Both helped carry food, cannons and 
ammunition; a task requiring no particular training as it was similar to agricultural work. Only the 
heavy artillery could be tricky to transport; demanding robust carts and healthy draught animals. 
The speed of carts pulled by buffalos, or pedati, can be judged around 3.22 kilometres an 
hour and sixteen kilometres a day. Lagging carriers were thus a common issue, exposing them to 
attacks. To stay safe, moving as part of a caravan was critical. Without any shared protection, the 
baggage train would turn into a sauntering target for bandits and hostile warriors.65 The restricted 
amount of routes made ambushes easy to arrange. Warlords thus needed to give careful thought on 
the arrangements of transportation.  
                                                          
61 When strong fortifications would prolong a siege for a long time, chances were that the monsoon and sickness would scatter the enemy. 
Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 73 and 78.  
62 Such alterations also included the protected positions for firing the muskets of the besieged themselves. See Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 
65-67; and Ricklefs, War, Economy: 131. 
63 I do not argue for a common Southeast Asian wat of warfare here, but these observations were largely based on Javanese cases. Charney 
stresses how “the Javanese launched [the noisy] kind of assault against Batavia in 1628 and 1629, as well as at Kediri in 1678 and against 
the Makassarese in 1679”. See Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 101; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol II: 135-139. 
64 Sultan Agung, for instance, used eight thousand carts for his 1624 campaign. The carts tended to be slaw wheeled and entirely made out 
of organic materials. See Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare; 207-210 ; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II, 131 and 139 
65 Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 207 and 211; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol II: 128 and 130. 
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On Java, certain roads and waterways were used time after time and became the main 
arteries of military mobility. The lack of bridges and the limited mountain passages restricted the 
itineraries. Blocking these routes by felling trees was an effective way to obstruct the opponent’s 
baggage train. Cutting crops and damming rivers were tactics too. Sultan Agung, for instance, 
ordered thousands of men to “to destroy the crops and produce in the fields and to despoil the land” 
of Surabaya. 66 But the despoilers needed to be careful not to cut their own resources as well. In dire 
straits, wasted fields could have served their own needs. For both sides were often vulnerable to 
famines, particularly during the rainy season.  
Avoiding the monsoon was hence crucial to keep the supplies running and the army 
marching. The rain season was capable of bringing the most persistent troops to a standstill. Mobility 
and communication were hardly possible in the mud, floods and erosion that heavy downfalls would 
bring. Not to mention the inevitable desertion when farmers felt the urge to plough and sow rather 
than kill and conquer. War campaigns were therefore planned in the dry months, usually from March 
till June, and September till December. In addition, larger armies favoured camping during the night 
to avoid nocturnal dangers like wild animals and obscure trails. Military advances were thus equally a 
fight against time and for nutrition. Trunajaya only truly caved in when scarcity obligated him to 
request food from his enemy.67 
At first sight, Mataram had a more efficient distribution system offered basic food and 
apparel supplies. But even the Sunan’s provisions frequently ran out.68 In those cases, soldiers were 
to live off the land. Both food and women were hunted for; foreign auxiliaries were especially 
notorious for their raids. During the 1670s, fear spread among Javanese peasants for the Balinese, 
Bugis, Madurese and Makassarese warriors serving either the VOC and the Sunan or Trunajaya. 
Robbing and burning down villages almost became a habit for them. Naturally, this tendency spelled 
disaster for many villagers. Houses were demolished, fields pilfered and families torn apart. The 
destruction in the shadow of marching armies was in itself an important component of drafting new 
forces. Desperate farmers and peasants could opt for the military as a final resort.69 
                                                          
66 In fact, setting out the routes traveled by certain war-bands will offer an important understanding of regional associations and abilities to 
attract troops from different places. As Schrieke understands it, the Javanese landscape offered similar geographical obstacles for most 
centuries before the technological revolutions of the modern age. Bridges, for example, were seemingly absent; ferries being likely used to 
cross rivers. In his perspective, this contributed to a “repetitative history” which does not “of course imply uniformity, as influences from 
outside have varied in both intensity and nature”. Roads could be “specially prepared beforehand” if the occasion called for it, making it 
easier to convey carriers. See Schrieke, Sociological  Studies vol. II: 100,  102-120, 132, 134-135, 146-147 and 153-229 . 
67 Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 210;  De Graaf, “Gevangenneming”; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 129.   
68 Notice that during the eighteenth century, Mataram was no longer paying its indigenous warriors directly. See Remmelink, The Chinese 
War: 19. 
69 Schrieke asserted that “war on any appreciable scale was for the Javanese an economic catastrophe”. See Charney, Southeast Asian 
Warfare: 190, 214, and 216-221; Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 60; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 129-130 and 143. 
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Local leaders could incite them to do so. Indeed, rousing ones people to war would usually 
establish the community leader as a warlord.70 But only few warlords had access to skilled soldiers; 
most subjects were porters instead. For Mataram, the military workforce can divided between the 
service, free and royal service populations. The first tended to be subjected to local rulers, the 
second less so and the latter were primarily accountable to the court and often provided restricted 
knowledge on weaponry and tactics.71 To bring such men under a single martial banner did require 
leadership skills that Nagtegaal overlooks when merely considering events on the battleground.  
The most valued warriors could be found among the royal service populations. Due to the 
high court demand for them, they were enabled to get thoroughly involved with politics. To fight was 
their most striking task, nonetheless. In fact, success on the battlefield usually was a chief 
requirement for achieving titles and courtly positions.72 Amidst the royal servicemen were the true 
prajurit or soldiers; disciplined, trained and experienced. The elite guards consisted out of these men. 
Not only did they protect the Sunan or central warlord, they equally were the core fighting force 
during battles; the ones engaging first and often exclusively.73 
Yet, nobles outside the capital were able to retract such skilled royal servicemen, decreasing 
the court’s revenue base and disturbing the balance of power. The same went for peasant levies; 
most of whom belonged “to noble-men or rich merchants” prior to Sultan Agung’s conquest. But 
even during the rule of Agung’s son and grandson, peasants still needed to be forcefully pulled from 
the farming fields onto those of battles. Thereby, the personal resources of local rulers were tapped 
into and seriously damaged in case of heavy losses. Hence, resistance against conscription as well as 
sudden desertion was common.74 
To hinder the nobles from detracting forces, rudimentary censuses and service lists were 
introduced to conscribe peasant levies. Amangkurat I composed one in 1651, for instance. Large 
parts of the population were drafted in this matter, even when the chaos of war disrupted the 
administration. Sultan Agung is stated to have armed ninety percent of his subjects against Batavia in 
1621. Halfway the century, Mataram’s army levelled between 150.000 and 300.000 men, and was 
claimed by Van Goens to potentially assemble 920.000.75 Such exaggerations illustrate how European 
                                                          
70 This of course depended on whether the leader himself would take soldiers to battle.  
71 Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 214-216. 
72 Bertrand, État Colonial: 73. 
73 Given their leading role in engagements the elite guards were the only soldiers that did wear a uniform. Military parades in modern 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta still give an impression of how these clothes looked like. See J. Groneman, De Garebeg's te Ngajogykarta (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1895). See further Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch Tiger: 61; and Remmelink, The Chinese War: 20.  
74 Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 214-216, 220, and 20; Remmelink, The Chinese War: 19; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 128 
and 147.  
75 See Ricklefs for a background on Amangkurat I’s census, which has now unfortunately been lost. These surveys were also conducted for 
gathering taxes; hence taxation units of cacahs, consisting out of a certain number of household, were used.  See M.C. Ricklefs, “Some 
Statistical Evidence on Javanese. Social, Economic and Demographic. History in the Later Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” Modern 
Asia Studies 20, no.1 (1986): 1-32; Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 46-50,  and 59-64; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 129 and 138-
139. 
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observers tended to overestimate the size of Asian armies.  As Charney shows, however, Southeast 
Asian leaders themselves equally spread hyperboles to increase their status or decrease the one of a 
competitor.76 The fact remains that the Javanese peasant warriors far outnumbered the VOC soldiers.  
Charney calls the high amount of these “low value” peasant warriors “a major problem facing 
early modern Southeast Asian courts”. In his mind, they would suffice best as porters, and indeed 
that was their chief function on Java. Moreover, they boosted military power by their mere presence, 
for the “rule of the thumb” was: ”the larger the size of the army, as opposed to training or other 
factors, the greater the likelihood of a successful outcome of a military campaign”. But when relying 
on peasant conscripts, sizes could easily fluctuate. Desertion and looting notoriously hindered 
Javanese armies and the arms and training provided to peasants by a ruler could easily turn against 
him when alliances shifted.77 
 Mercenaries tended to be more trustworthy, and better trained plus equipped at that. Dutch, 
British, Portuguese, Turkish, Malabari, Acehnese, Bugis, Balinese, Madurese, and Makassarese 
soldiers or captives were all made use of. As uniforms were not worn in this era, the ethnic markers 
of these groups functioned as the means to distinguish them. Being foreigners, they were not 
entangled in court politics, and thus no direct competitors to Javanese rule. At the same time, a rebel 
leader would have fewer fears for them claiming the lands he tried to conquer. In most cases, looting 
appeared more important than dominating to these outsiders. At the same time, they had no 
compulsion to pay due respects to leaders other than receiving their payment. Conversely, the ruler 
could get financially indebted since the expenses of mercenaries far outweighed those of peasant 
levies.78 
No matter the wages, all warriors were exposed to elaborate oaths and rituals used to ensure 
their loyalty. As Raffles tells, even the summoning of ancestor spirits was resorted to.79 Equally 
important was boosting bravery. Especially the elite warriors were expected to fight till death follows. 
To make sure they would, banners, spells of invulnerability or –equally effective- opium were of great 
use. Attacking with ‘iron’ to spill ‘blood’ involved mystical instigation; and battle tactics thus had a 
spiritual coating. All these stimulants were noticed and described by the Dutch.  
                                                          
76 He also claims that “from the 1630s, however, as Europeans became more knowledgeable about Southeast Asia and its demographic 
resources and as the intense warfare of the sixteenth century gave way to a more docile period, estimates of Southeast Asian armies 
became more modest” (p.217). Naturally, he refers mainly to the Iberian forces here. See M. Charney, “A Reassessment of Hyperbolic 
Military Statistics in Some Early Modern Burmese Texts.”Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 46, no. 2 (2003): 193-214; 
and idem., Southeast Asian Warfare: 217. 
77 Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 218-220; Remmelink, The Chinese War: 19 and 118; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 128. 
78 Remmelink, The Chinese War: 20; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 124. 
79 Charney claims: “[p]rior to the rise of nationalism in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asians generally fought either in the interests of their 
village or for their patron, either a local lord or the king. The oath was a means of emphasizing these bonds before entering battle.“ See 
Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare, 9; and Raffles, The History of Java vol. II: clxxxv and 817. 
War-bands on Java 26 
 
Trunajaya was said to have a banner depicting “a strange figure regarding whom he had 
misled his people with many fabulous stories”. It contained “an ancient flag, on which (…) was 
depicted a strange human form with strange limbs, standing with an uprooted tree in his hand, the 
which is explained by some experienced natives as representing the first conqueror of this island of 
Java. According to information procured, Trunajaya has some time since audaciously claimed this 
honour for himself, hence his adaptation of such a flag“.80 
But these flags not only boosted the ego of the warlord; they equally uplifted his followers. 
Almost all troops the VOC encountered -Makassarese, Mataramese, Madurese- carried them. Spells 
served a similar purpose. Sultan Agung was even said to have seven thousand men “impervious to 
shot or thrust” among the army of thirty thousand he gathered in 1624.81 Chants like these made 
sure warriors would stick to the fight despite the absence of strict battle orders. In the heat of the 
encounter, command appeared given by the senses as much as overseers; running amok was desired 
over standing in line. 
Vicious bloodshed was aroused among the elite soldiers; a fact not always recognized by the 
European observers. Foreigners “frequently underestimated” the violent nature of the ‘indigenous 
warfare’. In contrast to the “labour-scarcity” argument of Reid -supposing limited casualties due to a 
general anxiety on the lack of population- Charney poses “killing and death” stood at the core of all 
Southeast Asian warfare.82 The term ‘Southeast Asian warfare’ is controversial, but the the degree to 
which bloodletting occurred on Java needs to be considered. The weapons and tactics –implicit as 
they might be- used tell much about the ways in which warlords could put their men and 
preparations to mortal use, or conversely avoid fatal encounters. 
Two sorts of weaponry can be distinguished; that belonging to individual soldiers, and that 
monopolized by the state. The former often consisted out of tools equally used in times of peace. 
Most non-gunpowder weaponry was accessible to a larger audience. Spears, pikes and lances were 
most common. Pires already observed in 1515 that “every man in Java, rich or poor” had a lance in 
his house.83 They were primarily used in hand-to-hand fighting rather than throwing. The javelin did 
serve that purpose. For protection, light leather shields seemed to be popular, although elite soldiers 
often wore chainmail or bronze armour. Trunajaya’s cavalry at Kediri was, for instance, armoured in 
these meshes of small metal rings.84 
                                                          
80 C. Speelman, “Letter XXI (14 June 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 120; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 125-127. 
81 The quote is from Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 125-127 and131-133. See also Raffles, History of Java vol. II: 298. 
82 Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 18  and 21. 
83 Tomé Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires: An Account of the East, From the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 1512-
1515 vol. I (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944): 179. 
84 There is unclearity about the armour, since they appeared to be used fighting neighbours more than European companies, hence 
accounts on them are scarce. Bows and arrows were not used in the seventeenth century Java.  For an impression of these weapons 
consult Raffles, who made illustrations of them from the early nineteenth century: Raffles, History of Java. See L. Andaya, The Heritage of 
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Most famous is of course the kris, which was an object of honour. All Javanese were 
expected to carry one. Pires wrote “every man in Java, whether he is rich or poor, must have a kris in 
his house, (…) and no man between the ages of twelve and eighty may go out of doors without a kris 
in his belt”. A married man was even required to wear three of them: as tokens of kinship, ancestry, 
and family-in-law. Nobles, moreover, limited elaborate decorations of sheath and weapon to their 
class. Even though widely spread, the kris thus still indicated status differences.85 
 Firearms were most exclusive, however. China being the birth ground of gunpowder, 
merchants had already introduced guns long before the seventeenth century. Cannons had become 
the symbol of mystical power, often being constructed -not even casted- with impractical large sizes. 
But the blasts or mere appearance of these enormous cannons could shiver the enemy to retreat. 
Small arms equally served claims to rule; gunfire marking special religious celebrations, ascendancy 
to the throne, or salutes to honoured visitors. Sometimes they were even considered lingam: a 
phallic symbol of manly capabilities.86 
 The distribution of guns among Trunajaya’s troops seems to have been arranged by every 
warlord separately. But within Mataram, firearms were centrally circulated. They were stored in the 
royal arsenals, to be taken out in times of war. The size of the armouries must have been extensive. 
In 1624, Mataram armed more than four thousand musketeers. Halfway the century, about thirteen 
percent of the army operated guns. Limiting the availability of firearms to soldiers on campaign did 
discourage the training of marksmanship. In times of peace, no shots could be practiced. This led 
some staff members of the VOC to doubt their “dexterity in the use of Muskets”.87 
 Dexterity was certainly not lacking when it came to using animals. The handling of elephants 
and horses left outsiders impressed. Yet, the former was gradually abandoned in the seventeenth 
century; wild elephant herds apparently becoming rarer and rarer on the island. The associations 
with royal power did remain; Amangkurat II even appeared to have considered his lost elephant as 
some kind of regalia. Horses enjoyed an elevated status too. War, hunting and tournaments were 
their domain, not agriculture.88 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981):387-8; Anderson, 
“The Idea of Power”; Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 23-42 Ricklefs, War, Culture: 13-4; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 122, 
125, 127, 213; and 405. 
85 G. B. Gardner, Keris and Other Malay Weapons (Singapore: Progressive  Publishing Co., 1936): 121; F. Noor, “From Majapahit to 
Putrajaya:  the  Kris as  a  Symptom of  Civilizational Developm ent  and  Decline.” South East Asia Research 8, no. 3 (2006): 239–279 and 
Pires, The Suma Oriental: 179. 
86 The European matchlock technology was quickly adapted in local foundries, although accustomation slowed down in the course of the 
seventeenth century. European captives were also used to gather instructions on artillery. See Charney, Southeast Asia: 42, 51-56; C.A. 
Gibson-Hill “Notes on the Old Cannon found in Malaya, and Known to be of Dutch Origin.” Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society 26.1 (1953): 152-153; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 124. 
87 This quote derives from Willem Lodewycksz. See Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 123-124, 127, 129, and 131. 
88 Unlike tigers, leopards and buffalos, the elephant was no longer used in the tournaments at the kraton either. The few remaining boars 
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elephant. Peter Boomgaard, Frontiers of Fear: Tigers and People In the Malay World, 1600-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): 
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 Horsemanship was a noble trait and reserved for elite guards. Etiquettes existed; allowing 
skills and bravery to shine through and determine victory. Such unwritten rules led to a great 
deception when facing the VOC, who could not care less about them. But the Europeans were left in 
awe from time to time. One VOC man convinced himself the Javanese only fought on horseback. 
Others were just overwhelmed by the sheer number of them. During the campaign of the late 1670s, 
large units of cavalry were often encountered. Trunajaya used hundreds of riders during the siege of 
Kediri.89 
 The horses available in the archipelago were not ideal for war. The prime stocks of them 
were of Tibetan, Mongol and similar breeds; resulting in short ponies rather than combative stallions. 
Other types of horses were highly requested. Van Goens experienced the pronounced demand for 
Persian stocks first-hand when the Sunan suggested sending some of his courtiers to pick out ‘proper’ 
ones.90 The indigenous ponies were put to good use too, however. First, they were valuable for 
communication and intelligence gathering. But most importantly, they were skilfully put to fight. 
When it came down to it, Javanese horses could be just as lethal as Persian ones. An 
eyewitness tells us how these “fine horsemen (…) have both hands at their disposal, as they guide 
the horse with their knees and body. Around their waists they wear a girdle on the front part which is 
fixed a copper hook, in which they fasten the rein, so that they keep both hands free, manipulating 
the long pike … so cleverly that anyone who had never seen it before would be astonished“. When 
put to charge, great damage could be done by these riders. If fortunate, a deadly strike of confusion, 
velocity and mobility bashed through infantry, tearing soldiers and porters apart and chasing the 
men in retreat.91 
Naval warfare was conducted as well. And halfway the 1670s, Mataram did order one large 
warship for every one-thousand coastal residents. These ships could be used to transport armies or 
block ports. Nonetheless, the realm’s rule over the waves was insignificant. Mataram was an insular 
power not an archipelagic one. Even in 1615, Mataram was claimed to have “no power at sea. [The 
ruler] is very mighty on land and has excellent means and materials for constructing fine galleys, but 
he lacks seamen”. Sultan Agung’s bloody campaigns in the Pasisir would only have decreased the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
naar de Binnenlanden van Java. Sept.-dec. 1678 volgens het journaal van Johan Jurgen Briel,  secretaris, ed. De Graaf (Amsterdam: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971): 128.  
89 Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 122 and 131. 
90 R. Van Goens, De Vijf Gezantschappen van Rijklof van Goens naar het Hof van Mataram 1648-1654, ed. H.J. de Graaf (The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1956): 57. Notice that the supply of Arabian and Persian horses appears to have declined halfway the seventeenth 
century. The reasons for this are not yet clear. See Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare: 182-183. 
91 The characteristics of the horses mentioned make it highly likely these horses were Javanese. See Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 
132.  
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amount of competent sailors further by its heavy tolls on sailors. Large scale naval actions halted 
completely after 1676, leaving the deep waters to European hegemony.92 
 
 
Picture 5 Imaginative engraving from Wouter Schouten’s ‘Oost-Indische voyagie’ depicting a battle between the Sunan of 
Mataram and ‘his enemies’. Interestingly, it was made near Haarlem in 1676, just before the inland campaigns of Hurdt 
started. The close cooperation between the Mataramese and VOC army would soon demonstrate elephants, bows and 
arrows were no longer used in the late seventeenth century and, most importantly, that the ‘Javanese’ sooner fought in 
small war-bands than massive phalanxes as shown here. 93 
                                                          
92 The quote derives from Coen. See ibid.: 139-141.  
93 Notice that archery came back after the seventeenth century, as is evident from Raffles’s drawings. “Gevecht tussen de sousouhounan 
van Mataram en zijn vijanden” In Oost-Indische Voyagie: Vervattende voorname voorvallen en bloedige zee- en landt gevechten tegen de 
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b. VOC warfare 
While the VOC was mighty on the waves, it could not dominate the Javanese hinterland. Therefore, it 
needed to adapt to the patterns of warfare discussed above. It partly had to become an “Asian 
Company”, depending on the “brawn and loyalty of men and women with an Asian descent”. Similar 
to the Asian warlords, huddling manpower proved important for the VOC. But, it took a while before 
a firm base of alliances was built up. First, the VOC systemized its own pool of warriors under 
contract. Secondly, a reputation needed to be established to access a stable flow of allies and 
mercenaries. Only the former warforce was truly impelled by conscription and resembled the 
privatized armies in early modern Europe. 94 
These conscribed warriors inclined to be non-Javanese. Common monikers included 
Ambonese, Balinese, Buginese plus the ambiguous ‘Mardijkers’ and ‘Malayans’.95 Raben suggests 
they tended to be lured from enemy troops around the archipelago. Everyone was welcome, 
although at times certain groups like the ‘Buginese’ were refused entry.96 The divergent body of 
warriors became settled in Batavia and formed a single Asian legion of the VOC army; a pattern no 
different from other “Asian cities”. No strict segregation between these groups existed. Formally, the 
kampongs or quarters near Batavia were assigned to residents with homogenous backgrounds, but 
they soon became ethnically mixed. It appears personal attraction of commanders motivated 
individual soldiers to assemble in their quarters. The administrative ethnic classifiers used for these 
troops and their commanders were hiding their hybrid nature. The Bugis mingled with the Ambonese, 
the Makassarese with the Balinese and so on.97 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Portugeezen en Makassaren 1658-1665 Derde Boeck , Wouter Schouten (Amsterdam: Jacob Meurs, 1676): 142. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, 
RP-P-OB-47-479 . 
94 Anthony van Diemen was influential in constituting this Asian legion. Raben “roughly” categorizes three types of Asian troops: the regular 
VOC soldiers (i.e. The Asian legion), the warriors of allies, and the gangs that joined during the campaigns. The difference between the 
second and third is very ambiguous, however. Raben claims the allies to mingle more with VOC troops than the gangs. But this overlooks 
that the troops of the allies were often constituted out of these gangs; some of them simply entered later during the campaign.  Moreover, 
his statements suggest a growing administrative control over the alliances: “Geheel eigen aan het rationele doel van haar expansie, poogde 
de Compagnie na verloop van tijd om het aanbod van reservetroepen te systematiseren”. He overlooks, however, the increasing 
dependence on rather autonomous troops outside Batavia. See D. De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen onder de Oostindische Compagnie (The Hague: 
W.P. van Stockum, 1950): 53- 56 and 61-78; and R. Raben, “Het Aziatisch legioen Huurlingen, bondgenoten en reservisten in het geweer 
voor de  Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie.” In De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie, eds. Gerrit Knaap 
en Ger Teitler (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002): 181, 185, and 197. For the “public-private partnerships” shaping early modern European armies, 
see Parrott, The Business of War. 
95 ‘Papangers’ or papanggo was also used to refer to Mardijkers, a group that might only have existed in an administrative sense. It is to be 
questioned whether a community of Mardijkers was ever formed at all. Instead, it could have been fragmented in groups like the 
papanggo. De Iongh claims the Malayans to primarily come from Gedong and Panjang. See De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 77; and Parakitri 
Tahi Simbolon, Menjadi Indonesia (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2007): 462. 
96 Raben writes: “Na een overwinning trachtte zij de krijgsheren van de voormalige vijand aan zich te verbinden. Aangezien in vele delen 
van Azië relaties tussen mensen en gemeenschappen in een hiërarchisch verband worden gebracht, betekende onderwerping ook het 
aangaan van een nieuwe loyaliteit.” De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 76-77; and Raben, Het Aziatisch:  189 and 191.  
97 Raben underlines the organization needed to operate the Asian legion : “[h]oe eenvoudig het ook lijkt, het vergde een aanzienlijke 
organisatie om duizenden reservesaidaten paraat te houden om op ieder gewenst ogenblik naar het strijdtoneel  op welke plaats in Azië 
dan ook te zenden. De VOC liet ook hier zien dat zij de heersende omstandigheden naar haar hand kon zetten”. A decree was made in 1688 
to pen down the system; the simplified ethnic classification was strongly present in it. De Iongh had a different view on the homogenizing 
effect of VOC policies. See De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 65-68; and Raben, Het Aziatisch legioen: 184-185 and 192-196.  
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 During campaigns, the Supreme Government of Batavia purposefully mixed troops abiding to 
different warlords and with different ethnicities. This was to avoid dominant single-minded army 
sections that could resist European rule. Furthermore, combining warriors with different skills under 
separate warlords increased the overall military strength. In due time, the VOC relied more on the 
Asian martial power than that of their European soldiers. While essential to the Company’s troops, 
the Asian legion still held an inferior position. There usually got lower wages and were put under 
temporary contracts. Therefore, they needed to work the Batavian lands in times of peace. However 
victorious a campaign might have been, on return the soldiers were left plowing to put bread on 
their tables and a shelter over their head.98 
This increased the tension within a community that was already upset by war traumas. In fact, 
Raben is not surprised by the amount of thugs, gangs and jagos springing from the legion.99 Besides 
wages, training was also lacking. The VOC hardly provided firearms to its Asian troops, let alone 
gunpowder to practice with. Moreover, Maurice of Nassau’s famous armament and drill were not 
applied to these warriors. The Asian and European troops therefore remained in “separate worlds” 
and kept operating differently. The former were storm-troops used for “hit and run” attacks, usually 
operating from the flanks. Their tactical use was mainly due to their “manoeuvrability and fanatical 
effort”.100 
It was only halfway the eighteenth century that modernization of the military management 
occurred. At that point, the Company finally made efforts to integrate its Asian army section and 
thereby increase its efficiency and discipline. However, the European soldiers also needed fixing. In 
the previous one and a half century their low quality had often been stressed by VOC officials. Their 
clothing, obedience and skills were all complained about. Military clothes -not uniforms- had to be 
brought along, or bought in the expensive VOC store. Under such conditions, soldiers marching 
shoeless were not uncommon. Provision was very scarce too; consisting of rice and kanjang. Order 
did not always prevail and desertion occurred frequently.101 
Worst of all, however, the European soldiers were not known as good marksmen either and 
at times lacked up to date equipment. What is more, their battle tactics were not adapted to dense 
                                                          
98 Raben, Het Aziatisch: 184-186 and 192-198. 
99 Raben states: “[h]et voortdurende komen en gaan van de soldaten, de psychische en sociale effecten van voortdurende ranseling en 
oorlogsvoering leidden tot ontregelmg van de sociale cohesie. Het is niet verwonderlijk dat zich uit de militaire kringen allerlei boeven en 
boefjes, bendeleiders en jago (vechtersbazen) ontwikkelden, die een gevaar vormden voor de rust en orde in de landen rondom Batavia.” 
See ibid.: 184-186, 192-198. 
100 Ibid.: 183, and 197-199; and Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 67-68. 
101 Desertion did seem to be much rarer among European company troops. Nagtegaal asserts their chances of survival would have been 
very low; unlike the Javanese they did not enjoy any family protection. See De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 80-88; Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 
68; and Raben, Het Aziatisch: 183-184 and 202-204. 
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forests, but open fields.102 Still, their ability to form lines and deliver volley fire did make them much 
more efficient spearheads. The interlocking shots produced by two rows of soldiers swapping place 
after every salvo -from sitting and loading, to standing and shooting- broke through many Javanese 
frontlines.103 European soldiers were even judged invincible by the Javanese at some points. 
Remmelink seemingly agrees with this, pointing at a superior European tradition of soldiery based on 
fighting oneself to death. The ‘primitive warfare’ of Javanese ‘warriors’ was instead centred on 
fleeing and therefore deemed to suffer defeat.104 Be this as it may, the Company’s military service 
came into high demand by the Sunans, his subordinates and his opponents.  
While signing alliance with the VOC, Amangkurat I addresses them as “those who have many 
weapons, that are feared by their enemies”.105 Those weapons went beyond guns, cannons and 
swords; it was a style of warring adapted to local circumstances. Not only were the Europeans drilled 
better, they were equally familiar with crucial tactics in Javanese warfare as sieges.106 Moreover, 
after the 1650s they increasingly tried to regulate their Asian alliances through control over 
indigenous troops outside the Asian legion; to incorporate sections of pejuang effectively. Their 
reputation allowed access to a ‘stable flow’ of war-bands in Java, Timor, Sulawesi and the 
Moluccas.107 Due to these factors, the VOC-servants have been depicted as “ultimate arbiters of 
insoluble disputes”.108 
                                                          
102 See for instance the complaints on the Makassarese hit and run techniques in and out of forests, while the VOC could not leave their 
turf. Concerning the equipment: flintlocks were introduced relatively late for instance. See Speelman, “Letter XXI”: 121; and De Iongh, Het 
Krijgswezen: 88-96. 
103 Volley fire developed in the Dutch Republic in the early seventeenth century and replaced the tercio lines; a square formation using 
both pike men and musketeers. Gustavus Adolphus used it brilliantly during the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 by letting his lines fire 
together; rousing a lot of fear among his opponent. This tactic slowly found its way to Java, where it was more difficult to apply due to the 
limited amount of open field battles and lacking availability of flintlocks. See De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 15, 22, and 114; and G. Parker, The 
Thirty Years' War (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).  
104 Remmelink not only distinguishes the European soldiers from the Javanese peasants, but equally from the Asian mercenaries and the 
skilled royal prajurit warriors. Soldiers and warriors are essentially different, he states. He suggests soldiery to be a European tradition 
going back to the “Greek phalanx and the Roman legion” and based on “hand-to-hand combat, the final battle, and fighting till the last man 
stands”. The prajurit instead derives from what Keegan calls “primitive warfare” centring on natural barriers or fortifications which left 
plenty of room for escape. Fighting oneself to death was not expected. The only tradition I can recognize here is one of Orientalism 
affecting the Dutch historian, not one of European or Javanese soldiery. See De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 114; Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 
67; Raben, Het Aziatisch: 183-184, and 202-204; Remmelink, De Worsteling om Java: 339; and M.C. Ricklefs, “De Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie en de Gewelddadige Wereld van het Vroegmoderne Azië.” In De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie” In De Verenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie: Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie, eds. Gerrit Knaap en Ger Teitler (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002): 370-373.  
105 The quote is translated from: “die veel wapenen hebben, die door haar vyanden ge vreest werden”. See Amangkurat II, “Letter XVI (25 
March, 1677); Translaat van den brieft' door den Sousouhounan Mataram aen d'h' admiraal Cornelis Speelman Geschreven.” In De 
Opkomst Van:  114-115. 
106 As De Iongh claims: “[n]og steeds culmineerde het krijgsgebeuren dier dagen in het al of niet bezit van en den strijd om versterkte 
steden en plaatsen. Zoo was het in Europa en zoo zien wij het dan ook in Oost-Azië.” The inclination to caravans appears similar to the 
Javanese one too: the Babad Tanah Jawi describes how the Company’s troops marched in step (sapangkat-pangkat). In other words; they 
had a snail’s pace likely due to pulling many carts with them. See De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 12; and  W.L. Olthof, Babad Tanah Jawi vol. II 
(Leiden: KITLV, 1941): 191. 
107 Andaya, The Heritage of  Palakka; H. Hägerdal, Lords of the Land, Lords of the Sea (Leiden: KILTV, 2012); and  S. Widjojo, The Revolt of 
Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-making in Maluku, C.1780-1810  (Leiden: Brill,  2008 ): 1-46. 
108 The controversial underlying assertion being that the Javanese were stuck in endemic violence to be resolved by an outside force. See D. 
Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-king: Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere.” Modern Asian Studies 39, 
no. 1 (2004): 85–144; and M. Ricklefs Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi  1749– 1792: a History of the Division of Java (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1974): 420-421.  
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The Javanese, however, sooner perceived them as mercenaries than arbiters. Mataram 
remained the sovereign seat of power, be it one crumbling apart. For the Sunan, relying on 
Europeans proved a double-edged sword; the dependence on foreign troops to settle inland issues 
raised questions on the legitimacy of the Sunan. It equally undermined his divide and rule politics; 
including the bestowal of office or local ruling positions. Indirectly, calling in the VOC summoned new 
conflicts in itself.109 
Yet, the Company was blind to the catalysing effects of their own interventions. In Nagtegaal’s 
opinion, the eventual failure to reap benefits from these campaigns had to do with the unreasonable 
expectation that the Sunan could easily step back to power. The Oriental stereotype of a “powerful 
Eastern despot” fed the misperception of a temporary chaos. Trunajaya was taken as just an unruly 
vassal to be put to check. This mind-set changed when the Madurese managed to muster many 
forces a month after the VOC interference started. The Mataramese periphery gave way much easier 
than the Company expected. In consequence, the extensive authority of the Sunan was put to doubt 
and neutrality became aimed for.110 
According to Nagtegaal, this simply resulted in a denunciation of the Susuhunan’s personality 
rather than recognition of the decentralized nature of the realm. He goes even further, however. The 
patih or bupati, i.e. the central administrators and regents, of the king supposedly came to be 
considered as the cunning and dangerous stooges of the Sunan. Unlike their leader they were 
capable of hindering the Company. All in all, this made the court a despised place; “an attitude that 
stemmed from the widespread distaste for monarchies in the Republic”.111 
Nagtegaal overlooks the varying perceptions on courtiers and regents. They both differed from 
one VOC servant to the other and while considering distinct Javanese rulers. The author makes the 
routine mistake of assuming an all-prevalent Orientalism among the European outsiders, thereby 
stereotyping the ‘stereotypers’. Based on a handful of letters he draws conclusions that do not seem 
granted for. The Batavian governors viewed matters differently from their men in the field. As will be 
shown in chapter four, careful analysis of individual VOC-servants shows opinions to be not so much 
settled a priori as to develop during interactions with the Javanese.112 
                                                          
109 K. H.Kian, “How Strangers became King.” Indonesia and the Malay World 36, no.105 (2008): 293-307; Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 69; W. 
Remmelink, “Expansion Without Design; The Snare of Javanese Politics.” In India and Indonesia during the Ancien Regime; Comparative 
History of India and Indonesia vol. III, eds. P.J. Marshall et al. (Leiden; Brill, 1989): 111-128; and Ricklefs, De Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie: 369. 
110 Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 22 and 28-30.  
111 Note that Nagtegaal starts his book with a discussion on the period directly after Trunajaya’s revolt and only later turns to the 
eighteenth century. His statements do thus certainly concern the period treated here, he writes: “[t]he VOC saw the Susuhunan as 
surrounded by bad counselors, minions, Moorish 'priests' and other disreputable characters. In such company the sovereign could not 
possibly arrive at the measured decisions that were needed”  (p.22). The resulting vision is claimed to affect the current historiographical 
view on the Javanese state. See ibid.: 22 and 28-30. 
112 A similar error is made when stating that “[t]he Dutch were only too aware of the impossibility of gaining any military victories on their 
own. Without sufficient Javanese allies they would not even venture into inland regions.” It remains to be wondered who ‘the Dutch’ and 
‘Javanese’ referred to are in this case. See ibid.: 67. 
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 But even the Batavian Supreme Government did not hold a single perspective. Larger shifts in 
policy determined how the Sunan and his mandala would be framed. Clashes with the Company 
abounded. The treaties signed between these different parties were a source of misunderstanding. 
The VOC approached them as contracts; rigid and binding. For the Javanese, Madurese or Sulawesian 
signees, the interpretation differed. Ricklefs suggest it was perceived as “a means to reach 
agreement in martial matters, so the battles could be ended, but the details of the text were in 
themselves of less importance”.113 The degree to which treaties could still be rectified, led the VOC to 
separate its trading area into three categories. 
The three cut divide was made in the Generale Instructie of 1650. First, were the areas of “own 
conquest”, like the Banda islands. Secondly, were those regions where exclusive contracts had been 
reached, as happened in Ternate and Amboina. Thirdly, those lands where the Company was on 
equal footing with the Asian lords, and needed to deal “as made possible by signed contacts”. 
Mataram clearly belonged to this category, and constant negotiations were required to settle 
business.114 At stake were not only profits, but basic stuffs of survival like wood and rice.  
Still, to the Lords XVII -who defined the general VOC policy from the Dutch Republic- lingering 
talks appeared a less costly option than warfare and colonization. In the early seventeenth century, 
only men like Jan Pietersoon Coen and Anthony van Diemen would opt otherwise. Coen expressed 
himself clearly: “trade cannot be maintained without war nor war without trade”.115 Under 
Maetsuycker’s governor-generalship (1653-1678) almost the opposite motto was abided to. Costly 
wars were to be avoided as much as possible to maximize profits. “No desire” existed “to gain 
possession of any more towns or estates in the kingdom of Mataram”. They would demand upkeep 
and only destabilize the region. This policy certainly reflected on the embassies and campaigns of 
Speelman and Van Goens.116 
                                                          
113 The original quote, albeit translated to Dutch by the editor, is: “weliswaar een middel waren om overeenstemming te bereiken inzake 
strijdige belangen, zodat er een einde kon worden gemaakt aan de gevechten, maar dat de details van de tekst er op zich minder toe 
deden”. See Ricklefs, De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: 374. For the Sulawesians see Andaya, The Heritage of Palakka: 100-116. 
114 As Bertrand notices: “Pour se prémunir contre le danger d’une éviction commerciale hors de eaux asiatiques, les administrateurs de la 
VOC prirent de plus en plus part aux intrigues des aristocraties indigènes”. See Bertrand, État Colonial: 50; C.R Boxer, Zeevarend Nederland 
en zijn wereldrijk 1600-1800 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff: 1965). For the official VOC policy lines see Generale missiven van gouverneurs-
generaal.en.raden.aan.heren.XVII.der.Verenigde.Oostindische.Compagnie.Historici.nl.(accessed.via 
http://www.historici.nl/retroboeken/generalemissiven/#page=0&size=800&accessor=toc&source=1, on 25-12-2013): 76. For an earlier and 
similar division, see M.E. van Opstall, “Laurens Reael in de Staten-Generaal. Verslag van Laurens Reael over de toestand in Oost-Indië, 
uitgebracht in de Staten-Generaal op 30 maart 1620.”In Nederlandse historische bronnen uitgegeven door het Nederlands Historisch 
Genootschap I, ed. M.E. van Opstall (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1979): 175-213. 
115 Coen wrote this on the 27th of September 1614 to the Lords XVII: “per experientie behoorden de Heeren wel bekent te wesen, dat in 
Indiën de handel gedreven ende gemainteneert moet worden onder beschuttinge ende faveur van U eigen wapenen ende dat de wapenen 
gevoert moeten worden van· de proffijten die met den handel sijn genietende, invoege dat de handelsonder d 'oorloge noch d' oorloge 
sonder den handel nyet gemaintineert connen werden”. See De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 38. 
116 So speaks Maetsuycker in the daghregister. Note that Hurdt’s campaign was initiated under the governance of Van Goens, so after the 
passing of Maetsuycker. See Supreme Government of Batavia.“13 August 1677.”Dagh-register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant 
passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India Anno 1676-1677, ed J.A. van der Chijs (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1903): 
192. 
War-bands on Java 35 
 
Maetsuycker’s instruction for the campaign against Trunajaya was to achieve armistice or break 
his movement through minor military interference. This was partly because of costs, and partly due 
to a looming attack from Banten. Quick solutions as the installation of new local chiefs or a partition 
between Amangkurat II and his brother Pangéran Puger were searched for.117 Some interference was 
unavoidable, however, with the lingering inland chaos and the threat of Makassarese pirates.  
After the havoc of Trunajaya’s uprising started, the Dutch meddled in several times. 1776 saw 
the commission of three expeditions: Jan Franszen Holsteyn, Christiaan Poleman and Cornelis 
Speelman were sent one after another to re-establish the central power of the kraton. Yet, Holsteyn 
and Poleman thought they only had to wipe the Makassarese from the coast and Speelman was 
strictly prohibited to march inlands by the Batavian Supreme Government.118 After Maetsuycker 
expired, his successor Van Goens decided the opposite and allowed hinterlands campaigns. 
Expectations were that Mataram would pay back the military expenses. 
In hindsight, this proved to be an idle wish. Only a small proportion of the war debts were 
returned by the Mataram rulers. But the damage done had been great. Both sides lost much 
manpower and material resources.119 This did not keep the Company from intervening, however. 
After the hectic years of Trunajaya’s upsurge and downfall, the VOC appeared a much more 
attractive partner to many regional Javanese leaders, certainly those of the Pasisir. The military 
victory demonstrated competence, and the increased taxes to pay the war debts raised hostility 
towards Mataram.  
After 1680, numerous requests were made by the Javanese elites to become vassals of the 
Company rather than Mataram. Batavia was very careful with such approaches, however; not 
wishing to destabilize the Sunan’s hierarchy. New chaos would merely bring more financial losses. 
Only over East Madura, Cirebon and Semarang did the Supreme Government take suzerainty.120 Even 
with men as Van Goens and Speelman calling the tune, the colonizing tendencies of the Company 
would thus still be restrained.  
Beliefs in ‘powerful Eastern despots’ do not explain their self-limitation. Van Goens did write two 
distorted accounts of an absolutist rule after returning to the Republic. Yet, these appear political 
ammunition in internal Company debates. Both Van Goens and Speelman noticed plenty of fractions 
in the Mataram realm during their embassies and campaigns. What is more, they actively used them 
                                                          
117 Gaastra has even called the VOC a “reluctant imperialist” dragged into the hinterland conflicts against its own wish. F. Gaastra, The 
Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003): 60; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies vol. II: 18-19, and 
141-142. 
118 The Supreme Government did not want to continue the intervention in 1677 due to threat of the Bantenese and the Malays of Johor. 
Palakka was called to Batavia and not Kediri for that reason. See De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 6; Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch Tiger: 8 and 
19-25; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 40. 
119 Ricklefs, War, Culture: 223. 
120 Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 41-43 and 46. 
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to their own benefit. Not so much a fear for weak Asian tyrants, but an awareness of the dependence 
on local alliances must have kept them from accepting the notion of obedient vassal states ruled by 
Mataram. 
At first sight, the failing tyrant and the autonomous local rulers might seem two sides of the 
same coin. Still, the realization of needing local and regional assistance is clearly different from 
betting on the favoured royal horse, i.e. the Sunan, for a return of the war debts. Two contrasting 
kinds of intelligence lay behind both views. The latter is based on the formal reporting guidelines, the 
former on experiences of negotiation and fighting with and against a fragmented Javanese society. 
The formal guidelines were certainly not all-prevailing in the accounts of admirals like Hurdt and 
Speelman.  
These guidelines were imposed since 1619, when the VOC gained an exclusive right on publishing 
and revealing all information gathered by its servants. The clearest request was made in the 
‘Memorie voor de coopluyden en andere officieren’ as put on paper by Maetsuycker in 1670. Main 
themes of interest were: the locations visited by the delegates, the state system, trade and other 
means of survival, agriculture, hostile military forces, and the power and potential of the VOC within 
the area. Other common concerns were the sex distribution, households, possible alliances with 
the central leader, availability of arms, munitions and soldiers, location of forts, fighting of crime, 
‘churches’ and religious figures.121 
Although these themes are certainly treated, reports were not limited to them. What is more, 
the ‘Memorie voor de coopluyden’ was hardly applicable to military operations; after all, no separate 
directions were given specifically for admirals. Their descriptions appear largely shaped by the 
immediate issues they faced; most of all keeping their army together. The empiric impression of 
indigenous affairs and organizations unfolded the fractions stirring politics on Java. Fighting 
Trunajaya confronted the authors with mandalas and military labour markets. This deluged them 
with intelligence of a different kind. The immersion into the chaotic warfare around 1677, made the 
contracts between military cultures more evident than ever. The aspects of warrior charisma and 
shifting war-bands diverged most clearly.  
 
 
 
                                                          
121 The 1670 Memorie revised several parts of the instructions written in 1643, still overall they make similar demands. Note that 
Maetsuycker followed the requests made by the Lords XVII when writing down the Memorie. J.A. van der Chijs, ed., Nederlandsch-Indisch 
Plakaatboek.1602-1811.deel.II.(Batavia:.Landsdrukkerij,.1885-1900):.52-72.and.527-534..(accessed.via 
http://archive.org/stream/nederlandschind00unkngoog#page/n6/mode/2up/search/In+de+Memorie+voor+de+coopluyden+en+andere+of
ficieren, on 04-06-2013) and D. De Wever, Javaense Reyse: de bezoeken van een VOC-gezant aan het hof van Mataram, 1648-1654 by 
Rijklof van Goens. (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 1995): 115; and A, Zuiderweg, “Batavia in reisverhalen uit de VOC-tijd” Indische Letteren 21 
(2006): 151-166 and 154. 
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 3. Describing Warfare: Between events and actors 
 
a. Historiography 
War surprises. Right before the VOC attacked Trunajaya’s stronghold Kediri, their Makassarese allies 
suddenly vanished in the air. Hurdt, the admiral in charge, was counting on these hundreds of men. 
He requested their return, asking their warlord Galesong to “fulfil his promises” so he can “welcome 
them as good friends”. The “sudden change of retreating ones dispatched people” -Hurdt wrote to 
Galesong- must have been caused by “the malicious inductions of several vile men”. Likely, Hurdt 
knew the latter was not true. The Makassarese were reputed to jump from one army to another. Yet, 
the VOC admiral appeared baffled, uncertain why this pact was suddenly broken.122 
The VOC was often at a loss to find out how alliances formed among the pejuang. A scramble 
for intelligence came about to discover what was motivating warlords, who could be trusted and 
what could be done to end the costly war as soon as possible. However, being thrown into a conflict 
on foreign islands, the VOC men were frequently left grasping in the dark. Their acumen was 
hindered by the limited understanding of both royal and religious hierarchies and cults.123 As 
mentioned, I attend to these gaps of knowledge and reflect on what the Dutch can still tell us about 
the war-bands under concern. 
It might surprise the reader that merely Dutch material is analysed. What remains of the 
Javanese perspective if their very sources are not given thorough attention? One practical reason for 
leaving them out of the main analysis is the sheer lack of time for writing a MA thesis. Moreover, 
only babads translated in English or Dutch could be consulted, since I cannot read Javanese. Yet, I am 
also convinced a careful evaluation of the VOC material yields new understandings of both their 
message and nature. Accordingly, it enables a more careful assessment of the information the 
sources contain on Javanese alliances, be it in times of peace or distress. 
My hope for increasing awareness on the potential of the VOC materials will come across 
best through reflecting on the existing historiography. For that purpose, I will start by reviewing the 
work that has already been written using the same kind of sources for the same period. Especially 
worth describing are the larger tendencies and presumptions central in De Graaf’s and Ricklefs’ 
oeuvre. Looking at their works specifically will show how the writings of European traders functioned 
as building stones for a Javanese history.  
                                                          
122 The quote derives from: ”Daeruijt soo schielijke veranderinge en het aftrekken uwer medegesondene volkeren voortgecomen zij, dan 
eenelijk dat ghij door quade inductien  van eenige boose menschen daartoe misleijd zijt” (p.216). See Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 135, 138, 
188-190, 191-193, 196 and 214-217. 
123 Betrand discusses this as a clash between two cultural perspectives. More will be said about this a few pages down. See Betrand, 
L’Histoire à Parts.  
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The upsurge of Trunajaya has been treated many times before. Receiving the title of ‘national 
hero’, Trunajaya has found his place in the curriculum of Indonesian history courses. In this 
chauvinistic niche he figures as the good guy fighting the deceptive Amangkurats and their kāfir 
allies.124 Luckily, more scholarly work has been available for decades already to counter this simplistic 
view. Yet, even within the academic literature certain discursive choices have been made that 
characterize the work and the stories told. In this chapter, I will trace these tendencies to see how 
they can be expanded upon. Naturally, a central issue is the use of Dutch sources. 
 Halfway the twentieth century, debates raged over the significance of Dutch sources for 
writing a history of Java. Scholars like De Graaf and Pigeaud very much liked to pick descriptions from 
both Javanese and Dutch writings to know the ‘true historical events’ the best. Berg instead stressed 
how Javanese sources were a league on their own, and could only be interpreted through recognition 
of their mythical character. This debate on reconstructing events and interpreting the actor who 
described them has steamed ahead since then; with well-known historians as Ricklefs or Kumar 
tending to one side or the other. 
 To understand the current scholarly discords, awareness of the academic debates halfway 
the twentieth century seems all but vital. And there is a good reason for this. After all, it was in these 
times that the foundation was laid for a post-colonial history of Indonesia. Different questions came 
to be posed, and different research methods were sanctioned. This is not to claim that comparable 
scholarly approaches did not bud before. Authors like De Graaf and Berg were, after all, active in the 
1920s already.125 Yet, a new disciplinary discourse emerged that directed the research to come. No 
book demonstrates this better than Soedjatmoko’s An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography.  
Published in 1965, the work reflects the debates bustling since the 1950s. It was the awaited 
response against the “overly nationalistic” history writing that simply embellished on “the existing 
often Europe-centric body of Indonesian history”. Thereby, it pointed towards a route not stuck with 
“European narratives, chronologies, and categories of analysis”.126 Be it about the earliest Hindu 
empires or the high colonialism of the nineteenth century, a new style of research was called for. 
 Multiple contributing authors -young and old, Asian and European- expound their ideas to 
take the ‘Indonesian Historiography’ one step ahead. Practical concerns are expressed on archival 
materials, research facilities and seminars. More interesting to us, however, is the theoretical layer 
                                                          
124 Kāfirs are unbelievers. See, for instance, R. S. Hadiwidjojo, Raden Trunodjojo, Panembahan Maduratna pahlawan Indonesia (Pamekasan: 
s.n., 1956). 
125 G. Nagelkerke, Bibliography H.J. de Graaf. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 141, no.2/3 (1985 Leiden): 201-214; and J. J. Ras: 
In memoriam Professor C.C. Berg, 18-12-1900 tot 25-6-1990. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 147, nr. 1 (1990): 1-11. 
126 G. Kahin and M.L. Barnett, "In Memoriam: Soedjatmoko, 1922 – 1989". Indonesia 49 (1990): 135.  
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supporting the preferred course of enquiry. As acknowledged by Soedjatmoko, theoretical 
perceptions on sources and methods determined the research questions posed.127 
Let me demonstrate the consequences of these assumptions for those contributors 
interested in applying Dutch materials to write a Javanese history; Hoesein Djajadiningrat, H.J. de 
Graaf, J. Noorduyn, C.R. Boxer, and Graham Irwin. A dominant topic in their essays is the epistemic 
concern for connecting European sources to ‘indigenous’ views and reasoning. The preceding 
generations of historians are refuted for having failed to do so.  
Most of the authors agree with Soedjatmoko’s statements that the “histoire réalité” needs to 
be distilled from the “histoire-récité”. Putting it differently; the ‘subjective’ Asian material is to be 
framed in factual ‘Western’ history as to provide an opportunity to truly perceive the real actions and 
motivations of the historical subjects. Hereby scholars can evade “inaccurate” mythological stories 
and use “relational objectivity”. Scholars can procure the objectivity of Asian sources through relating 
them to Western ones. This is done by contextualizing the deeds and thoughts of Asian actors 
through events described in objective, mainly Western, sources.128 
In this manner, a “universal history” can be written; contrasting and thereby transcending 
different regional historical traditions.129 The philosophical justification of this method is the notion 
of interpretationism propounded by Collingwood. As he stated: “the historian’s work may begin by 
discovering the outside of the event, but it can never end there; he must always remember that the 
event was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action, to discern the thought 
of its agent.” Thinking oneself into an action requires a truthful understanding of events. Basing 
interpretations on obscure myths will merely results in distorted depictions of the action 
underneath.130 
Interpretationist epistemological concerns are clearly addressed in the aforementioned 
essays. De Graaf argues European sources offer “a check on the historical references in the Babad” 
and Jayadiningrat finds comparisons with “regular history books” crucial for making any sense out of 
the Javanese chronicles.131 Irwin stresses how the “high degree of cultural and economic integration” 
between colony and metropolis makes Dutch sources “expert and exact”. Hence, they offer “checks 
                                                          
127 Soedjatmoko, “Introduction” In An introduction To Indonesian Historiography, ed Sudjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): xv. 
128 Ali expresses this perspective very clearly. See M. Ali, “Historiographical Problems.” In An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, ed. 
Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 13; and Soedjatmoko, “The Indonesian Historian and his Time.” In An Introduction to 
Indonesian Historiography, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 406. 
129 The stress on a ‘universal’ history reveals the notion of a singular truth in which all human beings, at all places and times, must have 
acted. See Soedjatmoko, “The Indonesian Historian.” In An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1965): 407. 
130 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History: With Lectures 1926-1928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and M. Day, The Philosophy of 
History (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008: 115-129.  
131 Notice that the VOC sources equally allow tracing the “political calculations” of men like Speelman. See De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 16; 
and also idem., “Aspects of Dutch historical writings on colonial activities in South East Asia with special reference to the indigenous 
peoples during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.” Historians of South East Asia, ed. D.G.E. Hall (London: Oxford University Press, 
1961): 213-224. 
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on indigenous Indonesian chronicles”.132 In short, a proper VOC-orientated contextualization of 
historic actors functions as a wand to bring them to life and read their thoughts. 
The relational objectivity within De Graaf’s work stimulates a portrayal of warlords’ 
rationales rather than their organizational ties. Well-founded assumptions on and interpretations of 
personal decision-making flourish in his texts. But neglect of the martial networks and associations of 
the warriors conceal their attitudes inside the military system they were part of. Only his article on 
Kajoran -the religious patron of Trunajaya- truly takes such interests.133 In the case of Trunajaya, De 
Graaf puts much weight on his desire for recognition by Amangkurat II. He, for instance, describes 
Trunajaya’s “pleasure” at receiving the Sunan’s letter in December 1679, which again addressed him 
as a subordinate rather than a rebel.134 
The long-term efforts of setting up a large war-band are thereby slighted. De Graaf is 
occupied with square inch circumstantial analyses -direct responses to current events- on the one 
hand, and very general narratives -winning the war, personal feuds and the like- on the other. This 
grants a contextualization of individual behaviour, but neglects perceptions actors themselves had on 
their conduct. That De Graaf wrote three separate articles on the Trunajaya’s deeds -concerning his 
rise, main alliance, and death- reflects the absence of an account fully dedicated to the man.135 By 
contrast, Berg did advocate thorough enquiries on personal motivations and thereby approached 
sources in a different way. 
It should not be forgotten that the theoretical debates supervised by Soedjatmoko defined 
both the possible connections between the sources as well as their intrinsic character. Not 
surprisingly, the single author that did reject ‘relational objectivity’ conceptualized Javanese 
chronicles in a very different manner. Berg considered the past as “a specific complex of myths” 
construed as “part of the speech habits of a community”. Over time, new generations would add 
new layers to the myths. Accordingly, a “continuous narrative evolution” added new and possibly 
contradictory aspects into a single “picture of the past”.136 
                                                          
132 H. Djajadiningrat, “Local Traditions and the study of Indonesian History.” In An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, ed. 
Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 77; H.J. De Graaf, “Later Javanese Sources and Historiography.” In An Introduction to 
Indonesian Historiography, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 126; and G. Irwin, “Dutch Historical Sources.” In An 
Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 235-238. 
133 In this article, De Graaf ponders on the reasons Kajoran’s forces accepted him as a warlord and the causes of the war-bands slowly 
falling apart after the sacking of the Mataramese kraton. See H.J. de Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk.” Djawa XX, no. 4-5 (1940).  
134 De Graaf states: “De brief zal intussen Raden Truna-Djaja mede genoegen gedaan hebben, omdat dit het eerste teken van 
vertouwelijkheid was, dat hij sedert ruim drie jaren van de Susuhunanan mocht vernemen”. See De Graaf,”Gevangenneming”: 289. 
135 Notice that De Graaf did write single and complete narratives for Sultan Agung, Amangkurat I and other royal figures. Even within these 
works, the description of events stirs most reflections on the historical subjects under concern. See De Graaf “Gevangenneming.” ; idem, 
“De Opkomst”; and idem., “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”.  
136 C.C. Berg, “De Evolutie der Javaanse Geschiedschrijving.“ Medelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen 14, 
no.2 (1950): 122; idem., ‘Herkomst, Vorm en Functie der Middeljavaanse Rijksdelingstheorie. Amsterdam: Verhandelingen der Koninklijke 
Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1951: 10; and idem., “The Javanese Picture of the Past.” In An Introduction to Indonesian 
Historiography, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 87. 
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For this reason, Berg suggests a “syntypical” method to evaluate the Javanese sources. This 
involves perceiving them as “products” of the “Indonesian culture” and “spirit”. Doing so requires 
attending to the intrinsic value of Asian mythical texts, not contrasting them with Western ones.137 
Zoetmulder applauds Berg and urges to read with the grain and view the sources as “special cultural 
manifestations and as a component parts of that culture”. To avoid a vicious circle merely based on 
the historical literature itself, ‘local knowledge’ should be used for theories and conclusions.138 
Friction between the two research approaches is evident. Soedjatmoko manages to express it 
clearly when stating: “Berg’s basic assumption cannot be ignored, and his provocative theory stands 
as a challenge to those historians who, on the basis of Javanese historical writing, are working 
towards the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’- to borrow R.G. Collingwood’s phrase”.139 Berg hence 
offers a different analytical platform, and allowed scholars to write a Javanese history contrasting 
clearly with that disseminated by researchers like De Graaf. Still, Berg never attempted to apply his 
methods to Dutch sources. 
 Interestingly, the scholarly schism of the 1950s tended to propel the historical research for 
the subsequent decades. With it, the neglect of an actor-centred take on VOC material continued too. 
This can not only be seen in the historiography on Java as a whole, but also for the sub-discipline of 
Javanese seventeenth century warfare. The major work in this field –Ricklefs’ ‘War, Culture and 
Economy’- demonstrates this most clearly. It is mainly concerned with the Kartasura period, 1677-
1726, and how the Mataram dynasty re-established itself through strong dependence on the VOC. 
Ricklefs portrays a Dutch dilemma. Every subsequent upcountry conflict required a choice whether to 
continue intervention.140   
The VOC could either prolong their interference in hopes of returns when peace was 
established or it could retract its forces and thereby lose their chance to gain more hinterland 
influence. The book pushes forwards an image of the Dutch Company as a ‘consortio economicus’; a 
purely rational actor opting the most profitable way out of every subsequent troublesome event. 
Even though the work offers many valuable insights on distinct circumstances, its scope is too large 
to refine on them extensively. The broad periodization draws attention away from small-scale 
                                                          
137 F. Bosch, “C.C. Berg and ancient Javanese history.” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 112, no.1 (1956): 2.   
138 Zoetmulder wrote on the adaptation of Indian epics in Old Javanese; such epics were conformed to the standards of Old Javanese 
poetry. He struggles with the limited ability to interpret Javanese sources and discusses a “vicious circle“: “we should read the sources 
using our knowledge of the cultural pattern, yet how can we comprehend that pattern if not from the sources?” Despites these limits in 
‘reliving the past’, local knowledge can serve as an alternative to century-old European knowledge. See P.J. Zoetmulder, “The Significance 
of the Study of Culture and Religion for Indonesian Historiography.” In An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, ed. Soedjatmoko 
(Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1965): 326, 329, 335, 338 and 341.  
139 Soedjatmoko, An Introduction to Indonesian: xix 
140 Ricklefs, War, Culture. 
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decision-making by specific authors, and consequently the less ‘rationalized’ choices made in 
engaging men like Trunajaya. 141    
Ricklefs does give general reasons for the Company to involve itself with the inland struggles, 
yet further exploration of individual motives falls short. The biographical account he gives of Van 
Goens and Speelman stretches no further than one paragraph in total, afterwards Speelman’s 
motives are rarely referred too. Instead, much of the book is dedicated to technological exchanges 
and the contracts signed between Mataram and the VOC, especially the way in which debts were 
demanded.142 For the Javanese, a similar bias is found.  
Mataram is depicted as a social structure with a hereditary hierarchy struggling to retain its 
dominance. Still, unlike the VOC it is seen as stirred by dominant personas, namely the lineage of 
Sunans. Here then, individual actors do shine in the limelight, be it in such a way that it suggests “a 
highly personal rule”. The shadow of De Graaf -Ricklefs’ former supervisor- casts over the “dynastic 
approach to history” directing Ricklefs’ focus on rulers. Hoadley admires the “truly Asian-centric view 
on history” portraying “Javanese perspectives”. Still, the strict abidance to the primary material 
disregards “any evaluation of the voluminous data’s veracity, or even their significance”.143 
Much of this disregard can be explained through the remnants of ‘relational objectivity’ in 
Ricklefs’ analysis. Throughout his work, both Javanese and Dutch sources are used to create a factual 
stage on which his actors of main interest operated. His Asian-centric view on history becomes one 
of interpreting the actions or motivations of the Sunans.144 These rulers are situated in a “world of 
brutal power struggles” in which they needed to “persuade, cajole, threaten or compel other 
powerful men with more direct control of resources until he achieved a consensus of notables in his 
favour.”145 
Hence, the bulk of attention goes to the figure of the Sunan himself and his attempt to 
sustain power. Further institutional and societal aspects as court alliances and war-banding thereby 
end up in the background. Theoretically they are stated to have been of significance, but the use of 
sources eliminates a thorough consideration for these facets.146 Like De Graaf, sources from both the 
                                                          
141 Ibid. 
142 A chief reason being the Company’s dependence on Central and Eastern Java for food and timber reserves in the headquarter of 
Batavia. See ibid.: and  33. Ibid.: 14-21, 33-35, 38 and 47-48. 
143 As Ricklefs himself introduces: “Dr. H.J. de Graaf and Dr. Th. G Th. Pigeaud, have left their mark on all that I write”. See  M.C. Hoadley, 
“Review of Ricklefs, War, Culture and Economy.” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no.3 (1994): 1019; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: x. 
144 In this way, Collingwood’s influence seems to linger ahead, even without being explicitly recognized.  
145 Stated differently, the Sunans needed to operate in world where violence was the “social fact”.  Amangkurat I, for example, is seen to 
have “tried to centralize his kingdom to serve his interest alone. He achieved thereby the alienation of many of those upon whose 
consensus the Javanese state depended: princes, officials, regional notables and religious leaders.” (Ricklefs, De Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie: 357). See idem., War, Culture: 8, 10, 12 and 31. 
146 In the introduction Ricklefs writes: “[a] central function of the administrative arrangements of the state was the levying of men and 
wealth for war. Military power was the basis of imperial politics. Java’s poor communications and barely institutionalized administrative 
network may indeed have encouraged war. Regions were emboldened to resist central authority while the centre, if personal ties, threats, 
cajolery and murder failed, could in the end only attempt conquest and retribution.” See Ricklefs, War, Culture:  13. 
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VOC and indigenous side are combined to reconstruct historical circumstances, not so much 
historical associations. Actors follow cues to an end, but are not clearly situated in the community 
they were part of. 
Ricklefs carefully considers the lacking mutual understanding of both Europeans and 
Javanese about each other. And he thereby certainly abandons any notion of VOC material being 
exclusively objective.147 Nonetheless, in bridging the gap between his varied historical materials, he 
searches for a straight-forward overarching narrative of the Kartasura period. The wonderful effort to 
create a plain oversight of what exactly happened in these times does, however, leave out more 
mystical or personal motivations of the actors involved.148 
Ricklefs’ description of both the VOC and Mataram shapes his conclusion on the influence of 
warfare. As he sees it, cross-cultural exchanges defined the martial activities and the institutional 
changes surrounding it. Both players were required to respond to each other’s innovations. Mataram 
is suggested to have lost the war not because of limited military capacities, but due to corruption 
within the Javanese court. Court intrigues hindered the successful adaptation to changing political, 
cultural and economic circumstances. Yet, Ricklefs fails to connect these issues of alliance to the 
intrinsic character of the Javanese military apparatus.149 
In his work, cross-cultural influences are largely limited to transference of military technology 
and intensification of “cultural (and) political identities”. The latter aspect gave war a perpetual 
character “exacerbating” the conflict which led to further schisms of identity. Unfortunately, 
however, the last point is only substantiated through discussing different dress codes and slight 
changes in behaviour. As Hoadley already observed, an important question is hence left out; how 
intensified identities can “explain the growing tensions within Javanese culture in the institutional 
sense”.150 
The strands of VOC-embracing ‘modernizers’ and hostile ‘conservatives’ at the court is a case 
in point. Their stance was not merely affected by affinity; the benefits they could gain from increased 
trade equally drew them closer or further from foreigners. Applying the notion of military labour 
markets reveals even more of these schisms. It expounds on the conflicting interior and coastal 
                                                          
147  “For Javanese society one must rely in part upon European documents which are contemporary, but which also reflect 
misunderstanding and misinformation.”(p.1-2). See ibid.: 1-2, 22 and 23. 
148 Even though it is only perceived as volume one of a proposed project on Kartasura. For a theoretical discussion on the difference 
between mystical and personal motivations for Javanese actors to conduct violence see R. Bertrand, “Un subject en souffrance? Rècit de 
soi, violence et magie à Java.” Social Anthropology 11, no.3 (2003) : 285-302. 
149 Ricklefs stresses three aspects of ‘military affairs’ that contrast between the VOC and the ‘indigenous forces’. These are the quantity of 
warriors, discipline and strategy plus tactics. It is the failure to discipline the troops and, at times, the lack of shared strategies that left the 
Javanese in disadvantage. See Hoadley, “Review of Ricklefs”, 46; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 38 and 234. 
150 Hoadley, “Review of Ricklefs”, 46; and  Ricklefs, “De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie”, 234 and 375-376. 
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interests, the mingling of non-Javanese forces and the dynamic collaborations that Ricklefs already 
touches upon, but does not flesh out.151 
 Just as individual decisions of VOC men and the intricacies of Mataram are overlooked, the 
bridge between the Company and the Javanese is interpreted using contemporary concepts (‘histoire 
réalité’) in a matter that largely ignores the notions applied in the ‘histoire-récité’ of either the 
European or Asian authors. Ricklefs almost got to discussing it thoroughly, apparently intending to 
write on the religious sides of Javanese warfare. But his publisher declined the project.152 Therefore, 
shadows still linger. Others did tempt to surpass them, however. Bertrand has been able to shine his 
own light over the sources and take up the issue of ‘L’histoire à parts égales’; the history beheld by 
two different societies in two unique ways.153 
Implicitly, he continues in line with Berg’s work; seeking “special cultural manifestations” and 
reading along the grain. Unlike Berg, however, the VOC men are now counted as cultural actors 
too. He describes they “sont issus, non des milieu lettrés ou nobilaires, mais du monde du port et du 
négoce”.154 Care is given to De Houtman’s 1596 arrival in Banten, the rivalries between the British 
and Dutch trade company and the defence of Batavia. Though multiple “tableaux” he is able to 
address various themes of intercultural exchanges made by both Asian and European participants. 
Contrasting backgrounds brought separate prejudices and posed merchants next to nobles. The VOC 
servants were shaped by the events and debates in the Dutch Republic, the Javanese by the new 
understanding of both state and religion hovering over the archipelago.155 
In framing the latter perspective, Bertrand still leans a lot on an assumed rise of the priyayi. 
His earlier works described how the priyayi constructed an identity as noble administrators. They 
took the lead from the older aristocratic class of warlords; the courtiers by blood. In the wake of 
Sultan Agung’ conquests, the need arrived to control the extensive realm of Mataram. Slowly a 
mandala was instituted, in which control over outer regions was facilitated through the command of 
the courtisized priyayi, including the bupati exercising local rule. According to Bertrand, the discourse 
                                                          
151 Ricklefs, War, Culture: 42-43. 
152 This was conveyed to me by Dr. David Kloos; I have yet to gain confirmation from Prof. Ricklefs himself. Likely the correspondence 
between H.J. De Graaf and M.C. Ricklefs will reveal similar intentions; see the personal documents of De Graaf (KITLV-inventaris 125). 
153 Bertrand argues: “Écrire une histoire “à parts égales” des commencements de la recontre, pas encore tout à fait inégale, entre les 
Provinces-Unies de la Grande Révolte et les societies des mondes malaise et javanais, ce n’est pas tenter de recomposer arbitrairement un 
monde commun. …d’une part de prendre acte du fait qu’elles ne constituaient que l’un des plans de pensée et d’action des parties en 
presence, de l ‘autre d’admettre qu’elles n’étaient pas initialement dotes des memes coordonnées spatiales et temporelles.” Bertrand, 
L’Histoire à Parts : 15-16.  
154 Ibid.: 19. 
155 Bertrand’s treatment of the intrinsic mysticism of political power, for instance, stresses the expanding “negara” or governed realm 
ideally under control of the “souverain-ascète”. Looming over this discussion are the “’noblesse de robe’ priyayi, qui assurait 
l’administration de la maison royale” halfway the seventeenth century. Thereby they constituted the newly conquered negara of Sultan 
Agung and allowed his ideal kingship to blossom. See ibid. : 19, 21-22, 25-58, 99-120, 189-214, 231-260, 293-322, 323-346, 375-444 and 
445-449. 
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of these ‘nobles of the robe’ -‘la tradition parfait’- dominated the Javanese state system since 
then.156 This, however, makes it appear as if warfare lost its identifying potential. 
The discourse surrounding Islamization has shown otherwise, but only of late. For a long time 
warfare remained disconnected from the spread of Islam. Anthony Johns proclaimed the scholarly 
and mercantile Sufi conversion as the chief propagator of Islam.157 The Southeast Asian trade ports 
came to the fore as transformative hubs from which the surrounding lands were converted.158 In a 
like manner, Azyumardi Azra describes “penetration” was first caused by Muslim merchants and then 
by “wandering Sufis and scholars who came in increasingly large numbers to the area from the 
thirteenth century onwards”. The scholars achieved a mix “between shari’ah (Islamic legal doctrine) 
and tasawwuf (Islamic mysticism)”.159 
Azra and Johns do not only chase the aggressive face of proselytization, they equally depict it 
as externally imposed. In his recent trilogy on Indonesian Islam, Ricklefs shifts this narrative around. 
The Islamic waves do not come from the shore but the court inlands. There, Islamic and Javanese 
cultures and believes were mingled into a “mystic synthesis”. “The cultural and social choices of the 
elite of this hierarchical society” were “crucial” in “developing cultural synthesis”. Simultaneously, 
Ricklefs still expects a surge in “Islamic sensibilities as a cementing force of resistance against the 
king and his new Christian allies”.160 
The trilogy, then, recognizes the violence underneath Javanese Islam. It acknowledges both 
war and religion as ‘social identifiers’.161 But is does not allow the ‘courtier’ and the ‘rebel’ to speak 
up with the same volume. This has to do with a dichotomy underlying the mystic synthesis and that 
derives back to his earlier work.162 In courtly circles, Islam did not so much guide “personal faith and 
                                                          
156 The new identification also altered education, as Bertrand notices:” Jusqu’ au milieu du 17e siècle, l’apprentissage des arts de la guerre 
faisait partie de l’éducation du gentilhomme priyayi, qui était excercé dès la prime enfance au manierement de la lance et au tir à l ‘arc” 
(p.69). See Bertrand, État colonial:  68-81, 86-90, and 100-103.  
157 As he states: “[i]n other words the history of Islam in Southeast Asia cannot be understood apart from the history of the generation of 
trading centers at focal points in the archipelago.” A. Johns, “Islam in Southeast Asia: Reflections and New Directions.” Indonesia 19 (1975): 
37. 
158 Unlike his predecessors, Johns went beyond discussion on the “provenance of Southeast Asian Islam” and instead gave prime attention 
to the “modality of its spread” as well as “the social and political effects of the new religion, and the subsequent character of the centres of 
political power where it developed”. In this manner, hard-core ‘Islamization’ theories were avoided and the Southeast Asian trade ports 
came to the fore as transformative hubs. However, the streams of conversion still flowed as rudimentary forces of trans-cultural 
adaptation. As he sees it, the “Muslim city-states” emerging at the coast around the fifteenth century were “gradually to diffuse waves of 
Islamic influence into the hinterland, (…) which was to lead to the Islamization of broad swathes of the indigenous population" (p. 34 and 
39). Even though a direct implementation of Arabic or Indo-Persian Islam is thereby doubted, it still asserts a religion prescribed from the 
coastal plains. See Johns, “Islam in Southeast Asia”: 33-55.  
159 He refers to a “cosmopolitan scholarly community linked together in a relatively solid fashion by way of their studies, particularly of 
hadith, and their involvement in the sufi tariqahs.” Crisscrossing theological networks and religious “processes of transmission” shaped the 
community. Pilgrimages subsequently furthered the connections with Mecca and hajj hubs. Through the effort of the roaming scholars, a 
“harmony” was achieved “between shari’ah (Islamic legal doctrine) and tasawwuf (Islamic mysticism)”. In effect, a “socio-moral 
reconstruction of Muslim societies” occurred, creating a “renewalist drive” touching “the outlook and daily lives of many Malay-
Indonesians”. Azra opens new windows by considering the bridges laid down by Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian theology.  See A. Azra, 
The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai’I Press, 2004): 2-4. 
160 Ricklefs, War, Culture: 29 and 40. Ricklefs refers to Azra too, See ibid.: 50-1. 
161 It thereby elaborates the social identification set out in ibid.: 11. That is, it now includes markers of cultural identity.  
162 Ricklefs’ notion of identity stirs a lot on assumptions of ‘Islamization’: the mystic synthesis assumes a binary collide and assimilation 
between forces of Islam and Javanese ‘culture’. Think of sentences as: “[i]t is possible that the idea of Javanese identity came to be 
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behaviour” as it shaped cultural identities. Within the pockets of conservative religion, matters were 
different; theology and personal belief did surface there.163 But in the seventeenth century, Islamic 
religious communities were not yet part of the regular hierarchy.164 Java held internal islands of 
religion; the frequent ethnic and sectarian hostilities between regional groups evidence this.165 
From Ricklefs’ perspective, a cleavage existed between the pious Muslims and the mundane 
or politicized one. A parallel to Geertz’s division between the abangan, priyayi and santri -the 
followers of ‘Javanese Islam’, the royals, and the dogmatic believers- comes to mind. Yet, different 
identities were eminent before the 1850s.166 Dogmatism was less important to the synthesis than 
how the ‘Javanese’ thought about converting to Islam, being a Muslim or living next to one. 
Accordingly, the juxtaposition of an Islamic and Javanese identity features prominently.167 The 
question looming in courts, mosques and villages was whether ‘Javanese Muslims’ existed, not 
whether they were proper believers.168 For Ricklefs, however, the question tends to become whether 
‘courtly Javanese Muslims’ prevailed.169 
The mystic synthesis juxtaposes the creation of an Islamic identity with that of ‘unified’ 
Javanese one.170 Even though no actual homogenous society was achieved, the synthesis did bring 
people together during the initial decades of the seventeenth century. Sultan Agung (r. 1613-1645) 
initiated it in 1633, under pressure to consent the rebelling Islamic groups. He both abided to rooted 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
approximately coterminous with an Islamic identity as one of the fruits of the success of Islamization.” The reader only needs to recall the 
work of Pollock and Ricci to perceive the danger of such a scheme.  In their view, the power of “grammar” or religious concepts tempted a 
“cultural process of imitation and borrowing” leading to the gradual emergence of a realm-like cosmopolis with a similar “cultural-political 
style”. Instead of a collision and synthesis, Islam seems to have entered the archipelago by circulation and regeneration. See S. Pollock, The 
Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006): 
133. 
163 M.C. Ricklefs, War, Culture: 11. 
164 Villages of the pious usually gained an independent (pradikan) status. Central to their functioning were the pesantrens that soon spread 
throughout the island, although uncertainty remains over their existence in the seventeenth century. The founders of the schools often 
chose to locate near holy graves, particularly those of the walis. Believers expected such places to hold extraordinary powers or kramat. 
This made them attractive for both worship and refuge. Especially the graves of Kajoran and Giri consistently allured wanderers at odds 
with the central state hierarchy. Not surprisingly, these places eventually turned into hotbeds of ‘rebellion’.  See Ibid: 4 and 11. 
165 In this manner, Ricklefs takes the continuing violence to indicate prominent local and religious identities rather than a dominating and 
all-encompassing Javanese one. Moreover, Ricklefs conceives a ‘degree of fluidity’ of ‘ethnic and cultural categories’ which allowed shifting 
identities. See ibid.: 22 and 225. 
166 Or the abangan-putihan distinction as it was called within the Javanese society itself. See Robert W. Hefner, “Islamization and the 
Changing Ethical Imagination in Java: Review of M.C. Ricklefs’ Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: c. 1930 to the Present.” Indonesia, no. 
96 (October 2013): 187-202; M.C. Ricklefs, “The Birth of Abangan.” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 162, No. 1 (2006): 35-55; 
and idem, Mystic Synthesis: 6-7. 
167 Notice how such a dichotomy suggests a still limited amount of separate branches among the Islamic believers. Different interpretations 
of beliefs and rituals certainly proliferated, but a split as that between Islamic modernism and the ‘spiritual’ Javanese Islam was not in 
place. This surely was to change in the modern age, at which point the mystic synthesis came to be deconstructed. Ricklefs defines identity 
as “the perception of membership within distinguishing boundaries that a group regards as defining itself, as expressing significant shared 
characteristics. All of us have multiple identities at any moment, but in some circumstances one or another of these memberships is the 
most salient”. Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis:  4 and 12. 
168 Notice that such debates of dogmatism have been described as occuring prior to Sultan Agung. Bertrand even states that “[a]u fil de ce 
processus [of Islamization], Java connut, à l’instar de toutes les societies du pourtout insilindien, une islamisation ‘en dents de scie’, 
productrice d’identités distinctes, en parfois contradictoires”. See Bertrand, L’Histoire À Parts: 261- 291. 
169 In posing this question, Ricklefs refers to the courts of the likes like Sultan Iskandar Muda in Aceh or Sultan Abdul Kadir in Banten. See 
M.C. Rickelfs, “Islamising Java:  The Long Shadow of Sultan Agung.” Archipel 56 (1998): 479-480. 
170 Notice how “particular practices” are used “as markers of Islamic identity”. See N. J. Kaptein, “Review of: (2006) Mystic Synthesis in Java: 
A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the early Nineteenth Centuries.” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 164 (2008): 
320. 
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courtly traditions and pious Islamic ones; visiting Tembayat, marrying the Goddess of the Southern 
Ocean (Ratu Kidul), creating a new calendar (Anno Javanico), financing extensive Islamic literature, 
and accepting the title of sultan.171 A new, normative culture was cropping up. Yet, after Sultan 
Agung expired in 1645, his successors would tear it apart again.  
Amangkurat I and II managed to increase internal hostilities rather than resolve them. In this 
sense, the wars in and after the 1670s resulted from an accumulation of discords within a realm 
lacking courtly synthesis. Fighting the Sunan became a fight for a proper Islam; a jihad to expel the 
kāfir influences at the centre of the mandala. For the insurgents, the kraton was tarnished through its 
ties with the Christian VOC and the lacking Islamic affections of the king. Underlying the schism were 
networks of different kinds. Firstly, the ‘colonial’ one focused on commerce, mercenary and profits. 
Secondly, the ‘Islamic’ one with its teachers, holy men and scriptures. Both clashed violently and 
derailed a proper mystic synthesis for the years to come.172 
Ricklefs thus certainly sketches an intricate and thoughtful account on the expansion of Islam. 
Nonetheless, the Islamic motives of warring forces can be delved out much further. Several sides of 
religious ‘social identification’ are not yet disclosed. Trunajaya’s ties to Majapahit, his marital links 
with the Makassarese and appreciation for Islamic honorary titles become side-matters.173 One 
reason for neglecting such aspects is the very abidance to a conceptual ‘mystic synthesis’. This 
pushes forwards an image of Islam directed by monarchs. But so much occurred beyond the capital. 
Local actors were vital for adapting and taking on the religion, while redistributing it at the 
same time. All kinds of means were available for this; from pesantrens to infantries. Such continuing 
reproductions of, for instance, the Walisanga legend is partly omitted from Ricklefs’ study. Relational 
objectivity rears its head again. The era is defined by a fluctuating mystic synthesis that during 
certain events was active and others, as the early Kartasura wars, was not. Ricklefs’ findings on 
identities thus derive from event-based reconstructions of the past. The hybrid beliefs of Trunajaya’s 
forces are not counted as a mystic synthesis or are merely depicted as a continuation of “the themes 
of Javanese identity as shaped by Sultan Agung”.174 
Since they were expressed while fighting the Javanese overlord, they do not fit the narrative 
of a dynastic fusion of Javanese and Islamic identities. The circumstances conclude full recognition of 
                                                          
171 Tembayat is the grave site of Sunan Bayat, one of the Walisanga who is depicted as a last ruler of Majapahit. He supposedly was 
converted to Islam by Sunan Kalijaga. The legends tell Sultans Agungs met  Sunan Bayat’s soul during the grave visit. The main pieces of 
sponsored literature were the Carita Iskandar, Serat Yusuf, and Kitab Usulbiyah. This synthesis contrasted with earlier manuscripts that 
often contradicted the Javanese and Islamic identity, although judgements are difficult to make for the times prior to Sultan Agung’s rule 
See Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis: 21-25, 34-36, 39 and 43-44; and idem.: War, Culture: 39.. 
172 Ricklefs continues with self-conscious Muslim identity established by the efforts of on Ratu Pakubuwana in the early 18th century. But 
this is beyond the scope of the thesis. See Ricklefs, War, Culture: 58. For a view similar to Ricklefs, see Remmelink, “De Worsteling om 
Java”: 348. 
173 Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis: 62-63. 
174 Ibid.: 63. 
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Trunajaya’s own mystic motivations, for they were only relevant as far as they countered the courtly 
ones. The diverging voices of warriors become melted into a single scream for insurgence. Yet, 
Islamic motives on the battlefield were uttered in different terms by the diverse amount of actors 
and war-bands involved. Even the VOC material manages to demonstrate the dissenting views of 
their warrior correspondents and addressees. 
The rebels’ constant regeneration of warrior cults calls for attention. By suggesting a rather 
uniform Islamization to underlay the mystic synthesis, Ricklefs does not give this attention yet. The 
different groups of believers are assumed to have been subjected to an overarching religious process 
that speeded up or impeded in subsequent historical periods, usually defined by the successions of 
Mataram rulers. Their thoughts are a reaction to the religious processes encapsulating them; to be 
framed in an abounding Islamic dispersion.  
Again a stage is set for interpreting the reasoning of historic actors. Their thoughts are 
approached through the supposed wave of Islamization the subjects happen to be caught into. The 
actors are hurdled together as pawns on the chessboard, moved from one square to another. A 
master play follows, in which the long term adaptation of Islam is reframed. What is left unexplained, 
however, is the manner in which every pawn piece is held together, or whether they form a unity at 
all. That is, what grouped the rebel forces specifically? 
I will reconsider these pawn pieces through taking the observations of individual actors as a 
starting point. In this case, these actors are the VOC men rather than the Javanese. Bertrand has 
demonstrated that the nature and authors of sources need to be respected; looking at Dutch 
material thus begs for a consideration of VOC actors. Surely, these were not the ones exposed to 
Islamization, mystic syntheses or Javanese identification. But great parts of their military subjects and 
opponents were. It is the way in which the VOC commanders considered these, that new insights on 
martial Islamization can be reached.  
 
b. Methodology  
In the Dutch Republic, friendships ensured survival.175 So they did on Java. Bertrand’s emphasis on 
limited contacts between the “Hollandais et Javanais” does not go for the era of encounters starting 
around 1650.176 The new series of embassies and interventions greatly widened the connections 
across the cultural divide. With it came personal relations that ran the gamut from amiable to hostile. 
                                                          
175 L. Kooijmans, Vriendschap en de Kunst van het Overleven in de Zeventiende en Achttiende Eeuw (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1997). 
176 On the initial contacts, Bertrand states: “[t]el est les secret bien gardé de la recontre imperial entre Hollandais et Javanais: elle n’a pas 
eu lieu.” He means no great civilizational exchange occurred, but only ones “entre des fragments instables de celles-ci”. The interaction 
between Mataram and Batavia became significant enough after the passing of Sultan Agung to claim the two societies were tied together 
later on, which is left ignored by Bertrand. See Bertrand, L’Histoire À Parts: 445.  
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Salvaging the former turned out crucial to attain success. I research how the new Asian networks 
were put to paper by the VOC commanders.  
Unbarring intercultural networks is the main reason individual authors are spotlighted. 
Archival ‘pulses’ are useful for describing the greater scheme of things. They can be researched to 
perceive the broader shifts of narrative. Yet, micro-level enquiries on actors as well as meso-level 
analyses of their associations enable a wholly different approach. Questions on mutual 
understanding, socio-religious motivation, self-perception and fraternization can only be addressed 
properly from those levels.  
Bridging cultural gaps required a cosmopolitan attitude. One could, however, have been 
cosmopolitan in many ways. The concept needs to be historicized to understand the past act of 
“conviviality and tolerance”.177 On one extreme, authors might sustain an intrinsic interest in the 
culture and people he or she encounters abroad. On the other, purely pragmatic motives abound. 
Usually the first attitude is taken as true cosmopolitanism. Yet, for those Europeans wandering in 
early modern Asia, empiric impressions tended to be shaped by ‘banal’ interests; as Bertrand calls 
them.178 Indeed, this was an “age of improvisation” in which contacts were to be sustained with 
newly contrived behaviour faceted by both commercial and cultural interests.179 
The earliest European visits to Asian courts were both intrinsically exploratory and utilitarian; 
seeking out how the hierarchy operated as well as how to reach profitable agreements. No manual 
was yet in place, so different approaches were tried out until trial and error led to consensus. 
Exploring the culture and rationality of the ‘Other’ and acting in accordance to it could open doors to 
new treaties.180 Subrahmanyam calls this the “negotiated ways of understanding one another”.181 
 He describes a ‘produced incommensurability’ that attends to the decisions of actor rather 
than any intrinsic semiotic divides. Diplomacy hence becomes a core interest. Despites the distortion 
through mistranslated treaties and false promises, diplomats had the power to negotiate and 
                                                          
177 J. Gommans, Asian Cosmopolitanism and the Dutch Microcosmos in Cochin (article to be published) (Leiden: Leiden University, 2013). 
178 Jacob had uttered an overarching definition spinning around “curiosity, interest, acceptance” and the absence of “suspicion, disdain and 
disinterest”. While the emphasis on "praxis" or "experientia" rather than ideology is useful, it is doubtful that the cosmopolitan attitude or 
behaviour can be simplified in this manner. Her exploration of the multiple social spheres in which cosmopolitanism can occur is 
illuminating. As is the way in which these varying communities are chronologically discussed in one narrative. Still, a distinction between 
personal and societal ‘acceptance’ is not drawn and the pragmatic drive of especially the initial encounters is overlooked. See Bertrand, 
L’Histoire à Parts: 22; and M. C. Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World; The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early Modern Europe (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 2006): 11. 
179 T. Brook, Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008): 19 and 21. 
See also Steenbrink’s view on the acceptance of Islam in the initial encounters between the ‘Dutch’ and the inhabitants of the archipelago. 
He claims “the trader or military official could hardly find any space for [describing religious customs] among the figures and surveys of 
cargoes and contracts in their ‘matter-of-fact’ reports”. K. Steenbrink, Dutch colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-
1950 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993): 25. 
180 Emmanuel Levinas inspired this formulation. See E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969).  
181 S. Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia (Cambridge: Mass, Harvard 
University Press, 2012). Bertrand made a similar argument for Western Java, see Bertrand, L'Histoire à parts Égales. 
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mediate ways in and out of cultural conflict.182 Their impact thus ranged from cultural exchanges of 
paintings and the like to erupting warfare due to exaggerating or summoning mutual agitations.  
The commensurability of war cultures is yet another issue. Geoffrey Parker has prompted it 
through his overarching thesis on ‘the military revolution’. He uttered contrasting cultural notions of 
warfare to have determined most conflicts between Europeans and non-Europeans from 1500 to 
1700. Three differing extra-European spheres are perceived as exposed to three different types of 
clashes. ‘Indonesia’ belongs to those regions where Europeans had triumphed by the 1650s. 
European modes of war and technologies had supposedly ruled superior, leaving the indigenous 
without any chances. Hence, the VOC had won through exploiting a gaping incommensurability.183 
Like Subrahmanyam, I will not adhere to such theories. They suffer from structuralist 
assertions that take historical continuities for granted. In other words, intercultural dynamics are 
dimmed down, local deviations ignored and colonial dominations asserted. On Java, the West did not 
simply clash with the East; military cooperation stretched beyond such dichotomies. Even the 
acceptance of firearms demonstrates this complicity; as is ironically proven by a joined article of 
Parker and Subrahmanyam. Having said that, ideas of acculturation and trans-culturalism can be just 
as misleading. Teleological assertions on ethnicity and integration condemn the theories to 
oblivion.184 
Instead, “shifting vocabularies and changes wrought over time by improvisations” directed 
the early contact.185 This had little to do with fundamental incomprehension or gradual incorporation, 
but was charged by a rational aim of reaching consensus and striking deals. A triangle of 
understanding, alliances and intelligence evolves. The awareness of cultural networks and etiquette 
enabled a clever selection of contacts resulting in the intelligence needed to negotiate ones 
objectives. Ergo, circumstances demanded careful consideration, spontaneity in approaching the 
right persons, and disclosing insights and information to reach a resolution. How this was to be done 
differed from one situation to another. 
                                                          
182 Subrahmanyam notices “there is a tendency to think of cultural incommensurability as particularly acute at moments of encounter, 
when two disparate (and perhaps historically separated) politico-cultural entities come into contact.” Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: 
4-5, 8-9, 32 and 209. Similar processes can be perceived in early modern Europe, see W. Roosen. “Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: a 
Systematic Approach.” The Journal of Modern History 52, no.3 (1980): 452-476.  
183 G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987). Note that the ‘military revolution’ was coined by Michael Roberts and expanded by Parker. For similar books see C. M. Cipolla, Guns, 
Sails and Empire (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965); and Jeremy Black, ed. War in the early modern world, 1450-1815 (London: Routledge, 
1999). 
184 Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: 24-26 and 29; and S. Subrahmanyam and G. Parker, “Arms and the Asian: Revisiting European 
Firearms and their Place in Early Modern Asia.” Revista de Cultura 26 (2008): 12-42. Ricklefs comments on ethnicity: “[d]e Europeanen en 
Javanen waarover wij het hebben, hadden nog niet het idee dat mensen, evenals alle overage levende wezens, bestonden uit ‘raciale’ 
groepen, die deel uitmaakten van een process van competitive en naturrlijke selectie”. Merle Ricklefs, De Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie: 362; and Steenbrink, Dutch colonialism, 25. 
185 Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: 24-26 and 29.  
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The context of the encounters is thus key to comprehending the underlying motives. The 
meetings were not between societies at large, but rather between “particular subcultures or 
segments of societies“.186 Whereas Subrahmanyam’s segment of choice is the court, most of my 
attention is on interactions during military marches (Hurdt) or the preparations for them (Speelman). 
However, his observation on the heuristics applied by the foreign visitors is applicable to both 
situations. The Portuguese rephrased the Asian court systems in their own vocabulary, automatically 
crafting a biased impression through translation. 187  A search for parallels and recognizable 
hierarchies equally defines the Dutch intelligence on the Javanese war-bands. 
 Consequently, the VOC agents framed warrior groups in much more rigid terms than seems 
suitable. Designations as ‘Javanese’, ‘Makassarese’, ‘Balinese’ and even the obscure ‘Malayans’ are 
thrown around; suggesting clearer groupings than might have existed. 188  Along with the 
categorization came rejection of the Asian “subservience and willingness to please, poor vitality and 
absence of wilfulness, a mixture of indifference and courtesy”.189 What is more, the leaders of these 
subservient and indifferent men -warlords or not- tend to be portrayed as greater arbiters than they 
appear to have been. However unguided such identifications may strike us now, they did fit the 
state-centred warfare of Europe.190 
A rationale in search for European army structures easily evoked such biases. Of course, a 
complete parallel was never drawn between Dutch and Javanese armies. European vocabulary could 
not encompass all new phenomena; hence the authors sometimes resorted to foreign words. Still, 
the convention of esquadres, infantry companies, and battalions as made famous by the Dutch States 
Army lingered in the descriptions. And a tendency remained to speak of Adipatis, Radens, 
Tumĕnggungs, Pangérans, Karaëngs as if they were captains, lieutenants, corporals, or sergeants.191 
 All in all, ‘the Asians’ had exactly the same inclinations. Like the VOC, the Javanese elite saw 
many opportunities in military cooperation and “hoped to profit from it”. Similarly, they 
encapsulated Dutch victories, histories and even alcoholism into their own stories. The wayang 
clown servant panakawan -comical and victorious- became associated with the Europeans, the 
independence from Spain was retold in a Javanese context and Speelman was portrayed in chronicles 
                                                          
186 Ibid.: xiv, 212. 
187 For Subrahmanyam, religion was not dominant in the courtly encounters. In his mind, they occurred in a “potentially secular sphere, 
where the religious identities of participants were at times somewhat attenuated or rendered irrelevant”. Subrahmanyam frames 
translation as “a positive intercultural hermeneutics based on deploying concepts such as prejudgments”. See ibid.: xiv, 29, 62, 173 and 213  
188 Malayans seemingly often refers to men from Minangkabau. 
189 J. Van Doorn, A Divided Society: Segmentation and Mediation in Late- Colonial Indonesia (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
1983): 95. 
190 Note that state-centred warfare did involve many private investors who often benefitted from bloodshed. See Parrott, The Business of 
War. 
191 Notice that while the reforms of Willem III after the ‘Rampjaar’ 1672 changed the military organization, its contrasts with the Javanese 
warriors groups remained about as large. See O. Van Nimwegen, "Deser landen crijchsvolck" Het Staatse leger en de militaire revoluties 
(1588–1688) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2006); and K. Roberts, Pike and Shot Tactics, 1590–1660 (Botley, Osprey Publishing, 2010). 
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as the drunk Dutch general. Asian alliances of the Dutch were characterized as part of this VOC 
cosmopolis as well. 192  Still, the Javanese heuristics are usually neglected due to a “deeply 
asymmetrical knowledge of the source materials of the period”.193 
 Subrahmanyam even warns for the “impoverished history” which only perceives European 
agents as ‘cosmopolitan’, active translators and bridge-builders.194 The reader might want to blame 
me for falling into the trap. But, even though the analysis sticks to Europeans, I certainly do not see 
them as the sole actors crossing cultural borders. Rather, they offer one of the several perspectives 
available on the abundant social, cultural and religious interactions during the wars on Java. For that 
very reason, a ‘Bergian’ analysis of their motivations is more than welcome.  
  
c. Asian Associations 
Capturing the diverge networks VOC men were part of, is the first leap to contextualizing their 
insights. To put it bluntly; their Asian associations determined the way in which they associated Asian 
concepts and institutions. Since the military campaigns were “intricate processes of treat, diplomacy 
and battle”, negotiations were as significant as fights.195 For both pursuits, victory and loss shaped 
the idea of an inferior or superior opponent. Face-to-face talks thus led to impressions on the society 
as a whole. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the inter-personal from the inter-cultural 
exposures. The first are characterized by feuds and friendships, the latter by generalizations.  
In Mataram, friendships were always tainted by the larger political parties opposing each 
other. In this manner, any personal contact would yield a particular angle for looking at society. The 
importance of associations is not surprising in a “network state” lacking elaborate institutions. To 
achieve aims, personal ties and strong personality counted much. The realm was a flexible and 
adaptive one, finding its way like a meandering river. Only the destruction of war could really tear 
the social-political network down. Fractions characterized the kraton. In different times, contrasting 
groups of courtiers gained the Sunan’s approval and dominated Mataram politics.196 
 Ordinarily led by a prince or powerful patih, these fractions could stir policies to trade or 
isolation, war or peace and fellow believers or kāfirs like the VOC. Consequently, “the regents’ sense 
of commitment to Mataram” was very much shaped by “the extent to which they could help 
determine the policy pursued by the court”. The Garebeg Mulud was the best occasion to 
                                                          
192 On the Asian alliances, Ricklefs writes: “Ongeacht hoe 'Nederlands' deze strijdkrachten naar onze huidige normen betreffende identiteit 
en nationaliteit zouden zijn, voor tijdgenoten ging het wel degelijk om troepen van de Nederlandse Compagnie.” See Nagtegaal, Riding the 
Dutch: 16; and Ricklefs, De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: 361-369. 
193 Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: 30. 
194 Ibid.: 30. 
195 Raben,  Het Aziatisch legioen:184. 
196 As Nagtegaal states: “it was only in the extremities of war, when social life  itself was thrown out of joint,  that the network collapsed 
altogether”. See Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch Tiger: 45-46 and 51-55; and Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: 215. 
War-bands on Java 53 
 
demonstrate ones loyalty. Not attending this annual ceremony more or less paralleled rebellion and 
the seats and roles given during the celebrations exposed ones standing at the court.197 
 Outside the court, leaders were suppressed as much as possible. But the arms of Mataram 
were not strong and its grip not tight. The local power networks were still largely intact despites the 
conquest of Sultan Agung in the first half of the seventeenth century. When Trunajaya stormed the 
island, the peripheral cities and communities were governed by individual rulers with local roots. 
Therefore, they were very capable of disobeying courtly orders in case their interests were not 
served. The Sunan’s frustration with this power balance is illustrated by his attempt to turn things 
around in 1680. Multiple local leaders were replaced for one single, non-native, bupati per region 
(kabupaten). But still centralized control remained limited and conflicts stayed on the horizon.198 
The VOC men discussed here, found themselves at the heart of these conflicts: Cornelis 
Speelman and Antonio Hurdt landed in the middle of military affairs splitting the Javanese.199 They 
both had to direct and mobilize the combined army of the Company and Mataram by drawing in 
warlords. However, they were unable to control or fully understand the army under their guidance. 
There were large fractions of local allies with high independence and on the verges of Dutch 
administration. The VOC men could only partly recognize the organization of such war-bands, 
including their shifting alliances. Equally limited were the attempts to survey Trunajaya’s legions 
through correspondence, negotiations and embassies. And in some cases, the main impression on his 
warforce was derived from the warriors switching from one army to another. 
 Still, enough was perceived to formulate personal heuristics on both royal and martial 
matters. To appreciate those interpretations, analyses based on ‘relational objectivity’ will not suffice. 
Reflection on the epistemic value of the consulted sources is required to go beyond event-based 
interpretations of what historical subjects were supposedly thinking. A focus on chronological events 
and actors can be combined to suggest the presence of military fraternization perceived by certain 
historical subjects and occurring in a specific time frame. Those fragmented observations are small 
beams of light revealing larger military tendencies, markets and group formations. For between 
events and actors, one can find the war-band.200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
197 Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 45-46. 
198 Ibid.: 43-45. 
199 That is, to the degree that the Javanese were one people to begin with. 
200 That is to say, by considering the perspectives and associations of the VOC authors, the epistemic value of descriptions of Javanese 
martial organizations can be judged upon. Based on such a survey, the particular military labour market in which war-bands functioned as 
well as, in extension, the nature of war-bands can be more carefully interpreted from the VOC’s standpoint. 
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d. Case study: Van Goens 
To fathom the consequences of the preceding methodological assertions, I will offer a test case: 
Rijckloff Van Goens’ five embassies between 1648 and 1654. The example will equally demonstrate 
the effect of shifting associations on the appreciation of Mataram as a whole. More so than 
Speelman and Hurdt, Van Goens witnessed the centre of the mandala and was thus strongly exposed 
to its political tides. In addition, the case offers a comparison between delegates and admirals; or 
that of ambassadorial and martial commensurability. The VOC man entered a world of court intrigues 
and needed to reach diplomatic consensus through availing the courtly divides. He had the option to 
either do so by force or consent.201 
Van Goens (1619- 1682) is a well-known character within VOC history. His conquest of and 
rule over Ceylon plus his position as governor-general between 1678 and 1681 have brought him 
fame. It equally established an image of a ruthless colonizer interested in bashing the autonomy of 
local Asian leaders to pieces.202 As two authors have pointed out, however, Van Goens’ colonizing 
tendencies seem to have entrenched in the early 1650s only.203 Most of his accounts of the Javanese 
court predated this ‘turning point’. 
He visited Mataram five times between 1648 and 1654. In the elaborate accounts on these 
embassies, there are only scarce hints to the colonizing agenda he would embrace afterwards. The 
court is not portrayed as a burdensome institution per se. Instead, his writing demonstrates a 
concern for delving deeply into the Javanese mandala. It is only when negotiations break down in the 
last two embassies that dismissal of the kraton comes through.204 Still, even at that point there 
remains an evident interest in the courtly alliances and the way to use them to reach his diplomatic 
aims.  
His sudden aversion might indicate self-censorship while corresponding with Supreme 
Government or doubts about the feasibility of subduing Mataram. But these possibilities only partly 
explain the trends in his reports and letters.205 Not aversion but immersion defined his embassies. 
                                                          
201 I say ‘peaceful’ because no massive wars occurred. The court itself was by no means serene: the Sunan in these days, Amangkurat I, was 
known for his violent and aggressive punishments. See R. Van Goens, De Vijf Gezantschappen van Rijklof van Goens naar het Hof van 
Mataram 1648-1654, ed. H.J. de Graaf (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956): 74-75, 202-3, 221 and 254.  
202 K.W. Goonewardena, The Foundation of Dutch power in Ceylon 1638-1658. (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958); H. s’Jacob, “Rijcklof 
Volkertsz van Goens, 1619-1682: Kind van de Compagnie, diplomat en krijgsman.” In De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: tussen oorlog 
en diplomatie, eds. : G. Knaap en G. Teitler (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2002): 131-151; A. Van der Kraan.” A Baptism of Fire: The Van Goens 
Mission to Ceylon and India, 1653-54.” Journal of the UNE Asia Centre 2 (1999): 1-52; and M. De Wever, ed. Javaense Reyse: de Bezoeken 
van een VOC-gezant aan het Hof van Mataram, 1648-1654 (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 1995). 
203 s´Jacob, “Rijcklof Volckertsz”: 140; and Van der Kraan, A Baptism of Fire: 1-52. 
204 Van Goens expresses this very clearly in his 1655 Vertooch. See  R. Van Goens, “Rapport van Van Goens; Vertooch wegens den 
presenten staet van de generale Nederlantse geoctroijeerde Oost-Indische Comp.” Bijdrage tot de taal-,Iand- en volkenkunde van 
Neerlands-Indië 4 (1856): 180. 
205 Van Goens might have purposely avoided direct critique on Maetsuycker’s government. At the same time, he neither expressed his 
aversion under the more liberal regime of the preceding governor-generals Cornelis van der Lijn and Carel Reyniersz. The hierarchical 
context in which he functioned does thus not explain much of Van Goens’ silence in this political debate. On the other hand, s’Jacob asserts 
that the very idea of an aggressive policy towards Asian rulers would only come to him during his voyage back to the United Provinces in 
1655. Goonewardena, The Foundation: 162-165; s´Jacob, “Rijcklof Volckertsz”: 140; W.M. Ottow, Rijckloff  Volckertsz Van Goens: De 
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After serving as secretary to Sebalt Wonderer during the first visit, he took charge of the delegation 
and was thereby enabled to carefully examine court relations. Van Goens used the knowledge of 
translators like Michiel Zeeburch and Matthijs Pietersen -who spend years in Mataram as captives- to 
his own avail. He praised the latter to “get along with these people wonderfully” and “speak the 
Javanese language fluently”. Zeeburch even converted to Islam and appeared to have married a 
Javanese wife. Assistants like that could guide Van Goens over the cultural and linguistic gap to the 
core of the kraton.206 
The VOC man’s framing of the reeling and dealing at the royal centre thereby tells a lot about 
the degree to which a European outsider could grasp the elaborate networks of Javanese court 
alliances. Confusion remained. The delegate, for instance, misinterpreted royal titles he encountered 
as representing the realms of subordinate kingdoms. As a consequence, he drew a faulty map of the 
mandala. For Schrieke, “this fact leads one to accept with some reservations what he has further to 
say regarding the administrative structure of Mataram”.207 Still, the VOC man was able to, if not 
touch, at least approach the essence of courtly functions of Pangérans, Tumĕnggungs, and that of 
the Sunan himself. Hence, Bertrand takes Van Goens as the sole eyewitness of the Mataramese state 
centralization; albeit one “légèrement plus tardif”.208 
Such judgement can be substantiated with an analysis of the reports used to convey his 
insights. Delving into Van Goens’ mind-set requires a concern for the different mediums used to pen 
down his observations. Whereas these were daghregisters -daily journals- for the first three 
embassies, the fourth and fifth one have been conveyed in letters and general reports. S’Jacob stated 
how Rijckloff’s writing style loosened accordingly.209 Yet, such loosening does not seem to have 
greatly affected Van Goens’ literary devices for judging the Javanese. 
 Clearly, daghregisters do have a more formal and chronological structure. In fact, the first 
one was even written anonymously, which stresses the bureaucratic nature of these documents.210 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Carrière van een Diplomaat 1619-1655 (Utecht: Utrecht University, 1954): 6 and 159-174; and L. P. van Putten.  Ambitie en Onvermogen: 
Gouverneurs-Generaal van Nederlands-Indië 1610-1796. (Rotterdam: ILCO-Productions, 2002). Notice that although interesting for the 
primary material gathered, Ottow’s work also comes close to being a hagiography. He wrote a sequel too, equally admiring, which can be 
consulted in the Royal Library in The Hague. 
206 Notice that Zeeburch did not follow Van Goens to the kraton. But he was used as a translator and spy on other occasions after returning 
to the VOC in 1651. Therefore, he would have likely influenced the information that reached Van Goens indirectly. Zeeburch left the 
Company in 1653 and moved to Djuwana under the protection of Tumĕnggung Pati. The quotes are translated from Dutch: “wonderlicq 
met dat volck ... om te gaen”; and “in de Javaense tale prompt is, ende vryposticheyt heeft, om by de groote zyn woort redelyck te doen”. 
See Van Goens, Vijf Gezantschappen: 80 and 466; and H.J. De Graaf,  De regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, vorst van Mataram 
1646-1677 Deel I: De ontbinding van het rijk (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961): 86-87. 
207 For instance, Schrieke writes: “Van Goens clearly constructed his subjugated kings of Purbaya, Blitar, and Silarong, and imagined his 
provinces of those names on the analogy of these examples.” See Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies vol. II: 187- 189. 
208 As Houben notices: “The prince’s title (Pangéran) earlier belonged to the regional lords of Java (formely: mahamantri), who were 
subjected by Mataram and incorporated into the realm. Thus the Dutch envoy Rijckloff van Goens was not wide of the mark when, during 
his visits to the Javanese courts, he defined all Pangéran as subordinate kings”. See Bertrand, État Colonial:  42; and Houben and Kolff, 
Between Empire building: 167-169. 
209 s’Jacob wrote: “In de loop van zijn missies naar het hof van Mataram zien we Van Goens in zijn rol groeien. Tot de derde missie hield hij 
keurig een dagverhaal bij maar daarna werd de toon losser en gaf hij vaker zijn eigen mening.” See  s´Jacob, “Rijcklof Volckertsz”: 140. 
210 Despites the unknown authorship of the first daghregister, there are clues suggesting Van Goens as the author. 
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Yet, when it comes down to it, they enabled a similar kind of reflection on the occurrences during the 
audiences as well as the events before, in-between and afterwards. Of course, letters did usually 
address a more particular topic and general reports could juxtapose events that occurred on 
different days. Still, expecting such differences to result in fundamentally different narratives by Van 
Goens is far-fetched. Rather, s’Jacob’s implication that the changed medium reflects an increased 
comfort with the kraton politics is well taken.  
Within all the sources, one can recognize a consistent approach towards the Javanese society. 
It is only in the overarching report addressed to the Lords XVII in 1655, Javaense Reyse, that the 
stories gain a fundamentally different character. Amangkurat I suddenly receives a more despotic 
personality and malpractices at the court are highlighted.211 The text seemingly caricaturizes 
Mataram and is therefore best perceived as part of a diptych with Van Goens’ Vertooch pamphlet 
from 1655.212 This report, after all, sees the eyewitness turn into an orator. 
The Vertooch pamphlet -addressing issues of concern to the Lord XVII and striving for more 
VOC dominance in Asia- forcefully rejected Asian polities and advocated increased independence 
from those corrupted trade partners. What is more, Christian sentiments pop up that had been 
marginal in his previous texts. Javaense Reyse picked up on this theme and appears to transform and 
embellish his embassy experiences to exaggerate the inefficient and lawless central Javanese court 
hierarchy. Even this document, nonetheless, shows through the court fraternization Van Goens was 
exposed to. Therefore, it is not to be entirely disdained. Rather, it demonstrates how the same court 
structure was described differently when viewed with distinguishable political motivations.  
So, what did Van Goens tell us about the court coalitions? First, I will discuss his 
interpretations given in the direct reports; afterwards a short contrast is drawn with his Javaense 
Reyse. A key point is Van Goens’ own functioning within the court. The man became trapped in royal 
games of affiliation. The elaborate attention for court relations and etiquette is a remnant of this. It 
indicates how courtly contacts shaped the information reaching Van Goens. Many of his observations 
could have only been derived from Javanese sources; treating circumstances that occurred more 
than a decade earlier, or that involved intricate details of the court system.213 
                                                          
211 De Wever refers to Orientalist tendencies in the text; stereotyping the East as a place of unrestricted sensuality and intrinsic violence. 
See R. Van Goens, Javaense Reyse: de bezoeken van een VOC-gezant aan het hof van Mataram, 1648-1654, ed. M. De Wever  (Amsterdam: 
Terra Incognita, 1995): 94, 99-101, and 118-119. 
212 De Wever makes this point too, stating: “Van Goens schreef in Javaense Reyse niet als onafhankelijk waarnemer over Mataram, maar als 
werknemer in opdracht van zijn werkgever de VOC. Dezegrote handelsonderneming manifesteerde zich in Azie slechts met een 
oogmerk:winst maken.” See Leupe, “Rapport Van Goens”: 180; and M. De Wever, ”‘Ambassades aen den Sousouhounan Mattaram, 
machtigste coninck van 't eijlant Groot Java’ De VOC-gezantschapsreizen van Rijklof van Goens en zijn voorgangers.” Indische Letteren 11 
(1996): 31-43; and idem., Javaense Reyse: 114 and 119. 
213 De Wever, Javaense Reyse: 116. 
War-bands on Java 57 
 
 
Picture 6 The map of the Mataramese kraton Plered (1646-1680), which was likely drawn by Van Goens with the 
assistance of his informant Pietersen. In the lower right corner the residencies of different courtiers are numbered; the 
locations are indicated on the map. These numbers demonstrate efforts to unravel the court networks.214 
 Fractions split the intelligence received. After decades of mutual avoidance under Sultan 
Agung, his successor Amangkurat I finally sought contact. His court was divided on these approaches; 
some welcomed the VOC, others quite the opposite. Even though we cannot expect binary opposites, 
the texts of Van Goens sometimes do suggest them. Already during the first embassy, complaints are 
made on the limited visits to courtiers due to “the jealousy between them”.215 Wierra Patra, for 
instance, showed dismay at being visited later than the Tumĕnggung Mataram. Subsequently, the 
report dismisses the former as a distrusted stooge of the Sunan; calling him arrogant and feeble-
minded.216 
                                                          
214 Notice that the picture is twisted due to lack of space. “Vertooningh van de Provinciale Hofplaats van de Sourousounan Ingalaga, 
genaamt Mataram of de Hoofdstad syns Ryks.” Kaartcollectie Buitenland Leupe. Nationaal Archief, 126 (as accessed via 
http://proxy.handle.net/10648/af992fa2-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84, on 24-02-2014. See R.A. Kern, “Een Kaart van Mataram.” 
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 113, no.2 (1957): 205. 
215 The report states:  “sulcken gevalle meer grooten besocht souden hebben, tensij uit jalousie d'een tegen d'ander”. “Want wanneer op 't 
versoeck van voorschreven Wierra patra bij hem verschenen, soo bespeurden terstond afgunstigheijt tegens den tommagon Mattaram, 
ons soetelijck reprocherende, hoe wij soo weijgerich waren geweest tot sijnent te comen, daer doch soo dickmael bij den tommagon 
gingen, daerbij voegende : seijde den Sousounangh tegens den tommagon vader , hij noemden hem outsten broeder”. Nebeij Wiera Patra 
was involved in another case of jealousy. Van Goens, Vijf Gezantschappen: 60. 
216 Note that this man was also known as the assassin of Wiera Goena, whom is described as an enemy of the Dutch. From the account a 
Dutch prisoner, Wiera Goena is claimed to have been personally responsible for the murder of several Dutchmen after the request for their 
liberation during a previous embassy.  Ibid.: 23, 60 and 62. 
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 The arrival of the fourth embassy was judged gloomily because the deputy welcoming them 
was seen as “our biggest enemy, and would not prefer anything more than our downfall”. This Anga 
Prajia was a court translator that seemingly had troubled the delegates before. Tension was only 
relieved when the favoured Tumĕnggung Pati appeared a bit later to guide them further.217 Evidently, 
the right connections mattered much for reaching success.  
 In fact, Van Goens’ attempt to disentangle the courtly ties and schisms went further than 
mere side-observations. He tried to stipulate the relations between the courtiers, saw the Garebeg 
Muludan court gatherings, the Sumatran embassies and noticed places at the kraton only accessible 
to favoured ‘nobles and friends’.218 Most importantly, Javanese nobles informed him on courtly feuds 
during his stay inlands. Most reveal an aggressive search to centralize the realm. So he is told by 
some Kjais that “the chief reason for the Susuhunan to travel southwards was to eliminate certain 
old lords, like Tumĕnggung Arta Tales and Tumĕnggung Wiera Sastra”.219 It is a confession leaving the 
delegate dazzled by the “odd manner of their government” to “kill the old, to make room for the 
young”.220 
 Javaense Reyse contains the bloodiest account of the Sunan’s aggression; telling about the 
large-scale murder of Islamic ‘priests’ whose bodies were still spread over the countryside. It appears 
these religious figures had favoured Allah over the monarch. The embassy reports describe 
executions too. During the third embassy, the courtier Ango Prajia conveys to Van Goens that the 
Sunan could not attend the VOC embassy for he was busy “killing 25 Javanese (…) whom against the 
Susuhunan’s order courted several Balinese women”. So, the delegates instead entertained 
themselves at Kjai Patra Mangala’s house.221 Similar events happened during the other embassies.222 
But punishments were not the Sunan’s only means to control. Van Goens is struck several 
times by the way in which warfare is applied as a power tool. In Javaense Reyse, he refers to the 
register of all “noteworthy lords” and their followers. The importance of martial power thus even led 
                                                          
217 Ibid.: 96 and 118-119 . 
218. Concerning the off-limit areas, it is mentioned that the “zuijderpleijn, alwaer wij audientie gehadt hebben, daer niemant mag 
binnencomen dan sijn beste vrinden ende heeren, daerop sich vertrout, ende uut deselve niemandt, dan die door hem daer geroepen 
wierden”. See ibid.: 46, 66, 79-80, 87-88 and 91-93. 
219 Van Goens received this information during the return travel of the embassy. The quote above is roughly translated from: “'de principale 
saeck, daerom den Sousounangh sijn reijse om de zuijt hadde aengenomen,was om eenige van d' oude grooten, daar hij noch op gebeten 
was, om den hals te helpen, als den Tommagon Arta Tales en de den Tommagon Wiera Sastra”. Later on, he hears about the hostilities 
between “Wiera Sittia ende Soeta met Angapraja”. The former assist the Dutch in their hunt for Chinese defaulters. During the third 
embassy, Van Goens would come to know that Wiera Sittia and Anga Praija had lost the Sunan's favour. Wiera Sittia was even degraded to 
a post in Kendal. Around the same time the news drippe din that “den Tommagon Mattaram mede in ongenade des Conincx was ende alle 
sijn volck, zijnde 6000 mannen, hem affgenomen waeren, ende geordineert was, sich als een gemeen Edelman met weijnich swiete te 
erneren”. Ibid.: 67-70 and 79-80. 
220 Translated from “'t Stondt noch te [ge]loven, dat het getal met geen 2 ofte 3 soude ophouden, daar door de vreemde maniere van hunne 
regeringe can bespeurt werden, die voor d' onse onbegrijpelijck is, mits d'oude vermoort werden, om de jonge plaetse in te ruijmen”. Ibid.: 
67. 
221 Van Goens, Javaense Reyse; and idem., Vijf Gezantschappen: 84. 
222 For the fourth Van Goens writes that there “was groote verslagentheijt onder de grooten om des Conincx grimmicheijt ende gestadige 
toorn, dat meest dag elijcx d'een ofte d'ander den hals coste”. Ibid.: 119. 
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to a bureaucracy surrounding it. Tellingly, Amangkurat I’s first enquiry is on the Dutch contacts with 
his martial rivals. It is plausible the VOC appeared as another potential warlord on his list.223 
Feigning war was effective too. The first embassy report concludes it is “certain” that the 
Sunan’s call to attack Banten, served no other reason than “to keep his enemies under fear, or 
eliminate his distrusted subordinates“.224 His analysis of the alliance between Mataram and Banten 
in 1652 equally typifies. Concerned with a potential pan-Islamic attack and a shrinking rice supply, he 
sets out the new marital links connecting the polities as well as the courtly oppositions towards 
them.225 
 Two political strands are described. On one side, the resistance of Pangéran Purbaja against 
the marriage. On the other, the plans of the “priests and other riff-raff” to attack Bali first and leave 
Banten in peace for now. Van Goens knows this plan is being advocated in the name of Sultan Agung 
who had assumingly claimed that “one should turn Mataram’s arms to the East before taking them 
to the West, otherwise they will not be blessed”. He had heard a near lethal accident with an 
exploding cannon had made Amangkurat I religious and abiding to the “priests”.226 
Besides confirming to the VOC delegate how “whimsical” these people are, the account 
above also shows how the delegates’ ties could establish and break apart. Next to the punishments, 
and war treats plus peace agreements, a vital way of expressing political preferences was through 
the embassy itself. The VOC men indicated their subordinate visitor status by wearing a yellow band 
and carrying their letter above the head. The most explicit expression of Javanese dominance was, 
however, the distance at which one was seated from the Sunan.227 
 The VOC visits were comparatively rare next to the frequent commission of local leaders. 
The more dismissive nature of ‘indigenous’ embassies is recognized by the VOC men. The Pangéran 
from Jambi visiting the court in 1651 is said to be “in awe of the Susuhunan’s power” and to 
undertake the journey “against [his] own wish”.228 It became obvious to Van Goens that subjected 
                                                          
223 Ibid.: 45, and 54. See also De Wever, Javaense Reyse: 41. 
224 This war never materialized Van Goens, Vijf Gezantschappen: 67.  
225 For the VOC, Mataram hostility towards either Banten or Blambangan was both equally obstructing. In both cases, it would likely mean 
an attempt by the Sunan to assure Dutch neutrality through putting the rice supply under pressure. Pan-Islamic alliances between Banten 
and Mataram would endanger Batavia for an attack from East and West. During the embassy these threats did not seem likely, however. 
Van Goens states: “Immers met Bantham is 't heel aff, ende tracht men des Conincx outste soon off den pangoran Maes (geseijt prince des 
Rijcx),  met een dochter van Bantham te trouwen, nochtans met conditien, dat de Banthammer een van syn kinderen ofte naeste 
bloetverwanten, dependenten van 't Ryck synde, aldaer ten hove senden sal ende jaerlycx continueren, wanneer den Coninck ofte 
Sousouhounan aenneemt vrient ende bontgenoot van den Sultan te wesen”. Ibid.: 103-104 and 153. 
226 The quotes are translated from Dutch: “papen en ander gespuys” and ”men soude de Matarams wapenen eerst naer 't Oosten ende dan 
naer 't Westen wenden, anders waeren se niet gesegent.”. On the religious turn of the Sunan he states: “dit doet hem religieus werden, bid 
de papen voor hem te bidden, staet aff van syn hartneckigh voomemen, sweert den oorlogh tegen 't Oosten ende belooft hem met den 
Bantammer te bevredigen, behoudens de reputatie synes persoons”. Ibid.: 122-123. 
227 Ibid.: 53- 54, 102-103 and 122-125. 
228 The quotes are roughly translated from Dutch: “de oorsaacke, waerom desen pangoran ten hove comt, geschiet nergens dan uijt 
ontsach van des Sousouhounans macht, ende genoech tegens den Jambijnees sijn sin, ’t welck UEd. vrijelijck voor vast gelieven aen te 
nemen; ende 't gene de Jambijnesen van hun out hercoment maechschap voorgeven (hoe wel 't seecker ende waer is) is niet dan omtrent 
ons hun cleijn heijt tegens den Coninck te bedecken.”Ibid.: 94. 
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polities needed to be submitted to these rituals if the realm was to be kept together. Schism within 
the court were not all that mattered, those between the centre and the periphery were just as 
important.  
Gradually, the independence enjoyed by local rulers was noted. That the fringes of Mataram 
were not easily commanded by the kraton came across when Van Goens needed to pay extra fees to 
locals while settling the trade post of Japara. Or when he needed to retrieve the promised rice 
himself when it turned out not to be delivered to Semarang by the local leaders.229 The Sunan 
expressed his concern for disloyal subjects multiple times. The Javanese migrating to Batavia were, 
for instance, dismissed as “bad and lazy no-goods, that flee from their masters” deserving to be 
punished.230 
 
Picture 7 Tournament games in the court of Mataram. This is how the kraton is depicted in Schouten, Oost-Indische 
Voyagie (1676). Halfway the 1670s, Van Goens’ embassies, mainly as expressed in Javaense Reyse, still provided the 
main insight into the Central Javanese court. No surprise, then, that Schouten chose to visualize it as both violent and 
autocratic, with all princes watching their peers being stabbed of horses. Just like the earlier engraving from this book, 
the Sunan’ army is large and mighty, appearing to dominate his subordinate rulers.231 
                                                          
229 As is stated in one of Van Goens’ reports: “hoewel den Coninck ons geschoncken had, 't gene wij begeerden, soo conden die luijden, die 
reede op dit eijlandt woonden, niet verdrijven ofte wij mosten den Gouverneur, die last had ons huijs op te maacken, de handt salven met 
200 Ra., doch niet eer te leveren, voordat wij 't eijlandt aileen in possessie hadden”. Ibid.: 95, 112 and 116. 
230 The quote is translated from Dutch: “'quade luije schelmen, die haer meesters ontlopen”.Ibid.: 86. 
231 “Tournooispel te Mataram in 1664” In Schouten, Oost-Indische Voyagie Derde Boeck: 147. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, RP-P-OB-47-468. 
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  In fact, the way in which Amangkurat I was subordinating the coast during these times 
demonstrates his need to clamp to it as if it could break away every moment. Local rulers were put 
under strict legislative and taxative restraints to ensure their loyalty. Even the VOC post at Japara was 
perceived as submissive to the court, despites its clear service to the Europeans.232 Yet, the 
centralization attempts witnessed by Van Goens were largely in vain. The possibilities to enact 
policies far from the kraton were limited, and governors strengthen their status through tertiary 
alliances. 
 The Company became a great allure to them. Throughout the embassies, multiple lords of 
the Sunan request the prolonged stay of the Dutch, usually for protection from their overlord.233 In 
this manner, the VOC offered local rulers a remedy to intensified central control by the court. When 
the VOC delegates wanted to sail off to end their third embassy, several Javanese governors came on 
board and delayed the depart so much that Van Goens reckoned they were ”exceptionally attached 
to us, as if we were their guardians against the Susuhunan”.234 
In 1651, Anga Praija assumed even the mere arrival of the VOC delegates to bring him and 
other coastal governors “back in the king’s favour”. Three year later, Tumĕnggung Patty and Nebey 
Wangsaradja felt the opposite when the VOC delegates had not brought the cannons that the two 
courtiers had ensured the Sunan to arrive. Nonetheless, the bupati succeeded in convincing Van 
Goens not to mention these issues at court and delayed his arrival till after the jurisdiction day. In 
this way, the embassy was still employed as protection against the Sunan’s wrath.235 
On the other hand, the VOC delegates were frequently assisted themselves. Van Goens, for 
instance, called on two ‘old ladies’ functioning within the kraton to speed up his demission. At 
another time, he supported on Tumĕnggung Patinata-Airnawa and the governor of Patramenggala to 
get extra rice supplies.236 At the end of his final embassy, two bupatis even assisted sacking 
Makassarese ships in Japara.237 Next to these aids, informal meetings were equally arranged without 
any apparent aim other than the consumption of wine.238 
                                                          
232 This became clear while Van Goens was discussing permission for the VOC resident of Japara to immediately visit the Sunan whenever 
he is being obstructed in his dealing by the local leaders. Amangkurat I approved this, stating the residents were bound to listen to his call. 
Yet, a year later the Sunan would be offended when one of the head of the Japara trade post would leave to Batavia without a request to 
the Sunan. Van Goens, Vijf Gezantschappen: 35, 84, 111-112 and 128. See also De Graaf, De Regering vol. I.: 83-85. 
233 During the first embassy, ‘Queij Soeta’ asks the VOC delegates to remain at the Semarang harbour, for a few days longer, which is 
declined. Van Goens, Vijf Gezantschappen: 68. 
234 The quote is a rough translation from: “die hem sonderlinge veel aan ons laet gelegen syn, als die syn lyffbeschermers omtrent den 
Sousouhounan zyn”. It concerns two nobles in particular.Ibid.: 96-97.  
235 The quote is translated from Dutch: “met onse comste weder in de gunst des Conincks soude comen d'andere resterende Zee-
Gouverneurs waren mede in decadentie, soodat naer apparentie binnen corten tijt pertije stonden over de klingh te dansen (…)”.Ibid.: 79-
80, 134, 142, and 158-163. 
236 These old ladies were Ingneijns't Chila and Parangh. Ibid.: 86-87 and 94 
237 He reasons: “daermede dan den roep genoch in Maccassar sal comen, om hun te doen gelooven, dat dese custen voor haeronveijl zijn 
(...)”.The Batavian government was quite displeased with these actions and opted to not tell the Sunan about them, hoping the courtiers 
would not do so either. Ibid.: 150-152 and 165- 170. 
238 Van Goens mentions how halfway the third embassy a lot of courtiers were visited “die alle sonderlingen smaack in onse Spaence wijn 
hadden, ende dickwils niet vertrocken, voordat thuijs gedragen werden”. Unfortunately no further information is given. Ibid.: 86. 
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The refined way of interacting with the elites largely limited the actual inter-personal contact 
to the kraton and regional centres. Yet, the latter’s impact could define the image of the Javanese 
way of living beyond the courtly walls.239 Van Goens does draw some generalized conclusion about 
the “Javanese” based on his strictly courtly networks. He notices their “hospitable and polite attitude” 
and less obese body shape. When frustration rises, especially during his fifth embassy, derogatory 
comments intensify; the Javanese are condemned for their “slowness” and to be trusted “as much as 
flies”.240 
Clearly, the most important contact was with the Sunan himself. On occasion, cultural 
exchanges similar to the interchange of paintings at the Mughal court happened. Be it that the 
objects of interest were weapons and horses. This did not keep the parties from praising each other’s 
cannons and stallions, which appeared to be among the Sunan’s pastimes.241 Acts like these 
strengthened a mutual hospitality. During the first three embassies, hardly any incommensurability 
was produced. The reception of the delegates symbolizes this. The magnificence of it even left some 
Pangérans amazed about “the extra honour the Susuhunan gave to them”.242 
 A shift would occur halfway 1652, however. Amangkurat I started emplacing restrictions on 
rice exports and logging. The underlying but ambiguous reason was the need for reserves due to a 
looming war with Banten. As it turned out, no such direct hostilities were planned by the Sunan. 
Rather, the restrictions functioned as a scheme to make Batavia more dependent on the court. This 
strategy was an old one: Javanese rulers used it back in the sixteenth century in an attempt to 
subdue Makassar.243 
 Van Goens was requested to deliver a fourth embassy to resolve the issue. Like previous 
years, the envoy existed out of fourteen men as not to expose the Company’s anxiety. Yet, the fear 
was reflected by the higher value of gifts brought with them.244  Even though the issues could be 
temporarily resolved through signing a new contract, a new court visit was required within a few 
months. Van Gent delivered it reluctantly after failing to strike a deal with the Japara leaders 
directly.245 Effort was thus made to bypass the Sunan altogether and to build on connections with his 
subordinates.   
                                                          
239 Van Goens, Javaense Reyse: 107 and 108.  
240 The quotes are translated from Dutch, e.g. “traecheijt deser menschen”. See ibid.: 107; and Van Goens, Vijf Gezantschappen: 12, 134, 
150 and 158-164. 
241 On the horses Van Goens comments:”'soo ' t scheen wilde ons den coninck hier mede te kennen geven, of te weI berispen, dat hij sijn 
paerden [beter] dan wij wisten te voeden”. Van Goens, Vijf Gezantschappen: 57, 84-86 and 94. 
242 Ibid.: 94. 
243 Ibid.: 95-99. 
244 This was about f 58727; more than three times the amount given in each of the previous embassies. In 1654, the VOC spend f 27171, 
which was a noticeable figure too.  Ibid.: 32. 
245 Ibid.: 94., 126-127. 
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 Not much was achieved through this tactic, however. A new embassy was set up in 1654 to 
gain further cooperation from the Sunan. Van Goens was again called upon to fix the lingering 
restrictions as well as provoke a war between Mataram and Makassar. The latter request had to 
appear a personal one, for the VOC wanted to conceal their limited capabilities for warring the south 
Sulawesian polity. Flattery was used to pull in the Sunan; Van Goens calling him the “biggest king in 
the world” and asserting the mere fact of him declaring war would scare away the opponents.246 
A translation error during the request enabled the courtiers contentious about fighting the 
Makassarese to intervene. Tumĕnggung Paty and Nebey Wangsaradja, who were mentioned earlier 
as the courtiers anxious about the lack of cannon gifts, objected that the VOC put too much pressure 
on Mataram and that “one should not appeal to the king to war his fellow believers”.247 The fraction 
hostile towards the VOC had spoken. 
Soon after, Amangkurat I politely refused the suggestion, supposedly stating Batavia and 
Mataram were like a single household: “Batavia was the husband due to his combativeness, and 
Mataram was the housewife due to her incapability and weakness”.248 To Van Goens, these “empty 
offers” meant minimal Mataramese assistance; leaving the hard work to the Company. From that 
moment on, the VOC man would fathom the infeasibility of his demands. As De Wever suggested, 
the European perception on the Asians was largely determined by their ‘usability’.249 Van Goens’ 
subsequent dismissal of the kraton is hence not unexpected. 
 His writing started to reflect his frustrations. The delegate criticizes the “special incapabilities 
that excel in the nature of these people and the flightiness that is detectable within it”. He dismisses 
“barbarians” and their “windy offers” and expects any concession to change whenever “the king feels 
like it”.250 It is “as clear as the sun that the king never intended to fight Makassar or any of his 
                                                          
246 Van Goens’ statement to Amangkurat I reads as follows: “Dat den Coningh van Maccassar wel sagh, dat hy tegens soo grooten Coningh 
niet bestaen conden als den Sousouhounan, ende daerom liever ons tegens d' Amboyneesen socht te becommeren, om door middel van 
onse oneenicheyt proffyt te doen, en dat wy vast stelden, soo de Sousouhounan den oorlogh tegens hem aennam, dat hy wel in corten tyt 
mocht contributaris van den Sousouhounan werden (…)by weleker goet succes hy een der grootste Coningen van de werelt syn zoude!” 
Ibid.: 138 and 156-162. 
247 These courtiers thus understood Malay and dared to intervene between the Sunan and the delegates. The quote is translated from 
Dutch: “‘Anga Praija (…) wert op 't jongste belet door den Tommagon Paty ende meest door Wangsa-Radja, juyst daer den Coningh tot den 
oorlogh geanimeert wert, voorgevende, dit discours tehooch liep ende men den Coningh niet behoorde te raden tot oorlogh tegens haer 
gelooffsverwanten (…)”. Ibid.: 139 and 140. 
248 The quote is translated form Dutch: “hy geen vyanden hadde, ende met niemant in oorloge waere, maer was seer belust syn volek 
onder d'onse ten stryde te conjugeren om te bethoonen dat wy een land besaeten, die als man en vrouw huys hielden; daerbij voegende: 
Batavia was de man, om haer strytbaerheyt, ende de Mataram was de vrouw, om haer oncunde ende slapherticheyt; gevende genoch te 
kennen, dat hy veel meer genegen  was, ons met volck te willen adsisteren, als wel een ander met de macht van syn vaertuygen te 
offenceeren.” Ibid.: 145 
249 Van Goens, Javaense Reyse: 108; and idem.: Vijf Gezantschappen: 94- 107.,  
250 The quotes are translated from Dutch: “‘speciale incapaciteijten, die in denature deeser mensch[en] uijtmunten ende de variabelheijt, 
diedaerin bespeurt wert”; “winderige aanbiedingen”; and “den Coninck weder andere sinnen in 't hooft comen”. Van Goens, Vijf 
Gezantschappen: 141-142 and 145-146. 
War-bands on Java 64 
 
subjects, countries or provinces”.251 At the same time, he also loses trust in the capabilities of his 
courtly contacts, his “assumed Javanese friends”, to speak in his favour. This while the hostile 
courtiers deserve a tough treatment, for a soft one would only make them “braver and bolder”.252 
Van Goens’ comments were not merely prompted by personal animosities but equally reflect 
a growing sense of incompatibilities between two societies. His ‘Javaense Reyse’ and ‘Vertooch’ 
exposes the disbelief in future cooperation. They suggest the Susuhunan brutally dominates and 
arbitrary rules abound. The people accepting such dictatorship are not to be trusted either. The VOC 
delegate “often wondered on the sovereign power of this ruler, that I even figured it a miracle rather 
than an ordinary course, to govern such numerous people in such a slavish matter”.253 
 A large section of ‘Javaense Reyse’ is dedicated to the intrigues between the young 
Amangkurat and Wira Guna; an important governor of Sultan Agung. Eventually this would result in 
the massive murder of priests, with whom Wira Guna had aligned. The lesson Van Goens draws from 
this gory episode is how a “gruesome, tough and unyielding wrathful nature” is rousing “this nation”, 
“yet how deceitfully these people hide their pretensions through skilful courtesy”.254 The centralizing 
urges were now seen as autocratic suppressions. No wonder, then, that refuge was sought among 
the local governors to at least make some impact. As a desperate final attempt to draw in the Sunan 
to war Makassar, he sacked two Makassarese ships in Japara with the help of local rulers.255 This was 
the only wedge to be driven between the overlord and his ‘subservient’ subjects.  
 Whereas the Central Javanese landscape is admired for its transparent beauty, its denizens 
are condemned for their inconceivable behaviour. No emotions are shown, it is impossible to even 
see “whether they are good or bad, happy or sad”. While this can make them worthy warriors, it 
equally makes them deceitful, jealous, and thievish. These were “evil and ungrateful humans” 
comparable to “Chams’ children” from the story of Noah.256 The fruitless inter-personal relations at 
the court resulted in a castigating view of the society as a whole, leaving no hope for inter-cultural 
compatibility. The depiction of the Oriental despot sucking the blood of his apathetic subjects did not 
                                                          
251 The quote is translated form Dutch: “zijnde soo claer als de zon, dat den Coninck noijt gedachten heeft gehadt, Maccassar ofte ymant 
zijner onderdaenen, landen, ofte plaetsen te bevechten, als in 't verhael van deesen UEde. nader gelieven te zien, insgelijcx 't principaelste 
op dese reijse voorgevallen”. Ibid.: 153. 
252 Namely Tumĕnggung Patij and Tumĕnggung Suranata. The quote is translated from Dutch: “'gepretendeerde Javaence vrunden”. Ibid.: 
134, 143, 154-156 and 165-170. 
253 The quote derives from: “my dickmael soodanigh verwondert over de souverayne macht van desen vorst, dat ick 't selve eer een mirakel 
dan een ordinair maniere genaemt heb, om suleken grooten volek soo slaefs te regeren”. Van Goens, Javaense Reyse: 47. 
254 The quote derives from: “Uyt dit lange verhael mach men oordeelen van wat wreede, harde, ende onversettelijckehaet-dragende 
nature dese natie gedreven wert” and “mitsgaders hoe verradersch dese menschen haer voornemens door konstig veynsen weten te 
verbergen.” Ibid.: 74.   
255 He reasons: “daermede dan den roep genoch in Maccassar sal comen, om hun te doen gelooven, dat dese custen voor haeronveijl zijn 
(...)”.The Batavian government was quite displeased with these actions and opted to not tell the Sunan about them, hoping the courtiers 
would not do so either. Van Goens, Vijf Gezantschappen: 150-152 and 165- 170. 
256 The quotes derive from: “Of se goet of quaet zijn” and "die ick om haer ongelooffeIijcke boosheijt voor eenige Chams kinderen houden.” 
Van Goens, Javaense Reyse: 85 and idem., Vijf Gezantschappen: 184. 
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derive from a priori biases towards Asians, but growing dissatisfaction in seeking cooperation with 
them.257 
A triangle of empirical description can be discerned. While picking up the sources, one will 
first notice the frameworks used to understand the phenomena surrounding the VOC man. Then the 
associations with indigenous informants are detected. Interestingly enough, the intelligence granted 
by these contacts evoked a whole new set of descriptive tendencies. Van Goens’ dismissal of the 
Javanese polity rooted in his suspicion towards certain courtiers and catalysed when he sensed the 
incapability of his kraton acquaintances to advocate his aims. The initial suspicion subsequently grew 
to new proportions and caused the VOC man to shift his attention to provincial rulers. By and by, 
involvement with the local networks again led to new reflections and raised fears for Javanese 
autocracy.   
 
e. Expanding the case study: Trunajaya 
The analysis of Van Goens’ reports shows the discourse on violent Oriental despots ultimately derives 
from alliances and fractions faced at court. The account given on Trunajaya can be delved out in this 
manner too. The degree to which he is depicted as a terrorizing vicious warlord rather than a capable 
ruler seems largely determined by the kind of informants engaged with. To trace the research 
possibilities left, I will end with an overview of what has been written on the warlord by De Graaf and 
Ricklefs. Especially their selection and interpretation of sources will reveal the potential for further 
enquiry. 
As told earlier, Trunajaya was born bearing the name of Nila Prawata. He descended from 
Cakraningrat I; the Madurese leader that was exiled to the Mataramese kraton by Sultan Agung. Nila 
Prawata was soon orphaned. Both his grandfather and father passed away, the latter being 
murdered at Amangkurat I‘s court. Apparently the family was perceived too powerful as formal 
vassal rulers of West Madura. Instead Trunajaya’s uncle, Cakranigrat II, was given the office.258 From 
then on, Trunajaya’s struggle grew.259 
Van Goens has described the previously mentioned courtly contests in his reports; framing 
them in his understanding of the kraton. Both De Graaf and Ricklefs have made ample use of these 
sources to recover courtly affairs. Treachery was very dominant at the court, and after some time 
Trunajaya himself fell into disfavour with the very man that had both raised him as an orphan and 
                                                          
257 De Wever expected the former, see De Wever, Javaense Reyse: 118-119. 
258 Pangéran Alit murdered Trunajaya’s father. De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 2-3; and idem., De regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, 
vorst van Mataram 1646-1677 Deel II: Opstand en Ondergang (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962):, 49.  
259 This royal family turned out much less faithful than the Sultan might have expected. Notice that no absolute certainty remains about 
Trunajaya’s original name; but Nila Prawata is the most likely one. See K. Van Dijk, H. de Jonge, and E. Touwen-Bouwsma, “Introduction”, In 
Across Madura Strait: the dynamics of an insular society, eds. van Dijk et al.  (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995): 1-6; and De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 
2 and 28. 
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taken the position of his parents: his uncle.260 At first, he sought protection from the crown prince, 
but to no avail. Trunajaya chose to flee to the town Kajoran where he married the daughter of Raden 
Kajoran; an Islamic holy-man competent in shakti (cosmic power) and tapa (asceticism).261 
De Graaf perceives both the alliances with Kajoran and the Makassarese to have constituted 
Trunajaya’s power.262 Attention to this cooperation is certainly called for; not only because of the 
soldiers they mustered, but also because of the identifications they evoked. Trunajaya’s relation with 
his stepfather Kajoran is described similarly in the varying Javanese chronicles, although the Dutch 
sources contain little about it. Usually, it is narrated how Kajoran considered him destined to become 
‘a great hero’ and to bring Mataram to its downfall. According to the legends, the Mataramese crown 
prince asked the Raden to subdue the Sunan, after which he naturally chose Trunajaya to do so. For 
this purpose, he was trained and sent to Sampang, Madura, to gather supporters.263 
Speelman wrote about Trunajaya on multiple occasions. He takes his efforts in southern 
Madura to have been the basis for his further rebellion. From there, he managed to increase his 
control over the rest of the island, which was eased by the unpopularity of his uncle.264 Yet, his army 
truly took form after the Makassarese exiles reached East Java, where they started plundering towns 
and harbours as Gerongan. Large groups of Makassarese left Sulawesi in the years after their 1669 
defeat against Buginese and VOC forces. Their reason for doing has not been determined yet, but 
they were clearly as outlandish to Java as cockatoos would have been.265 Violence, however, allowed 
them to settle or at least survive. In due time, the Makassarese moved from unknown to notorious. 
They thereby proved a competitor to state rule. Gradually, attacks were no longer necessary to win 
the support of Pasisir rulers; envoys would already do the job. Many coastal Javanese joined the 
insurgence of their own accord.266 
Mataram sent out instructions to the bupati; demanding they submitted the Makassarese to 
their power and thus make them subjects of the empire. These calls turned out inefficient, 
nonetheless. Indications can be found of a closer cooperation between Trunajaya and Galesong’s 
Makassarese warriors, which was soon sealed by a marital bond in 1674. Trunajaya offered his 
                                                          
260 De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 2-4.  
261 This happened under the threat of his uncle. See De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 2-4; idem, “De Opkmost”: 3; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 
31. 
262 De Graaf suggests both the Makassarese and Kajoran to have served as field warlords fighting in the interest of Trunajaya, but acting 
rather independently. De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 5 and 7; idem., “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”; and idem.,  De Regering vol. I. 
263 De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 5; idem.: De Regering vol. I: 46-47; and idem.,  De Regering vol. II: 46 and 51. 
264 Speelman specifically referred to his activities in Pamekasan The Makassarese arrived in two main groups: a western one led by Karaëng 
Bonto-Marannu and an eastern one commanded by Karaëng Galesong. See De Graaf, “De Opkomst”, 14; and idem., De Regering vol.I: 56 
and 62-92.  
265 The habitat of Cockatoo stretches from the Australia to all Indonesian islands east of Java, including Sulawesi.  
266 Even the bastard son of the Sunan, Notobroto, betrayed him. He was claimed to have gathered the unlikely number of 100.000 men and 
ambiguously claimed neutrality. Only when local leaders would support his father, would he fight for the Madurese; a policy detrimental to 
Mataram. The Bupati equally had a dubious role in these sieges. C. Speelman “Letter X (9 January 1677).” In De Opkmost Van: 73-75. See 
also Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch Tiger: 19; and De Graaf, De Regering vol. I:  81-82.  
War-bands on Java 67 
 
daughter in return for “the conquest of Surabaya and Grisik”.267 Around this time, the Madurese 
warlord started to use the royal title ‘Raden Trunajaya’; the youthful conqueror. Two years later, he 
married one of Amangkurat I’s daughters and praised himself Raja or Panembahan Maduretna; the 
true king of Java.268 Likewise, Karaëng Galesong changed his to Adipati or Adipati Anom; the young 
ruler.269 To Speelman, these entitlements demonstrate a boisterous arrogance and relentless desire 
to conquer all.270 
But the labels were as much directed to allied warriors as opposing ones. Throughout his 
struggle, Trunajaya strived for a cult status. Religion was one of the ways and means to do so; as 
Ricklefs observed: “an Islamic sense of identity had long been evident among the rebel forces”.271 
Raden Kajoran stood central in this.272 But when Trunajaya decked himself with laurel, most 
attention indeed became focused on his personality; as was symbolized by the use of sacred 
standards, banners, and genealogies to Majapahit.273 This might be one reason for him to neglect his 
ties with the Sunan’s son. The kāfir enemy symbolized by the VOC only enforced such identifications. 
Mataram was rejected; his followers in Kediri praised Trunajaya as Sultan Intra Prista not 
Susuhunan.274 
The numerous appellations of Trunajaya evoked legacies too.275 All boosted the warlord’s 
charisma further. The status constructed in this period appears vital for the onslaught that followed. 
Looking at conquests, De Graaf underlines the warlord’s rise in the preceding years without intending 
to constitute a new realm.276 Looking at his entitlements, his ascendance takes a different shape. It 
enabled a close cooperation with distinctive groups as the Makassarese. This new alignment soon led 
to the acquirement of Javanese beaches and ports proximate to Madura. In command was a capable 
overlord, whose pretentions were less imaginative than Speelman would recognize. Fear rose among 
                                                          
267 Trunajaya himself stated this trade-off to the VOC delegate Moor Piero: “hy syn dochter aan Crain Glisson ten huwelyck gegeven hadde, 
op voorwaarde dat hy, Glisson, Surabaya en Grissee voor hem overwinnen zoude…”. Moor Piero, “Letter XIV (24/25th February 1677): 
Rapport door den Moor Piero, wegens syne verrichtinge geduerende het bestellen van syn brieff aen den Panembahan Maduratna, ten 
overstaan van de gecommitteerden M. Isaack de S.. Martin, Jacobus Couper, Everard van der Schuur en Johan Leeuwenson, tusschen den 
24e en 25e February ’s nachts, gedaan.” In De Opkomst Van: 83-93. See also De Graaf, “De Opkmost”: 14; idem., De Regering vol. I: 84 and 
86; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 32. 
268 C. Speelman, “Letter XXIX (7 August, 1677).“ In De Opkomst Van: 135. See alos De Graaf, “De Opkomst“: 28.   
269 This title mimicked the one carried by Amangkurat II as a prince. Around this time, a priest associated with the Makassarese started to 
foretell the doom of Mataram in the mountains behind Gresik. See De Graaf, De Regering vol. I: 110. 
270 C. Speelman “Letter XII (10 March 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 77-78.  
271 Ricklefs, War, Culture: 40. 
272 The influence of Sunan Giri appears to be limited. De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 13.  
273 Galesong's Makassarese used different banners. Trunajaya also asserted the title Susuhunan to belong to him based on his own 
genealogical arguments and aimed to reconstitute the court of Majapahit. After Trunajaya settled in Kediri, he krissed the former head of 
the town; Katawengan. Having done so, Trunajaya divides Katawengan’s wives among his followers and titles himself panembahan Ratu 
Pamenang or "Coning van Groot Java ...onder den titul van Ratou Cadirij". Round the same time rumours spread on his illicit acts, which 
Speelman initially plays down. See De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 21; and Schrieke, Sociological Studies Vol. II: 125, 275 and 278 
274 J. Couper, “Letter LXIII (12 January, 1680) and LXVI (13 March, 1680).” In De Opkomst Van:  282 and 295; and Briel: “Letter LXV”: 295. For 
Trunajaya’s entitlements see De Graaf, “De Opkmost”: 28-29. For the neglect of these ties see Ricklefs, War, Culture: 40. 
275 Many myths spread that conflict with the Trunajaya’s own story of his predecessors gathered for the VOC by Moor Piero in direct 
negotiations in 1677. De Graaf, De Regering vol. I: 49-53. 
276 Consider, for instance, his comment on the Moor Piero embassy. De Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”: 286. 
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the local rulers that Mataram would not be able to beat the forces by itself, which indeed turned out 
to be the case. 277 
In 1776, Amangkurat I attempted to pursue Trunajaya’s forces by sending, of all people, the 
crown prince to hunt him down. This is the very prince plotting a coup against the Sunan and the one 
eventually succeeding his father as Amangkurat II. The Sunan thus had plenty of reasons to be on 
guard. His army, however, largely consisted out of tanis, i.e. farmers; not noblemen that could keep 
their eyes on him. Chances were ripe for desertion. But instead of betraying his father, the crown 
prince was betrayed by Trunajaya. The two appeared to have agreed on a feigned battle at Gegodog 
to fool the Sunan. Yet, the prince’s forces instead faced a bloody and decisive defeat in October. With 
it, the amicable relation between the prince and the warlord was equally shattered.278 After Gegodog, 
the crown prince’s brothers Pangéran Martasana and Puger took over instead, to lead a campaign 
that was now chiefly defensive.  
The Madurese victory at Gegodog was followed by more success. On the fifth of January 
1677, the forces reached up to Cirebon, although the inlands advance was naturally slower. New 
Javanese forces were attracted.279 In the meantime, however, the Madurese and Makassarese 
started to drift apart; Trunajaya claimed to have been offended by the way Galesong “damaged and 
redistributed merchant ships without his order or any need”.280 Within the latter group a further split 
occurred.281 Concurrently, the kraton also fell to pieces now the Sunan proved incapable of stopping 
the Madurese. Naturally, De Graaf and Ricklefs underline the impact this had on the Mataramese 
dynasty, and the ego of Trunajaya. The personal betrayal of Amangkurat II by Trunajaya is eminent in 
their narratives; the Madurese dwarf had tricked the giant causing him to stumble and fall.282 Yet, 
how the warlord’s followers shifted sides in the wake of these events has not been touched upon 
much. 
 Many changed camps, nonetheless. And the VOC sources give plenty of clues why they did. 
The Company got involved in 1676; Poleman took charge over multiple battles. In the beginning, 
unawareness of who was in league with whom hindered the campaign. Poleman was even ignorant 
                                                          
277 The acquirement occurred when Javanese regents deserted from Mataram. Adipati Anom stirred this up to increase his power. In fact, 
the crown prince was assisting Trunajaya too, and the Makassarese were making much use of this second alliance. The alliance between 
the Madurese and the Makassarese was sealed through the marriage of Trunajaya’s daughter with Karaëng Galesong  in 1675. See De 
Graaf, “De Opkmost”: 16, 17, 18; and idem. De Regering vol.I: 87-91.  
278 C. Speelman, “Letter XV (30 March 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 94; and De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 4 and 7. 
279 Trunajaya was still abusing the earlier support he gained from Adipati Anom, which had broken apart after Gegodog. Making such 
fictional claims of alliance made it easier to attract Javanese rulers.  See Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 53 and 119-128; De Graaf, “De Opkmost”: 
26; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 33. 
280 The quote comes from: “de vaartuygen der coopluyden buyten ordre off last aentastende en verdistruerende, was hy daardoor tot 
toorn verweckt”. Moor Piero, “Letter XIV”: 83-93. 
281 Namely that between Karaëng Galesong's Makassarese and those abiding to Karaëng Tellolo. Speelman, “Letter X”: 75. See also De 
Graaf, De Regering vol I:  53 and 134-137; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 34.  
282 De Graaf, De Regering vol.I: 139. 
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of Trunajaya’s involvement with the ‘insurgence’.283 But interests in alliances grew and the increased 
description of them allows an analysis of martial associations. Where Van Goens probed the court 
fractions, VOC admirals where now exploring the ties between different war-bands. Friendly and 
hostile forces were distinguished. Attempts were made, for instance, to survey the ties between the 
Madurese and the Makassarese through elaborate correspondence.284 
Even allegiance with Trunajaya was contemplated. Speelman’s campaign in Japara, and later 
on Madura, started with attempts to mediate with the warlord. During these negotiations, the 
warrior once exclaimed that all Javanese were already paying tribute to him, excepting the Sunan, so 
that within a month he would rule supreme. Nevertheless, he completely undermined the talks 
through unreliable promises, seemingly stirred by alcoholism, and war was declared by Speelman on 
the 27th of April, 1677. The warlord’s name would be blackened since. By that time, the Makassarese 
had equally abandoned Trunajaya.285 
Speelman now made the “master move” -in De Graaf’s words- and joined the ‘incapable’ 
Sunan.286 After attacks on Surabaya, the VOC hoped to create a path to Kediri; Trunajaya’s 
headquarter. Cooperation with his former allies, among whom the Makassarese, was sought to 
achieve this. Yet, the news that Kajoran had captured the kraton -the heart of Mataram- arrived in 
the meantime.287 Speelman appeared to have been at a loss.288 The intervention had only brought 
more instability; the admiral had cornered the cat, but now it jumped in rage. De Graaf and Ricklefs’ 
stress how Trunajaya and his followers were driven further inlands and attached to a religious 
resistance “against the king and his new Christian allies”. The capture of the court would only 
strengthen them.289 
                                                          
283 The same goes for Jan Fransz. Initislly the mission was only aimed at stopping the Makassarese. It was only after Poleman’s first 
campaign that he started to notice the coalition between the Makassarese and Trunajaya. Ironically enough his campaign contributed to 
this alliance by forcing the Makassarese to abandon their ships and roam inlands. See De Graaf, “De Opkmost”: 18-19, 21 and 23; and 
idem., De Regering vol. I: 95-99 and 114.  
284 Here one should mind the fact that Trunajaya only exposed himself in October 1676, which might have been due to the troubles of 
controlling the Makassarese as a force. De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 16. The Makassarese had their own warrior background. Several sources 
can be used to trace it back. European literature grants some valuable descriptions of the society. The Makassarese court chronicles do 
mention acts of war, yet have a strong focus on the central ruler. See W. Cummings, A chain of kings: the Makassarese chronicles of Gowa 
and Talloq (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
285 Already on the 28th of February did Speelman sign a contract with Ngabéhi Wangsdipa, the Sunan’s regent of Japara. Later on, 
Amangkurat II would state he was misinformed about the contents of these contracts. Galesong also abandoned Trunajaya after the latter 
kidnapped his family.See De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 8-9; idem., “De Opkomst”: 27; and idem., De Regering vol. I: 146 and 165-166. 
286 The contract of alliance was firs signed by the governor of Japara in March 1677. Amangkurat I indirectly rectified it. Since he was too 
sick to put his signature himself, the soon-to-be Amangkurat II did it for him. After the fall of the kraton the alliance extended to 
Amangkurat II. Cooperation with the other princes was sought to, but with few results. None of them wanted to submit to their brother 
Amangkurat II. 
See Speelman, “Letter XII”: 77; and De Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”: 324. 
287 While Trunajaya himself was kept at bay in Eastern Java, two of his warlords, Raden Wiramenggala and Tumĕnggung Mangkujuda, 
fought their way to the kraton. The Madurese were not trusted in Central Java. But Raden Kajoran certainly was. He could hence hurdle 
enough men to attack the kraton twice. They managed to subdue the court at the end of June 1677, turning Speelman’s campaign on its 
head. See also De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 8-9; and idem., “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”; and  idem.: De Regering vol.I:  170-180. 
288 C. Speelman, “Letter XXIV (17 July, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 125-126. 
289 Ricklefs, War, Culture: 40.  
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Increased Islamic sensibilities go a long way in explaining the troops gathered by Kajoran to 
conquer the kraton on account of Trunajaya. The Madurese warlord himself was unable to constitute 
a power base in Central Java. He remained too much of an outsider, settled far eastwards. Only his 
father in law was recognized as a justified ruler by the population. After all, he was both Javanese 
and an established religious figure, unlike his stepson whose alleged sanctity was recent. Under these 
circumstances, a diarchy was set up to control the region. Kajoran was the authority in Central-, and 
Trunajaya in East-Java. Still, it remained clear who was in charge; Trunajaya swallowed all power. The 
court treasuries of Mataram were brought to Kediri; Kajoran would not see any of them. The 
nobleman would lose the capital he vanquished too; soon Pangéran Puger would take the royal city, 
and leave the warlord empty-handed.290 
In the other military camp, new forms of cooperation were sought for as well. This alliance 
between Amangkurat II and the VOC, headed by Hurdt, would eventually lead to the end of 
Trunajaya. Hurdt’s campaign turned the tide and even caused men as Kajoran to desert Trunajaya 
and ally the Makassarese. This central Javanese holy man was not spared however, and got captured 
in September 1679. No Javanese lord wanted to kill him, so the VOC ordered a Buginese soldier to do 
it. Karaëng Galesong was still to return to Trunajaya, but was seemingly murdered by him after the 
Madurese warlord found out about his earlier deceit.291 
Previous historians acknowledged the downfall of the warlord looking at these facts, yet did 
not thoroughly delve into the reasons ‘the insurgents’ fell apart. Only De Graaf’s article on Kajoran 
extends on this issue. First, De Graaf perceives a split of the Kajorans and their allies the Purbayas 
(centred in Madiun) from the kraton in early 1677.292 Secondly, unlike Trunajaya’s followers, Kajoran 
chiefly used Javanese warriors and lords; appealing to a shared ethnic background. Thirdly, he 
suggests Trunajaya tried to manipulate this appeal by summoning him to Kediri after the conquest of 
Mataram. Finally, this “honourable detention” as well as the absence of a suited heir destroyed his 
prestige in Central Java; from a charismatic warlord he turned into a stooge of the Madurese.293 
Obedience among his subjects waned afterwards. 
                                                          
290 The Islamic sensibilities are for instance revealed when the Sultan of Banten offered Kajoran two “holy shirts from Mecca”. Notice that 
most of the regalia were still in the hands of Amangkurat I. Puger’s servant Raden Wira-Truna misled Kajoran’s warlord to leave the kraton 
early, so Puger could claim supremacy over it. See De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt:  12; idem. “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”:  323; and Ricklefs, 
War, Culture:  40-42. 
291 For the capture and murder of Kajoran see J. A. Sloot and W. Taalbeecq, “Letter LVIII (20 September, 1679).” In De Opkomst Van, 271-
274;  and C.B. Marchier, “Letter LVIX (26 September, 1679).” In De Opkomst Van: 274-276. For the death of Karaëng Galesong see J. Couper, 
“Letter LXII (7 January, 1680).” In De Opkomst Van: 279-282. See also De Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”: 323; and Ricklefs, War, Culture: 
55. 
292 The Kajorans are the denizens of Kajoran; the town and region ruled by Raden Kajoran. 
293 Purbaya II was important for initiating the rebellion, but died soon after it started, explaining the minimal attention for this man in the 
VOC sources. Islamization is perceived by De Graaf as a way to legitimize power, especially when lacking heirs or ethnic ties, his comment 
on Islam is very brief, however, and does not do justice to the role in had in these uprisings. See De Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”: 279, 
285- 286, and 290-297.   
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The VOC campaign appears to have brought about a similar character assassination of 
Trunajaya. In these last months of fleeing about, Trunajaya sustained correspondence with both the 
VOC and Amangkurat II. In it, he exclaimed the injustice done to him as well as the motivations for 
his rebellion. To the VOC, he explained his revenge over not inheriting Madura as well as the hostility 
of his uncle towards him.294 He was a just prince; a ‘Ratu Adil’ who by nature was to muster many 
and constitute new hierarchies in replacement of the old corrupted ones. But it was not to be, due to 
the European ‘deus ex machina’.  
Clearly, Trunajaya’s dream of becoming ‘the true king of Java’ had flown out of the window. 
His appeal as a mighty warlord with powerful allies was no more. After making his way to the 
Limbangan mountain ranges, Trunajaya surrendered to Captain Jonker on the 26th of December 1679. 
The opening scene of this thesis was to follow. The history of his resistance clearly reveals shifting 
alliances whenever victory occurred or losses prevailed. Moreover, his legacy remained inspiring for 
subsequent warriors. Wasengrana would, for example, pretend to be Trunajaya risen from the dead 
in August 1680.295 
Even though work has been made of clarifying the all too shuffling fraternizations, lore 
stimulating such resurrections directs us to new unexplored arguments of cult and faith. Most 
importantly, the manner in which such lore impacted the intelligence received on Trunajaya by the 
VOC is left ignored. Chapter four and the conclusion indicate how this determined his image as a 
rebel instead of a sovereign, how Amangkurat II became defined as a justified successor and how 
men like Galesong were neither fish nor fowl. Conceptions on the warlords subsequently established 
the vision on their war-bands. 
  
                                                          
294 This is a statement that seems to be tied in current affairs; he even claimed his uncle wanted to kill him. See De Graaf, ”De Opkomst”: 3-
4. 
295 Ricklefs, War, Culture:  57 and 77. 
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4. The Eye of the Beholder: Associations during martial encounters 
 
In 1678, Speelman warned the VOC for the “devilishly hymned false prophecies” used by the 
opponents to distract the “general people” from “their required obedience”.296 Ironically, many 
similar ‘wicked’ temptations appear to have pulled in troops of Amangkurat II. The religious glue 
sticking the Company’s allies together was looked at less suspiciously, however. Observations on 
favoured men, ‘Islamic temples’ or graveyards “deemed very holy” by “the Javanese” and “their 
priests”, do not carry a diabolical undertone.297 The commensurability of heuristics has already been 
demonstrated in the last chapter, in the following pages it is asked how devils and saints fitted into a 
larger discourse on Javanese armies expressed by writers like Speelman. 
Those ‘devils and saints’ were not necessarily religious figures; court fractions, ethnic warrior 
groups, and peasants were equally fashioned in similar terms. Such framing clearly reflects a broader 
interpretation of the Javanese society. The way in which writers approached the people, politics and 
myths around them thus deserves notice. I therefore offer a closer look at the actors or authors 
behind the Dutch sources. To begin, their manner of reporting on war-bands, shifting alliances and 
even religious legends is investigated. I describe their work and observations by looking at their 
occupations in Southeast and South Asia, the context in which they wrote and the retrievable 
impression of their personalities. Most of all, however, I consider the ‘Asian’ networks in which they 
operated.  
Hurdt, Speelman and the previously mentioned Van Goens can all be taken as early 
colonizers. They strove to diminish the autonomy of indigenous rule and sought to bring the 
Javanese lands to fuller exploitation. The support of the Sunan was just a mean to win his obedience. 
Yet, they were equally some of the best informed VOC agents when it came to hinterland affairs. This 
apparent irony does not have to be taken as an oddity. The aims of these men could, after all, only be 
reached through a proper understanding of inland hierarchies, local issues, diplomacy and warfare. 
And, consequently, of social ties too. Mustering warriors required it. 
Besides the ‘author’, the ‘document’ is worthy of concern too. All selected authors produced 
intelligence for an extensive trade company. But, the headquarters in Batavia and Amsterdam only 
partially directed the documented observations of the actors under concern. Their writings were 
largely derived from experiences on the field. The eye of the beholder justified a personal narrative 
                                                          
296 The quote refers to Kajoran’ efforts to tempt warriors around Mataram to join his side. C. Speelman, “Inscriptie door Edele Admiraal 
Corn. Speelman op sijn Edele vertrek van Japara aen d’Edele commandeur Isaac Saint martin tot naeright gelaten” (23 March 1678). 
Nationaal Archief, 1.04.02, 1332: 746.  
297Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 82, 109 , 245 and 251.  
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of issues, chronologies and causation.298 Yet, the beholder was not a scholar. He gazed on practical 
matters that, in the end, did serve the Company’s interest. The men in the field might not be strongly 
restrained in their writing, they were still expected to deliver certain intelligence.  
In the end, all documents served as input to the Supreme Government in Batavia, or even the 
Lord XVII in the Dutch Republic. Different kinds of documentation took different aims. Daily journals 
sought to clarify the progress of operations, letters replied to specific queries, and mission reports 
granted overviews of key affairs. Therefore, all discussions on the authors will start by reviewing the 
type of records they made and how this influenced their writing. From the sources up, I then trace 
their articulated view on society, war and religion.  
 Some VOC servants contemplated more on indigenous affairs than others. I selected two 
lengthy reports that delved into martial alliances most thoroughly; Speelman’s instruction to De 
Saint-Martin’s and Briel’s daily report on Hurdt’s 1678 campaign.299 These sources were cornerstones 
for earlier research. But no one dedicated separate analyses to them or compared them explicitly; 
here they stand at the centre of attention. A progression exists from the previously discussed court 
focus of Van Goens, to the mixed interests in royal hierarchies and warring of Speelman, and the 
description of Hurdt’s hinterland military marches.300 All accounts, in their own terms, grant a unique 
perspective on mandalas and military labour markets.  
It will be scrutinized how Speelman and Hurdt operated and understood the struggle against 
Trunajaya’s ‘insurgence’. The former campaigned on the Javanese coasts between December 1676 
and late 1677. Hurdt took over afterwards and, unlike his predecessor, was allowed to go inlands. 
They themselves formally controlled troops of Mataram. But many of those went their one way still. 
The only means for directing these pejuangs was through constant examination of their 
fraternizations, leaders and political ties. VOC men needed to carefully note their assistance and the 
information they disclosed. Warlords were to be watched. Hence, intelligence provided by central 
informants like Jacob Couper, Moor Priero and Willem Bastinck is consulted too.301 
                                                          
298 These personal historical narratives spread since the 1560s and reflected a growing scholarly sense of causally linked events and a 
chronological history. Woolf has demonstrated how this conception impacted the perception of the English population at large. Bertrand 
stresses, however, that this new discourse also “se nourrissent en effet de plus en plus des façons de dire des voyageurs”. The empirical 
arguments of the travellers could then serve a strongly personalized historical narrative on exotic destinations. See Bertrand, L’Histoire à 
Parts: 51-57; and D. Woolf, “From Hystories to History: Five Transitions in Thinking about the past.” The Huntington Library Quarterly 68, 
no. 1-2 (2005): 33-70. 
299 Some readers might be surprised by the absence of François Valentijn’s "Old and New East-India". This elaborate text possibly allows the 
most in-depth insights into Javanese warring and religion from a Dutch perspective. Still, I wanted to stick to agents reporting within the 
VOC apparatus and thus contributing directly to the Company’s intelligence gathering and cooperating with local rulers out of a 
professional interest. Valentijn’s work, although based on his VOC service, were published as a separate travel report.  Speelman, Inscriptie 
Edele Vertrek; and Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt. 
300 As Schrieke noted, the impression gained in the hinterland differed much from the kraton: “[w]hen, thanks to Hurdt’s expedition from 
Japara to Kadiri in 1678, the Dutch East India Company first came to know the interior of Java, it proved to consist of various regions, some 
governed by court dignitaries (including members of the ruling family), others by officials, still others by the descendants of the original 
local nobility.” See Schrieke, Sociological Studies Vol.II: 153. See also Ricklefs, “Some Statistical Evidence”: 2-3.  
301 De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 49.  
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In the conclusion, I address the degree to which the VOC men could recognize the 
organization of war-bands, including their shifting alliances. The epistemic range of the VOC sources 
can then be tested. In general, much information can be obtained on the group formations, be it 
coloured by ethnic categorization, misspellings of names, and ignorance about the specific reasons 
for deserting or allying. But before sifting for such knowledge, I address how these different types of 
literature reflect the social associations of the authors as well as their produced 
incommensurabilities. Through reflecting on their authors, the qualities, narratives and oversights of 
the material are to be judged upon. And the devils and saints are to be appraised in context.  
 
 
a. Cornelis Speelman 
Like Van Goens, Speelman is one of the major figures in VOC history. Born in a higher middle class 
family in Rotterdam on the third of March 1628, he joined the Company as a mere sixteen year-old. 
His first functions were that of assistant and boekhouder-generaal. 302 Both positions required skills in 
accounting that Speelman would prove to master in his subsequent military career too. While his 
fame might have been largely obtained through martial success, it is his proficient writing that makes 
his legend highly suited for scrutiny.  
 Mataram was certainly not the first polity he would interact with. Speelman’s report on the 
Joan Cunnaeus embassy to Shah Abbas II of Persia is still published today and reveals a high curiosity 
on unknown cultures.303 He had a nose for unfamiliar commerce networks too, as he was able to 
influence the trade relations on the Indian subcontinent during his three-year directorship over the 
Coromandel trade post. He fought privateering, but equally sought to establish a stronger influence 
on the indigenous polities. The latter aim tied him to intricate rivalries between local lords; leaving 
him caught in a web of local politics.304 
But conspiracies also hunted him in Batavia. False accusations of privateering blemished his 
reputation and led him to lose office. Speelman made up his mind to leave the Indies and return to 
the Republic at once after having cleared his name. His decision to abandon Asia would never 
materialize, however. Makassar would come in its way. Tension between the VOC and this 
Sulawesian polity had risen over the years. Signed contracts and VOC monopolies were ignored. 
When the Makassarese killed some VOC men while sacking wracked ships, this proved to be the final 
straw. On the 23th of November 1666, Speelman was instructed to sail the VOC naval force to 
Sulawesi to impress the enemy by using cannon fire and thereby tempting them to negotiate.305 
                                                          
302 F.W.Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1936): 2. 
303 C. Speelman,  Journaal Der Reis Van Den Gezant Der O.T. Compagnie Joan Cunaeus Naar Perzië in 1651-1652 (Charleston, South Carolina: 
Nabu Press, 2010). 
304 He received this position in 1663. Stapel, Speelman: 11.  
305 Ibid.; 25-28 and 34-35. 
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Were this to fail, Speelman was requested to plunder parts of the Sulawesian coast and visit 
Buton to win over its leader. Afterwards, sails were set to be to Ternate and Tidore for bridging the 
discrepancies between these realms. A final means was to block Makassar’s harbour and lead a 
destructive artillery attack. Yet, invasion of the city was prohibited. In case negotiations were 
possible, Speelman was to enact specific conditions of surrender predetermined by the Supreme 
Government.306 
 Matters turned out differently, however. Speelman was bold enough to stride inlands and 
commit to direct combat. The shores of Makassar were reached on the 19th of December; a 
Makassarese pirogue tried to pay off the murders through offering some silver and gold. Speelman 
refused to accept the gift, however, and demanded the death of those responsible for the bloodshed. 
So war began. A long struggle ensued testing the ties between the European and Asian army 
sections.307 
The campaign was one of the first to intensively rely on pejuangs; local alliances were more 
decisive than the Asian legion or even European soldiers. The twenty-one ships for this mission 
contained six-hundred VOC soldiers and several Buginese and Ambonese assisting forces. The bulk of 
troops were, however, gathered at the spot. Speelman’s most crucial native intermediaries were 
Arung Palakka -the Sultan of Bone who had fled from the Makassarese- and Captain Jonker;  the chief 
of the Ambonese.308 Both assisted in controlling a warforce far greater than the initial handful of 
Europeans. 
 Attracting those crowds demanded traversing a long and winding road of diplomacy. Even 
though the martial instructions of Batavia were cast aside, the diplomatic plan of the Supreme 
government was partly enacted. The Batavian directions again positioned Speelman in the midst of 
Asian tact. Buton signed a treaty of alliance on the 31st of January 1667. Ternate, Tidore and Bacan 
were drawn in too. The VOC army equally attracted extra Buginese forces that deserted the 
Makassarese as soon as they learned about Arung Palakka’s presence.309 
Speelman promptly requested for more freedom in contriving Makassar’s submission, which 
was granted by Batavia. During his visit to the Moluccas, he also took the liberty of shipping in 
additional troops that were officially assigned to their post in the eastern archipelago. At the same 
time, he managed to attract about 10.000 pejuangs through use of Sulawesian rivalries, promises of 
power shifts, the charisma of Palakka and the distribution of the spoils of war; especially ships and 
                                                          
306 Ibid.: 35-36. 
307 Ibid.: 36 
308 De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 68-69;  De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 6; and Stapel, Speelman; 35.  
309 Other troops deserting to Palakka’s side were from Luwu, Mandar and Buma. See Raben, “Het Aziatisch Legioen.”: 191; and Stapel, 
Speelman: 38-41. 
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weapons. Despite these numbers, the war soon became one of attrition and unrest among the 
Buginese did need to be calmed down.310 
 A lot became at stake for settling the fights; for sickness, desertion and plain weariness 
started tearing the army apart. Speelman kept up pretence towards the Makassarese, as to fake 
military strength that was no longer there. Sultan Hassanudin went for the bait, but his initiation of 
negotiations was torpedoed by the Makassarese court. After resolving some internal disagreements, 
a peace treaty was finally signed in Bongaja on the 18th of November 1667. Among other things, it 
contained Sultan Hassanudin’s promise to retreat from Sumbawa, Buton and surrounding polities. 
Large celebrations on the Buginese and VOC side ensued, but Speelman retained his scepticism and 
kept the navy on guard for an extra month.311 
And indeed another two years of fighting followed prior to a definitive peace settlement in 
1669.312 The persistent resistance of the Makassarese and attritious warring against them likely 
evoked Speelman’s adage in the following years: “[the enemy] flees if one comes and returns if one 
retreats, so nothing is achieved. To strike at the heart of the matter, the enemy should not only be 
chased, but also pursued and crushed”.313 But these words stretch beyond Sulawesi; his efforts on 
Java are equally captured by these two phrases. 1677 saw the start of a campaign that would soon 
manifest the adage. 
 
 
Picture 8 “Victory of the VOC over the kingdom of Macassar”: this well-known print is noticeable for its depiction of 
heroic Buginese fighting alongside the European soldiers. Both Speelman, on the top left, and Palakka, on the top right,   
are praised for their command.314 
                                                          
310 These pejuangs were not just Buginese. See Stapel, Speelman: 37-38,  40, 42 and 44. 
311 Sultan Hassanudin tried to appease the Boni and Palakka. See ibid.: 40-41 and 44-48. 
312 De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 5. 
313 The quote is translated from Dutch: “[de vijanden] vlughten, als men komt en retourneeren als men terughkeert, sulcx op die wijse 
nooyt gedaan wercq. De saeck moet in 't herte aengetast en de vijandt niet alleen verdreven, maer vervolgt en ontsenuwt werden.” De 
Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 123. 
314 R. de Hooge, “Victorien der Nederl. Ge O Compagnie in het Koninkryck van Macassar” (circa 1669). Nationaal Archief, VELH0619.68 
(accessed via http://www.atlasofmutualheritage.nl/nl/object/?id=6157, on 24-03-2014). 
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 Again Speelman brought along a mixed arm force. Besides the 310 Europeans, he assigned 
four companies of Ambonese, Malays, Balinese and Mardijkers plus 600 sailors and the like to join 
the 400 troops already stationed in Japara.315 In the beginning, negotiations were led with both 
Amangkurat II and Trunajaya. The admiral hoped to meet Trunajaya “with good intentions”, but 
those turned sore soon enough. In April, the Sunan gained Speelman’s favour, war was declared on 
Trunajaya and all his followers were urged to again obey Amangkurat who will “forgive their sins”.316 
Nagtegaal takes the agreement with the Mataram as a “personal initiative” of the VOC man, who 
looked for an “autonomous yet subservient ruler”. Trunajaya, in contrast, was suspected to easily 
take matters in his own hands.317 
 In the admiral’s final report, mention is made of the failed attempt to draw Trunajaya to 
Japara for negotiations. Speelman was willing to give an “honourable pardon” plus rank and 
recognition. Yet, it soon “turned out, that all our efforts were to no avail and to confidence in him 
could be stabilized, [him] being like all criminals, full suspicion, disbelief and distrust, so that were 
finally forced to draw the sword from the sheath”. God immediately “blessed” this decision through 
the conquest of Surabaya.318 To which Trunajaya responded that the true favour of God could only 
manifest without the arbitrary intervention of the Company. He rebelled because of internal issues: 
dissatisfaction among the Mataram courtiers, inheritance of Madura, and courtly assassinations.319  
No matter whether the ties to Amangkurat were a personal initiative or not, Speelman 
certainly grew strongly disfavoured towards Trunajaya due to failed diplomacy. The reliability of 
Amangkurat II was doubted too, however. The VOC officer distrusted the degree to which the Sunan 
and his ‘minister’ Mandaraka were seriously involved with the war. Their lacking persistence led to a 
warning. The admiral would retreat his VOC forces if Amangkurat’s men “would show to have been 
born to serve Trunajaya as slaves” rather than fight against him. Military support was minimal. When 
the Dutchman sought to set up a campaign only the “the old, honourable” Martapura and Martalaja 
volunteered.320 
                                                          
315 Ricklefs, War, Culture: 35. 
316 Amangkurat I’s sickness inhibited him to meet with Speelman, so his son led the negotiations which eventually would concern his rule as 
overlord. In the other camp, Moor Piero met with Trunajaya to negotiate agreements. Speelman, “Letter X”: 7, idem., “Letter XII”: 77-78; 
idem., “Letter XVII (16 April, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 115-116; idem., “Letter XVIII (30 April, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 116-117; and 
idem., ”Letter XIX (23 May 1677).” In De Opkomst Van:  117-119.  
317 Nagtegaal, Riding the Dutch: 23 and 25. 
318 The quote is translated from: “een honorabel pardon , en daar en boven nog zoo veel meer eere staad, en aanzien, zonden verzongen, 
als hij eeniger maten met rede konde desidireeren, dan het is gebleeken, dat alle onze moeijten te vergeefs en in hem geen confidentie te 
stabileeren was, zijnde gelijk al tijd de misdadigers, vol argwaen, agterdagt en wantrouwen, zoo dat wij ten laatsten genootdrukt zijn 
gewerdig het swaart uijt de scheede te trekken, en onze proceduren op die wijze aan te leggen, die hoewel door God de Heere genadelijk 
gesegent met de veroveringe van Sourabaija”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 745. 
319 This was stated years later on the second of December 1679; shortly before Trunajaya met his end. Couper, “Letter LXII”: 280-282. 
320 The quote is translated from: “aandien zy lieten blyken, als geboren te wesen om Troenadjaja als slaven te dienen”. See C. Speelman, 
“Letter XLI (30 November 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 175-178.  
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Martapura was a stout supporter of the Sunan; the mere request to join Trunajaya’s forces 
led him to behead the harbingers. But even his commanders needed to be urged by Speelman not to 
return without putting up a fight for “he would shoot a bullet through their head” if they did.321 
Tumĕnggung Martapura reconquered Kudus, Pati and Djuwana with 1500 men, but the lords were 
eventually led to a retreat. Having arrived back, more hostilities followed as Tumĕnggung Martapura 
was killed in courtly affairs. 322 Mobilizing the Sunan’s forces thus required having an eye for courtly 
friendships; for the ones that truly cooperated could be rare.  
Speelman’s campaign again immersed deeply into local strives. Much of this is due to his 
efforts to find stable political support from Javanese leaders. Selecting a leader for Surabaya, for 
instance, involved quite some considerations. Since the governor Wangsaprana had just passed away, 
the priestervorst of Giri, named Panembahan Agong, was next in line. Since he too was old and weak, 
contact was made with his representative; Dipati Mas Tumapel.323 Tumapel, subsequently, gained de 
facto power over the city. Unlike the Panembahan, he did not pursue high autonomy and accepted 
the Sunan’s wishes. Speelman’s political manoeuvres ensured a vassal state, not a competitor.324 
Similar negotiations were conducted in Semarang, Demak and Pati.325 
An elaborate documentation was needed to choose proper representatives. Speelman asked 
Amangkurat II to pen down a “Nader Verclaringe” on the fall of the kraton and the court ‘historian’ 
Surawikrama to record his insights on the war and Javanese society.326 Even more perceptive is the 
account of the alliances by the admiral himself at the end of his mission; written in Japara and 
Semarang and completed on the 23th of March, 1678. Speelman was promoted to First Counsellor 
and Director-General of the Indies and had to leave Central Java with the onset of the monsoon. 
Since the war was still in full swing he wrote an elaborate Memorie to his assumed successor De 
Saint-Martin. In this manner, the new Dutch admiral would be able to approach the right men, keep 
hold of the needed resources and steer the war-machine that was as much Javanese as it was 
Dutch.327 
At the time of writing the Memorie, Speelman was suffering from grits in his kidney and 
bladder for about ten days.328 His illness made it difficult to abide to the exact wishes made for the 
                                                          
321 The quote is translated from:  “hij hun een kogel door den kop zou doen jagen.” Speelman, “Letter XLI.”: 175-179. 
322 C. Speelman, “Letter XLII (10 December, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 182-183. 
323 C. Speelman, “Letter XXVII (4/5 August, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 134; idem.,”Letter XXX (3 September, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 
139-143; and idem. “Letter XXXV (2 November, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 169-170. 
324 Couper, “Letter LXIII”: 284. 
325 Notice that Tumapel needed to flee Surabaya in July 1678. See I. De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLIX (8 July, 1678).” In De Opkomst Van: 215. 
326 De Graaf, Titels en Namen”: 64. 
327 Speelman gained the position of “Eerste Raad en Directeur-Generaal van Indië”. As will be read in the next section, not De Saint-Martin 
but Hurdt became the new admiral. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek:  739- 742. 
328 Ibid.:.739,.742,.801.  Speelman.refers.to.“pijnelijke.graveelpijne”, which.is.a.“[b]enaming.voor.het.kalkachtig gruis.dat.zich.bij 
sommige.personen in.de.nieren.en.de.blaas.vormt.en met.het.water geloosd.wordt.” See.De.Geïntegreerde Taalbank, ”Graveel”, 
Historischekwoordenboeken op,internet,De,Geïntegreerde,Taalbank.(accessed.via 
http://gtb.inl.nl/iWDB/search?actie=article&wdb=WNT&id=M021643, on 14-02-2014). 
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Missive. Instead, he “was forced to use whatever was still in my memory and how I considered the 
matters at present”. And -as he stresses- if some of those matters are not described truthfully at 
least they are addressed as issues of concern. To his own surprise, the text “has become much larger 
and elaborate, than I had expected in the beginning”. But he does believe it to reflect “the most 
important current affairs”.329 
Of all these affairs, starting the inland campaign is deemed most essential.330 The piece 
addresses De Saint-Martin as well as the Supreme Government. Both are offered a summary of the 
VOC’s potential for winning the war. Elaborations are sometimes avoided, however. He promises to 
give additional oral explanation on certain issues treated in his text.331 At other points, he refers to 
previously send letters containing details on events, problems and allies.332 Still, the Memorie 
remains a coherent overview of Speelman’s perception on the current circumstances and military 
potentials. 
The writing style exposes an interest in foreign terms and expressions. Not only does he 
resort to French words and terms, he equally layers his texts with Javanese titles and concepts.333 
Only at rare occasions are Dutch translations of noble titles attempted. This demonstrates 
recognition of the unique nature of Javanese entitlement, including the confusing name-changing for 
every new status. Speelman even tends to give both the venerable and common name for lords. And 
whenever he is unaware of the original name, he careful avoids mentioning it by referring to 
ethnicity or other personal features.334 His grasp of Javanese designations must have been enabled 
by his assistants. 
Speelman relied much on servants assembling news on the road. As mentioned, he tends to 
direct his reader to their reports and letters for more elaborate information. The dependence on 
them is not surprising, for the admiral was stuck at the coast himself. They could thus operate as 
back land envoys. Especially translators were of much value. His Malaysian scribe Alem and Javanese 
writers Pousparaga and Pouradria are rewarded for their services. The “most highly regarded” 
Sergeant Couper is praised for his “Javanese language capabilities”. These men were rare, and would 
a similar interpreter be found, “he will be wisely employed and used”.335 Dealing with Javanese and 
                                                          
329 The quote derives from: “van ’t geene mij de geheugennisse suppediteerde en zoodanig, als mij de zake present voor ooge stinden”; and 
“veel grooter en wijtlopiger is gevallen, als ik inden beginnen gedagt hadde”; and “de zaken ten principalen voorgevallen”. Ibid.: 902-903. 
330 Ibid.: 903. 
331 Ibid.: 739, 769 and 786-787. 
332 Ibid.: 741-744, 747, 760, 785, 790-791, 819, 839, 870, 872-873 and 892. 
333 These terms are often basterdised to Dutch, as was common in the Dutch Republic. 
334 Tumĕnggung Jalalana is, for instance, referred to as the “Balinese” prior to achieving his noble title from the Susuhunan. See ibid.: 796-
797 
335 The quotes are translated from : “Javaanse taalkunde” and "die zal wel mogen aangenomen en gebruijkt werden.”. The Scotsman 
Couper was the resident of Japara between 1671 and 1676, and led embassies to the Sunan. He has been stated to speak Javanese fluently 
and also appears to have been a crucial intermediary for the admirals. At the end of the war he even took command of the VOC force in 
East Java. See ibid.: 862-863. Also see De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 49.  
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Malaysian was crucial in his opinion; to gather the desired knowledge required crossing linguistic 
borders with care. 
 Such care is exhibited when choosing informants too. These agents came in all colours and 
shapes: Dutch, Scotts, Javanese, Muslims, royals, and merchants. The reports range from Jagapati‘s 
account of the Madurese occupation of the kraton and the genealogy of the Sunans, meetings 
between Trunajaya and Moor Priero, to the assassination attempt on the Madurese warlord as 
observed by Captain Couper.336 All these conveyed important insights, but others failed doing so. 
Few issues led to condemnation as much as corrupted or partial intelligence. If VOC officers or 
merchants neglect to inform, the admiral tends to request their discharge.337 The comments on 
Javanese informants can be equally sceptical: “one can in general not trust Javanese messages, as 
our experience has taught us redundantly and dreadfully”.338 
This does not change the fact that two of his most knowledgeable contacts were Javanese: 
Tumĕnggung Surawikrama and Tumĕnggung Ingawanga. The first is described as a “secretary of state 
of the old and the new Susuhunan, who was famous among the Javanese as one of the major shrewd 
and specialized experts of their antiquity”.339 De Graaf suggests he might have been an editor for the 
famed Mataram court chronicle: the Babad Tanah Jawi. Ingawanga was a grand-Mantri and 
confidante of the Sunan, and served as a delegate to both Pangéran Puger and the Supreme 
Government.340 More Javanese agents offered valuable insights, however. In fact, several Javanese 
lords were invited to attend the VOC meetings in Japara, which demonstrates appreciation for their 
accounts.341 
Deputies of warlords or rulers were welcomed as well. The admiral confirms to the Supreme 
Government that he does keep a watchful eye to whatever delegate asks for his attention, but 
reveals the best salutes were reserved for those negotiating a submission or alliance.342 Most eager 
was the admiral about a possible abasement of Amangkurat II’s brother, Pangéran Puger. Both 
princes held legitimacy to the Sunan title. Favouring Amangkurat over Trunajaya still left the former’s 
siblings the possibility to claim sovereignty. The mandala, after all, allowed multiple monarchs to 
                                                          
336 De Graaf, “Titels en Namen”: 64; and Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 782. 
337 Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 800-806, 848-853, 864-865, 872-873, 889-892 and 894. 
338 The quote is translated from: “gelijk men int geheel op geene Javaense tijdinge doen mag, zoo als ons d’ervaren  theijd overvloedig en 
tot vervelens toe, geleert heeft”.  Ibid.: 756 
339 The quote comes from François Valentijn, it is roughly translated from: “Sura-Wikrama, secretaris van staat van de oude en nieuwe 
Susuhunan, welke, onder de Javanen beroemd was voor een der voornaamste vernuftelingen en kenners hunner oudheden". De Graaf, 
“Titels en Namen”: 64. 
340 Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 91. 
341 Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek : 862 and 890. 
342 Ibid.: 844.  
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gather a significant backing. The admiral draws parallels with the Indian and “European kingdoms, 
where the kings have many brothers” and fears fraternal fights.343 
To avoid secession struggles, Amangkurat II’s inheritance is elaborated to show why he 
suffices better than his brothers. It is told how he arrived in Japara on the 15th of September bearing 
the title Susuhunan Amangkurat Sinnepattij Ingalaga; which he claimed to have obtained from his 
dying father. The new Sunan arrived with a mission, for his father had equally recommended him to 
search VOC support, because “there was no hope for restoration”.344 Trunajaya had to be put to 
death. But, the new Sunan said he was powerless because “I cannot bring the people of Mataram to 
warring or fighting”; he asked VOC’s help to reconquer territory “so many may follow me” again. The 
Javanese lords no longer sent delegations “out of fear for Puger” and Trunajaya; leaving Speelman 
the only one to turn to.345 
Speelman was, however, aware of the rumours among “the people” that this prince had 
killed his own father. Since this would invalidate any claim to the throne, the admiral enquired 
further on these hearsays. Amangkurat II was asked to report on the fall of the Kraton via a Nadere 
Verclaringe or additional declaration. The resulting report shows knotty courtly ties to have slowly 
dislodged Amangkurat I. Only the crown prince stayed at his side; a self-proclaimed and uncontested 
loyalty.346 Speelman takes this for granted and rejects the gossip as plotted by the “deceased 
untrustworthy Marta Saaija”.347  
The deceit and defeat at Gegodog is excused too. Amangkurat II is relatively open about it 
and his courtiers convey his father never gave hay to the accusations of the prince commencing 
rebellion.348 But curbing the rebellion he can; Speelman hopes to control the uprise through 
establishing Amangkurat as recognized overlord. A captured warlord from Semarang, Astrajuda, 
provides Speelman with a detailed account of the kraton’s fall and stresses that many of the 
Mataramese courtiers brought to Kediri desired for “one of their legitimate rulers” descending from 
                                                          
343 The quote derives from:  "andersuijt te verwagten, als nog het dempen van 't eene vier, het weder ontfonken van een ander, gelijk 
d'ervarentheijd in de Euopische Coninkrijken, daar de coningen veel broeders hadden, en nog bij onze geheugenisse in het Hindostanse 
gebiet, ten overvloede geleert, en aangewezen heeft". See Ibid.: 877-878. Notice that Speelman was aware of the Aria Martalaja’s attempt 
to refrain the Sunan from contacting the Dutch. See Speelman, “Letter XXX”: 136-137. 
344 Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek : 746-747. 
345 The quotes are translated from “opdat velen my volgen mogen en in der haaste , de Mattaram weder verwinnen dat ick het volck van de 
Mattaram tot het oorlogen noch vechten, niet crygen conde”; “opdat velen my volgen mogen”; and “uit vreeze voor Poeger”.  Amangkurat 
II, “Letter XVII (16 April, 1677): Translaat van een verzegelden brief, door den Adipati Anoem, nu genaamd Ngalaga Amankoerat aan den Ed. 
Hr. Gouverneur Generaal, uit Tegal geschreven.“ In De Opkomst Van:  130-132;  idem., “Letter XL (around November, 1677): Translaet van 
een versegeit versoeekschrift soo in  de Javaanse als Maleijtse tale door den Sousouhounan Aman Conrat Sinnepatty Ingalaga, op den ... 
aen d'Ed. H.. Admirael Cornelis Speelman.” In De Opkomst Van: 171; C. Speelman, “Letter XXXIV (14 October, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 
157-158; and idem., “Letter XLI”: 175.  
346 Amangkurat II, “Letter XXXIII (10 October, 1677): Nader verclaringe door den Sousouhounan selffs ... op de instantie van den admiraal 
Cornelis Speelman op den 19de en 20de September opgegeven.” In De Opkomst van: 147-155. 
347 The quote is translated from “den overleden trouwlooze Marta Saaija”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 747. 
348 Ibid.: 758-759. 
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Sultan Agung.349 Amangkurat II might well be it. To prove so, further attention is paid to the mothers 
and the background of the brothers.350  
Just two of the six princes are judged “lawful and legitimate” heirs; Amangkurat II and 
Pangéran Puger.351 In the end, Speelman claims the former to be the true successor. Nine courtiers 
witnessed Amangkurat I’s decree: it “is my oldest son on which I rely, and [to him] Mataram belongs; 
Niety Nagara, hand to him my precious gong Sibietsia, and my krits Belatar” as “to recognize this 
truthful, and legitimate successor of his father, in spite of Pangéran Puger”. In contrast, Puger is said 
to only have only one important Mantri following him. 352  One cannot avoid noticing the 
opportunistic reasoning behind this; Speelman himself suggests the choice of Sunan is not as relevant 
as “the Company’s interests” of retrieving “tranquillity” and “eradicating” Kajoran and Trunajaya. 
Counting Mantris eases the choice of ruler, so attention can be quickly turned to chief concerns.353 
 The intricacies of legitimacy to rule are side-issues. Speelman even wishes the fight between 
the brothers would cease “so to exterminate their shared enemy easier with the Company’s help.” 
Thereby they would sooner become independent, and the VOC would be able to halt its costly 
intervention much faster.354 The intrinsic difficulty of having two heirs fight alongside is hence 
disregarded and Puger’s suggestion to divide the realm into a two rejected. The false promises of 
Puger to attend Amangkurat II’s court are instead blamed on “mistrust and suspicion”, self-interest, 
“false hearsays” and ignorance on the VOC’s aim “to make them rule the realm themselves.”355 Even 
cooperation with Kajoran and Trunajaya is suspected.356 Nonetheless, “as much honour and respect 
                                                          
349 Speelman, “Letter XXX”: 136. 
350 The degree to which the brothers are willing to submit to Amangkurat II is treated too. Most of Amangkurat I’s daughters ended up in 
Puger’s or Trunajaya’s camp, still Speelman does not take this as important (“die ons ter zake weijnig importeeren”) while summarizing 
their stories. Thereby he neglects the genealogical legitimation of these warlords; binding in the late Sunan’s wives could after all bring 
recognition from others. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 747-750 and 777- 779. 
351 Even the successor of Amangkurat II is debated; the Sunan points at his son Raden Mas, who is so young that Speelman suggests might 
better resort to one of his brother instead in case of succession. Notice that Amangkurat II is the Sunan title, as a boy his name was Raden 
Mas Rahmat and as a prince Pangéran Adipati Anom. Ibid.:  750 and 776-777. 
352 The quotes derive from: “is mijn oudste zoon daar op ik mij verlate, en hoort de Mataram toe, Nietij Nagara, geeft hem over mijn rijke 
gong Sibietsia, en mijn krids Belatar, ’t welk zoodanig naargevolgt en door dezen Mandaraka voor ende van wegenz zijnen heer aanvaart 
wierde, zulke men allenthalven ten belange van de wittigheid zig niet en schijnt te komen abuseeren met den dezen voor waaragti, en 
ligitieme opvolger van zijn vader aan te nemen ende te erkennen, niet tegenstaande den Pangéran Pougar …” Puger’s pretensions and the 
rumour that Amangkurat I divided the realm – expressed in letters to the VOC- are wholly dismissed as “deceitful”. See idem.: 750-751. The 
Mantri staying with Puger was “Tommagon Sjougulimouda, welke bij hem tot nu toe  continueert, en gehouden werd, voor een quaad 
instrument ontrent den zelven”. See further idem.:  756-757. 
353 Ibid.: 751-752 and 874. 
354 The quote is translated from: “om alzoo gesamentlijk  haren algemeenen vijand te gemakkelijker mets Compagnies hulpe te verdelgen.” 
Ibid.: 752, 768. 
355 The quote derives from: “haar door haren agterdogtigen aart niet konnende imagineeren dat de Compagnie al deze moeijte, en kosten 
doet, puer en alleen to hare adsistentie maar nergens anders om, als om hun selfs meester van het rijk te maken”. Speelman laments teh 
self-interest in this phrase: “dat zij daar van mij anders wisten te denken, nog te zeggen als dat een ijder van hun alle, even garig zelfs 
konink in des vadersplaatse willen zoude, want hunnes wetens, en had Adepattij Anmon, hun noijt in hare perzonen, eenige redenen tot 
misgenoegen gegeven”.  Ibid.: 754 and 758-760. See also Speelman, “Letter XLI”: 179. 
356 C. Speelman, “Letter XLIII (2 January 1678).” In De Opkomst Van: 184-185; and idem., Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 752-755, 759 and 874-
875.  
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should be given [to him] as is convenient for princes of such royal birth”; for that will prove the 
Company’s good intentions.357 
Puger himself claims to face famine and epidemics and can only send delegates to Japara. 
Speelman agrees to support such an embassy and selects a commander to guide it; the “most adroit 
and capable” Mandaraka. Mandaraka is assigned a hidden agenda, however. He is to gather an 
sizeable army as “to march towards Mataram with awe, so in case Pangéran Puger would submit to 
his brother, they can meet him with all due respects.”358 Although the embassy was never assembled, 
the intention of Speelman to draw an alliance between the two brothers shines through once more. 
The reported weak position and popularity of Amangkurat at the kraton would supposedly ease this 
aim.359 
Conversely, Pangéran Puger is “generally perceived” as a “just as competent ruler” that “was 
by far not as guided by his lust that much”.360 Amangkurat II instead managed to offend “the bulk of 
the large and small people” by taking “wives and daughters for his own pleasure”. Speelman even 
needed to publically reproach him for this behaviour to satisfy his subjects; stating it would be a sin 
to God empowering a man acting like that. The Sunan was urged to change his ways.361 Javanese 
courtiers had similar objections. Indeed, at one point Amangkurat confessed having too few 
followers to “do anything significant”.362 
According to Speelman, Amangkurat II subsequently swore “with very touching oaths, and 
tears in his eyes, that he would no longer disgrace himself with this [behaviour], and that he would 
even punish his commanders by death or other heavy penalties, in case they would act alike”.363 
Rather than an actual confession, this anecdote appears a flight of fancy; serving to increase the 
Batavian support for Amangkurat II. The Sunan had persisted in pursuing romantic affairs and 
insisted “that the previous wars among the Javanese were generally fought for women or daughters, 
                                                          
357 The quote derives from:  zoo veel eere en respect te bewijzen als princen van zoo hooge geboorte convenieert ...te tonen dat wij haar 
welstand betragten zonder ander opzigt als om ons contract met haar en haar vader gemaakt, als trouwe bontgenoten naar te komen, en 
in een onverbreekelijke vrede en aliantie tot afweeringe van alle vijande met haar te continueren, indien zij luijden van hare kant insgelijks 
alle pligten van een eerlijk bontgenootschap komen te presteeren en met haar broeder den Sousouhoenan in vrede blijven leven ..." 
Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 871-872. 
358 The quote is roughly translated from: “om met ontzag voort naar de Mattaram te trekken, behouden dat ingevalle den Pangéran Pougar 
zijnen broeder quam te erkennen, zij hem als dan met alle respect rencontreeren”. In reverse, when Puger would not show any intentions 
to abasement, they could claim to have arranged an army for the purpose of showing respect not causing bloodshed. See ibid.: 766-767. 
359 Speelman, “Letter XLI”: 174-175; idem., “Letter XXXV”: 161-163; and idem., Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 767-768. 
360 Raden Tappa, for instance, gives Puger his preference. See Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 763-764 and 777. 
361 The quotes derives from: “is nogal het gemeen gevoelen ... dat Pangéran Pougar door het geheele land, bij groot en kleen, aangenamer, 
en veel meer getrokken zij, als den dezen dat hij ook ruijm zoo bequaam tot de regeeringe is ... maar op verre na zoo veel niet aan zijn 
wellust, als den dezen, zeer was overgegeven, zonder nogtans ijmants vrouwen off kinderen tot zijn vermaak naar hem te nemen, ’t welk 
de grootste  en voorneemste oorzake gezegt wert, te wezen, waarom deze zijn hoogheijds successive, het meeste gros van groote, en 
kleen volk, tegens de borst zoude stooten”. Ibid.: 763-764. Earlier agitations arrived over Amangkurat II desire for retreiving a certain 
princess. See C. Speelman, “Letter XXXII” (6 October, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 145-147; and  idem., “Letter XXXIV”: 157-158. 
362 The quotes is translated from: “ijets van belang te komen uijtregten”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 827. 
363 The quote is translated from: “sweerende indien tijd met zeer diere eeden, en de tranen in zijn oogen, dat hij niet nader zig daar met 
niet bezoetelen, maar dat hij ook zelfs zijne bevelhebbers, met de dood, off ander swaarlijk straffen zoude, indien zij het hun onder 
wonden te doen.” Ibid.: 764. 
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and that [these desires] were hence not strange to this country, but familiar”.364 Speelman appears 
to cover up the Sunan’s convictions to the Supreme Government. Amangkurat’s ‘oaths and tears’ 
suggests the reputed decency of Puger should not lead to preference for him, for in the future the 
same can be expected of Amangkurat.365 
Couper seems to have laid the seeds for favouring Amangkurat II. His embassy in March 1677 
centred on Amangkurat II; then still titled Pangéran Adipati Anom. He was the one recommending 
the visit to his brother Pangéran Martasana to open doors to the kraton. Martasana, however, warns 
Couper for the possible difficulties in getting his three brothers to sign for cooperation with the VOC. 
“One wants to become Susuhunan [i.e. Puger], the other is a womanizer [i.e. Amangkurat II], the 
third just slacking about [i.e. Singasari]; leaving the realm’s matters to decay. For if they had acted 
like sons of the Susuhunan, Raden Kajoran would, without doubt, not have turned his back” to 
Mataram.366  
Their “distrust towards each other” precluded efficient rule; as the ill and aging Sunan had 
given authority to them. Yet, having arrived at Pangéran Adipati Anom’s court, Couper is assured full 
support by the prince. The crown prince calls himself “the admiral’s own son” and stresses how his 
brothers are jealous on the recognition he gains from the Dutch. It is he who receives the diplomatic 
letter and contract; “opening it with his own hands”, asking the royal secretary to read it out and 
“calling loudly: silentium, thee Mataramese lords listen with attention!” When the Sunan turns out 
too sick to sign the contract, his son Adipati Anom does it for him; as such rectifying a contract that 
would soon position himself as the ‘just prince’ and Sunan, at least as far as Speelman was 
concerned.367 
All these arguments for supporting a single legitimate leader, point into one direction: the 
need to quickly initiate a hinterland march to constitute the Sunan’s power. Throughout the 
Memorie, the campaign to Kediri keeps looming. All kinds of preparations are made; from 
strengthening fortifications and depots, accumulating arms and cannons, to gathering intelligence 
                                                          
364 The quote is translated from: “dat de voorgaande meeste oorlogen onder de Javanen al doorgaans om vrouwen of dochters was 
toegecomen, en dat het mitsdien hier te lande niets vreemts; maar familjaer was’”. Speelman, “Letter XXXIV”: 157-158; idem.,“Letter 
XXXV”: 159-160;  idem., “Letter XLI”: 179-180; and I. De Saint-Martin “Letter XLV (9 May, 1678).” In De Opkomst Van: 208-209. 
365 Notice that Speelman expresses his doubts on the confession, but subsequently demonstrates how his behavior has improved. Hence, 
concluding that the oaths were legitimate. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 764-765. 
366 The quotes derive from: “d'een wil Sousouhounan wesen, d'andere hout het met moye vrouwen ende den derde met een toebackjen, 
latende de saacken van 't ryck verlooren gaan. Want indien se haar als des Sonsonhounans soons gethoont hadden, boyten twytfel was 
Radingh Cadjohoran niet wegh geraackt, en dat ontstaat uyt bet misvertrouwen, dat sy op den anderen hebben, waarmede het soodanich 
hebben laten liggen”. J. Couper, “Letter XVI ( 25 March, 1677): Schriftelyck rapport door den coopman Jacobus Couper over syne 
commissie aan 't Mataramse hoft aen d'EdH. Comelis Speelman.” In De Opkomst Van: 98.  
367 The quotes derive from: “want ick ben des admiraals eygen soon, hy mach van my in alles verseeckert wesen, ick sal Pangorangh Pongar 
beweegen om met my syn stemme tot des admiraals versoeek te geven”; “want myn broeders zyn jaloers, dat ick bij de Hollanders in 
meerder aansien zoude wesen als syluyden”; “Pangerangh Adypatty, die den brieft en contract oock overnam, doende de brieft' met 
eygener handen open”; and “overluydt geroepen zynde. silentium, ghy Mattaramse grooten hoort toe met aandacht!” . Couper is the one 
ending up reading out the contract, as he could speak Javanese. See ibid.: 98-113. 
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and tempting warriors.368 As Speelman stresses in the first pages, the opponents were slowly forced 
into retreat. The enemy was “pushed back to the land of Djepan” by “the might of some of our army 
men” and the assistance of Javanese troops charged by Adipati Martapura and Martalaja. Thanks to 
“the help of God” it is evident how “mighty the Company’s weapon has become on this island”.369 
The situation was “favourable for the upcoming campaign”, and no further time should be 
wasted “lying still”.370 While putting these words on paper, Speelman must have realized the power 
shifts in Batavia would make such hinterland campaign very feasible indeed. Up till that point, he had 
received autonomy of the Susuhunan to act as he wished within Mataram.371 No similar sovereignty 
was granted by the governor-general. The new leadership of Van Goens would do justice to his 
agreements with the Sunan; granting access inlands. In his own words, the Mataramese contracts 
were signed with “the intention to safe his majesty from the disorder striking his realm … to the 
fullest extremity”. To blame were “Trunajaya… and his followers under Raden Kajoran” and the 
“roaming Makassarese under Karaëng Galesong”.372 Freedom to enter the back lands would finally 
bring back order. 
He had already brought the Pasisir “to again obey the Susuhunan”; capturing the coastal 
towns “under the Company’s protection” or planting VOC flags to deter opponents.373 Thereby they 
“would have contributed to whatever made the recovery of calmness practicable and applicable”. 
Yet, stabilizing peace further required stepping foot on the back land.374 Trunajaya hid in Kediri, 
where Speelman had been unable “to visit” him due to “the strict prohibition of the Supreme 
Government”, causing the admiral “very sincere discontent”. In the meantime, Trunajaya’s “deceitful 
father in law, masked under priestly sanctity, played his part and distracted the common population 
from their required obedience though devilishly hymned false prophecies”. Mataram had been 
                                                          
368 For the enforcement of forts see: Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 794, 827-832, 837-839, 843, 863-864, 871, 879-880, 882-883, 893, 
and 902. New depots were built too.  
369 The quote derives from: “dat alles met Godes hulpe naar alle apparentie zig naar wensche vlijen, en schikken, zoude, hebbende de 
ervarentheijd ons tot nu toe overvloedig geseert hoe onsagellijk ’s Compagnies wapen op dit eijland gewerden zijn”. Inid.: 742. Speelman 
had been stressing this since the conquest of Surabaya, see Speelman, “Letter XIX”: 117-119.  
370 The quotes are derived from: “dog dat ook sedert de veranderinge op Sourabaija en hier om herre met de hulpe Godes met alleene 
weder geredresseert, maar dat ook zelfs den vijand hier bij, en ontrent doorgebroken, door t’ontsag van weijnige onze militeijren, zonder 
eenige bijzondere resistentie te derven bieden, of ergens stant te houden, zoo verre zijn gedreven gewerden tot in t‘land van Dsjepan toe, 
t’gunt zij al meede verliesen en aan d'onze ten besten gaven zulke de Javaanse troepen van zijn hoogste onder Adepattijs Marta Poura en 
Marta Laija geadsisteert”; “die brave gedesidereerde situatie, zoo favorabel voor 't aanstaande companje door de Javaanse tropen”; and 
“in plaats van stilleggen”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 738, 742, 763, 790 and 837-839. 
371 Two contracts determining a taxative payback as well as increased autonomy of Batavia show an unusual recognition of autonomy that 
might not have been granted to other neighbouring realms. The VOC was even allowed to control the foreign Asian groups within their 
territories. See De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 16-17. 
372 Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 744. 
373 Speelman, “Letter X”; and idem., “Letter XI (10 January, 1677).“ In De Opkmost Van: 76.  
374 The quote is derived from “den Sousouhounan weder hebben doen erkennen, verklarende met verzegelde actens en het uijt deelen van 
prince vlaggens, dat wij die plaatsen namen onder Compagnies bescherminge, ten minsten , tot zoo lange wij vanwegens de Compagnie 
alles zouden hebben bijgebragt wat to herstellinge van de ruste particabel en applicabel konde wezen”.  Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 
744-745. 
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sacked and “the old lord, with his four feminized sons” had cowardly fled. A stitch in time had to be 
made before disorder would rule all.375 
 The fastest and easiest way to reap the benefits of these contracts would be a submission of 
Trunajaya and Kajoran. Kajoran could “be brought back to friendship and taken as a noted minister of 
the state”. Trunajaya could become a governor of Madura, if he acts properly. Speelman hopes for 
this, but at the same time envisions the inevitability of conquest.376 To muster the required 
manpower, the admiral evaluates the pejuang troops that are likely to participate or are already 
under command. The teaming of Puger and Amangkurat II is one aspect of this query. But local 
leaders and war-bands gain equal attention.377 
 In the overview he gives of the current army, four categories are applied: European (566 
soldiers), Ambonese (138 soldiers), Mardijkers (81 soldiers), and Makassarese (67 soldiers). Smaller 
war-bands are found among them: the Makassarese are commanded by three and the Ambonese by 
two lords. All these sections are stationed separately and appear to have formed rather independent 
war-bands. Hardly any details are given on these groups, however.378 It almost appears the 
particularities of the warriors no longer matter when they are already drawn into the warforce. This 
is different for the potential allies.  
Other than his successor Hurdt, Speelman fully relied on pejuang troops for hinterland 
battles; for only they could enter the back lands with large groups and for an extended period.379 The 
concern with Sulawesians and Javanese warriors is thus not unexpected. Several reports were 
written on them. Couper’s account, for example, unveiled the fraternization within Galesong’s army 
and demonstrated the need to make the Makassarese submit to the Company. It suggests different 
war-bands started to drift apart. The group “is about 2.000 men strong, but divided by so many 
leaders of equal quality, nobility and origin, that they as such assert to be alike [and] that Karaëng 
Galesong … do[es] not hold much authority over them, and the internal discords are not small”. 
Speelman plans to cause a split between these troops by sending two- to four-hundred of Raja 
                                                          
375 The quote is derived from “en al waar wij hem  hem tot mijn bijzonder, en zeer hartelijk leetweezen, door hey expres en stricte verbod 
van de Hooge Regeeringe niet hebben mogen gaan bezoeken, en heeft hij derhalven binnen ’s lands de handen ruijm gehouden, om ten 
principalen door toe doen van zijnen listigen schoonvader, onder schijn van een priesterterlijke heijligheijd, zijn personagie te speelen en 
het gemeene volk door een parthije duijvelsche gesingen valsche prophecijen van hare schuldige gehoorsaamheijd af te leijden, zoo verre 
dat den ouden laten vorst, en zijne vier verwijfde zoonen, eijnteling haar niet langer in de Mataram dervende vertrouwen.” Ibid.: 746. 
376 The quote derives from: “weder in vrintschap en een aansienelijk minister in het rijk aan te neemen”. Ibid.: 844-845. See also earlier 
letters: Speelman, “Letter XII”:  77-79. 
377Ibid.: 769-770. 
378 On Semarang are stationed: Karra Pappas leading 12 Makassarese soldiers and one sergeant, two Ambonese Sergeants leading 40 
Ambonese and Kambral heading a group of 19 mixed indigenous men. The latter mixed groups were also described as Mardijkers; but it is 
not clear whether they had anything to do with Batavia. ‘Mardijkers’ was after all a very ambiguous moniker. In the fields: the Makassarese 
lieutenant Karremou Toulij charging three sergeants and 41 soldiers, 96 Ambonese under Captain Abraham Tieko, eight Makassarese 
soldiers of Care Montoulijs. See ibid.: 834 and 836-837. 
379 Hence Speelman’s request to the Sunan for men after the fall of Surabaya. See E. van der Schuer, “Letter XX (4 June, 1677).” In De 
Opkomst Van: 119. 
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Palakka’s “best men” which ought to be done “with care”, because “no opportunity should be given 
for one part of [Palakka’s] group to desert to Trunajaya”.380 
 A comparable plan was made for convincing the Madurese to submit to Amangkurat. This 
time the Buginese themselves proposed going to Madura “to deprive Trunajaya of all support that he 
could still aspire from those lands”. The admiral had to admit that “the project is in fact not ill 
conceived”. But care needed to be taken to select a trustworthy warlord to avoid one that “will act to 
his own benefits, and would attempt to make himself master, which is not an unlikely event, and 
which will grant them more prosperous and arable lands than can be found on the entire Javanese 
island”. Yet, with the proper warlords and VOC surveillance -he reckons- this plot might convince 
locals to join the marching army.381 
 Next to attracting new masses, local rulers were also expected to hold on to their current 
ones. Speelman recommends local leaders to “firmly win over the favour of the villages, at least 
those approximate [to their power centres], so rebels won’t dare to invade or oppose them”.382 The 
population surrounding the cities was to be used for guarding duties too; the Chinese and Javanese 
living near Semarang were, for example, insisted to flee inside the city and not the forests whenever 
enemy forces approached. In that matter, they could be equipped with arms if the need arrived. 
Local protection was thus relied on; both in and outside city walls. Several Javanese nobles were 
assigned to guard the fields with their own followers and minimal European backing.383 At the same 
time, Speelman realizes that for some villages “our help might be as small as anything, [but it] seems 
to be their only salvage”.384 
Just as was the case for winning over new warriors, protecting villages was done better by 
some leaders than others. If successful, Javanese warlords and rulers are highly praised and usually 
earn royal designations in consequence.385 Aria Urawan stands out particularly; both Couper and 
                                                          
380 The quotes derive from: “bestaan de hare presente sterkte naar dat Glissons broeder Dain Memang met de zijne van ’t eijland Cagginjan 
bij den hoop gekomen was, volgens de laatste tijdinge, door Sergeant Couper daar van gerapporteert zoo men zegt in ontrent twee 
duijsent koppen, dog verdeelt onder zoo veel hoofden van gelijke qualiteijt, geslagt en afkomst, en die der halven, meijnen d’een zoo wel 
als d’ander te wezen, dat Craijn Glisson en zijne naaste Dain Masserrij, neve van Niontemorano, daar over zoo groot gezag nog authoriteijt 
niet zeer geschikt, en de onderlinge disordre niet kleen is”; and “want U Edele zelfs genoegsaam weeten dat daar door geen oorzaake 
zoude mogen gegeven warden, om een parthije van de zelve tot Troenadjaaija te doen overgaan”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 790-
791. Speelman first expressed this plan on the 10th of March, 1677. See Speelman, “Letter XII”: 78. 
381 The quotes are translated from: “om Troenadjaaija te ontzetten alle hulpe die hij zig van die kant nog mogte imagineren, ’t project en is 
in effect van zoo quaden aanzien niet”; and “daar in naar eijgen voordeel zoeken, en tragten zouden, voor haar zelven meester daarvan te 
werden, ’t welk voor hun gansche geen onmoogelijke zaak is, en waar met zij dan nog gelukkiger en vrugtbaarder akker zouden bezitten als 
op ’t geheele eijland Java te vinden zij...”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 791-793. Another reason is to free VOC prisoners kept by the 
Madurese after a shipwreck, see ibid.: 793.  
382 Descriptions of trade posts or villages often have the tendency to urge proper defences against roaming rebels.  The quote is translated 
from: “de dorpen met een sterke hand, ten minsten de gene die naast bij gelegen zijn, onder haar devotie te stellen, omdat wij geloofden 
dat de Maccassaren hun evenwel opentlijk daar tegen niet en zouden durven stellen, nogte in oppositie komen”. Ibid.: 794, 800 and 806-
807. 
383 Only the most basic information on the troops is given: leaderships, number and provincial origin. However, mention is made of slight 
competition between the units. Ibid.: 873-874, 878- 879, and 896-897. 
384 The quote is translated from: “dat onze hulpe zoo kleen alse ook wezen mag, haren eenigsten toeverlaat schijnt te wezen”. Ibid.: 809. 
385 Ibid.: 795-797, 806-807, 814, 861-862, 873, 876, 881-882 and 899.  
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Speelman acclaim his dedication. This “modest” and “brave” Surabayan governor offered to conquer 
Kediri, if about two-hundred VOC soldiers or the Ambonese/Ternaten legion would assist him for two 
weeks. Furthermore, he would be able to maintain the city and its surroundings “with the followers 
he was convinced to gain there”. He took this as a safe bet for the Kedirians were still angry about 
the murder of their former lord and the assignation of his wives to others. But his brother had 
escaped to Giri and could attract “his followers in Kediri ... that he surely still had”. 386 
Urawan requested governorship over the area in return. The Surabayan Ombols (county 
regents) similarly recommended installing him as city administrator. The Sunan equally tried to “pull 
him in”. Urawan’s popularity thus stretched beyond the VOC. The potential of the fervent warlord 
was recognized by all. His initiative never lifted off, however, since -as Speelman stresses- no VOC 
soldiers could enter the backcountry due to Batavian policy. Instead, he is offered governorship over 
Sidaijo “where he is much better regarded and appreciated by the population” as the current 
ruler.387 
Comparable endeavours were suggested by other local rulers. But these were not always as 
reliable. The governor of Wiera Saba, for example, claimed he only needed about 30 men support to 
retake his land. But Speelman notices that he had “joined the Makassarese” immediately after 
Trunajaya has conquered his territory. Even though Wiera Saba assumed Galesong to be warring 
under the Sunan’s banner, the admiral still thinks him a traitor. Other rulers do formally abide to the 
Sunan but do not mobilize their population.388 When Kjai Derma Souda and Aria Blater -lords 
‘eastwards of Surabaya’- are asked to “appear from their mountains and hiding places and arm and 
marshal their people”, none such efforts are made; “so that their loyalty cannot be honoured”.389 
The lords residing in Mataram with Pangéran Puger claim similar recognition without living 
up to it.390 And the Javanese lord that deserted the post Siepan, Martalaja, simply refuses to collect 
men to retake it; rather requesting to be assigned a new territory. Similarly, the ruler of Balora 
quietly fled his town while pretending he had defended it well. Prince Martasana even faked alliance, 
while he “detracted the loyalty to the Susuhunan from the people on Wates with evil intentions”; 
making it necessary to reconquer the post.391 
                                                          
386 The quote is translated from: “maar ook met den aanhang, die hij vast stelde te zullen krijgen”. Ibid.: 795. 
387 The quotes are translated from: “weder bij sig te trekken” and “waar in hij bij het volk veel beter gezien en bemint is”. Ibid.: 795-796. 
See also Speelman, “Letter XXXIV”: 156. 
388 This happens even when traditions of handing out men exist; see for instance the complaints on Limbraauwa. See Speelman, Inscriptie 
Edele Vertrek:  756, 776 and 883-884. 
389 The quotes are translated from: “uijt hare bergen en schuijlhoeken te voorschijn te doen komen en haar volk in wapens op de been te 
brengen” and “zoo dat ook van hare getrouwheijd niet te roemen valt". Ibid.: 798-799. 
390 This is demonstrated to Speelman by Pugers’ ‘deceipftul’ occupation of the kraton and informants stating the insincerity of the rulers in 
the old court. See ibid.:760-763, 768. 
391 The Sunan forgave him these pretensions, possibly showing an expected confession of bravery even when it did not occur, or otherwise 
a form of nepotism. See ibid.: 807-808 and 865-870 . 
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All of them appeared to be playing a diplomatic game in deceit of the VOC. For each and 
every case, Speelman expresses his frustration. That his doubts were justified is proven by the two-
day showdown with which Martalaja sealed his disobedience. After his wishes were not fulfilled, he 
hid in a removed kampung as an act of resistance and needed to be hunted down. In the battle that 
followed, not only he himself, but equally the well-respected Martapura and Wangsa Diepa lost their 
lives. The lament over the latter offers a shining contrast to the condemnation of Laja for whose cut-
off head a “high price was paid”.392 
More forgiveness is shown to the Surabayan Ombols that had temporarily associated with 
Trunajaya or the Makassarese but later travelled to Japara to submit to the Sunan.393 They gained 
new noble titles as a reward. All their backgrounds and personalities are described to showcase their 
alliance. Speelman recommends gratifying them “so them all …., as well as their community, will be 
indebted and tied to the Company through well-doings and riches and unable to persist without 
those and her fatherly care”. The admiral even accepted Amangkurat selecting rulers that were 
known “as very disfavoured towards the Company”. None of them, after all, could bite the hand that 
feeds; a hand ultimately belonging to the VOC. 394 
 For the campaign lying ahead, Speelman had plans to ensure comparable compliance from 
new allies. Traversing the right roads was one of them. It was necessary to find out how the land lies 
to gain support. The Supreme Government is alerted on the lacking geographical knowledge on 
“provinces, cities, villages etc.” The hinterlands and coastal peripheries thus need to be mapped out. 
Few Javanese have acquired the knowledge to do so; therefore Speelman suggests their first mate 
Cornelis Coops to expand an earlier map of the shipper Corter.395 
Routes for the campaign were picked; three trails are suggested for three different army 
sections consisting out of men with varied ethnic backgrounds. Unlike the broad categorizations of 
Hurdt’s armed force, Speelman refers to certain regions where warriors can be obtained.396 The 
routes of the campaign seem tailored to collect these specific regional forces. The admiral is 
                                                          
392 This ‘traitor’ did appear to enjoy Amangkurat’s protection, to the chagrin of Speelman. Yet, the admiral already believed him to “desert” 
whenever he will be capable to before his rebellion. Later on, the VOC man would regret would come to regret the initial trust he had gave 
to him. See ibid.:  800-805. 
393 For the letter accounting on them see C. Speelman, ”Letter XXV (1 August, 1677).”: 126-130. 
394 The quote is taken from: ““want dezelve alle zonder onderscheijt, zoo wel als de heele gemeente, door weldaden ten overvloede aan de 
Compagnie verpligt, ende verbonden zijn, en ook nog eerst zonder dezelve, en haar vaderlijke voorzorge, niet en zouden komen bestaan.” 
Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 797-798 and 860-861. 
395 Ibid.: 846-847. 
396 Speelman mentions how “ zoude uijt het volk van Coudoes Damacq, Pattij, Jawana, Rimbang , Lassem en de plaatsen daar om her, het 
derde esquadre zoude bestaan, uijt het volk van Sourabaija, Griesik, Gierij, Zidaayo, en eenige uijt het Kindanse gebergte om daar mede 
over Wiera Saba, of een ander bequamer weg, naar de generale rendevous, daar men dezelve komt vast te stellen, te avanceeren.” Ibid.: 
769 and 882-883. The list of villages controlled in Banjukunung on folio 882-883 might be noted down with similar intentions. For ealier 
planned routes see Speelman, “Letter XXI”: 121-122; and idem., “Letter XXIII”: 123-125. Here again, submission or scaring away Madurese 
support in towns and regions was aimed for.  
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therefore very displeased when one of the posts that was part of his scheduled march, Siepan, is 
suddenly abandoned without any permission of him or the Sunan.397 
Seasonal scheduling is also addressed; for monsoons can change paths into swamps. “His 
highness as well as his principal ministers” declare to Speelman that they cannot muster their forces 
before the end of May or the start of June due to heavy rainfall and the harvest season. Still, the 
admiral urges that “the Company and the Susuhunan are determined to have the bulk of our troops 
moved beyond Kudus … before the end of April, as to submit those areas, stop the invasion of thugs 
and poachers, and ensure the [acquirement] of the harvest.”398 Those troops, be it European or 
pejuang, required training and provision  
 Speelman makes several requests to the Supreme Government to ensure the army is well 
prepared.399 Special care is taken to ready the “foreigners” -Chinese, Balinese, Arabians etc.- in 
Javanese port towns, since they will require much “guidance”. The Javanese do “not have the power, 
nor the skills to bring those people to proper obedience and under discipline”.  Without such control, 
they will bother everyone -“friend or enemy”- with “robbing, stealing, burning and plunder”.400 Were 
there to develop difficulties between the Javanese and the foreigners, the Sunan was to settle those. 
Amangkurat was equally held responsible for delivering carriers and grooms, who were demanded 
separately from the warriors.401 
Indigenous manpower thus served two purposes to the VOC: fighting and transporting. 
Amassing the former kind tended to involve much more diplomacy and consequently takes up much 
more attention within Speelman’s report. The Javanese commander Mandaraka suggests 20.000 
armed forced and between 600 till 1.800 horses can be mustered at the coastal towns between Tegal 
and Surabaya. Speelman, however, trusts his own judgement better, and instead counts on 2.000 to 
2.500 men, to be collected by Adipati Martumappel. To the admiral’s opinion, destruction of the 
region between Tuban and Demak makes it impossible to collect manpower there. Simultaneously, 
                                                          
397 This appears so because the suggested routes tend to take a detour towards these regions. Notice that the Madurese reconquest of 
Surabaya initially led to a planned campaign through Mataram (Couper would retake it before this Missive was written, but after the first 
ideas for a campaign were discussed), but that this campaign was adjusted to gathering troops in that area. See Speelman, Inscriptie Edele 
Vertrek: 769-770, 773, and 800-806; and idem., “Letter XLII”: 184. 
398 Quote derives from: “de Compagnie ende dde Sousouhounan ernst gaat werden het gros van onze troepen met het eijnde van April 
naar buijten tot in Coedoes, en naar gelegentheijd ook verder tot in Grobagan te voeren, om die landstreeken voor eerste tot beter devotie 
te verpligten, d’invasie der loopers en stroopers te doen ophouden en ‘t gezaij op ‘t veld dat dan rijc en ontrent rijp zal zijn, allent halven te 
verzeekeren”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek:  770-771 
399 This included a recommendation to make “our armed forces” capable of “using the horses of this land”. Mandaraka was to collect six to 
seven hundred of them. Bans on the private consumption of arak were also suggested to avoid disorder; instead the army could provide 
them with a daily small amount of it. See ibid.: 771-772, 825-826 and 840-841. 
400 The quotes are translated from: “vreemdelingen”; “begeleijdinge”; “de Javanen, nog de magt, nog de bequaamheijt hebben, om dat 
volk onder behoorlijke devitue en discipline te houden”; ”'t zij vrunt of vijand”; and “met roven, steelen, branden, en plunderen”. Ibid.: 
820. 
401 The seal of the Sunan was referred to when asking obedience from Javanese warriors, in combination with the threat of death when 
defying orders. Ibid.: 773, 809 and 841. 
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the VOC had “lost many benefits” in the last few months due to “the risen rebellion that has been so 
successful”.402 
Interestingly, the admiral refers to the march to Kudus conducted some months earlier to 
showcase how alliances could be attracted and lost. Within the “short period” of one week, their 
“Javanese force grew to no fewer than 6.000 heads”. Similarly the march of “the aged Martapura and 
other chiefs, who were assisted by so few of our men” “multiplied” in force too. This convinces him 
“that the assistance of Javanese will not disappoint”. Yet, one “requisite” is the presence of the 
Sunan, so “the suspicious and superstitious people see, and as such believe …, that the Company is 
not making such great costs and efforts for themselves but for his resumption”.403 
 Most of these men were not ready for combat. Speelman reckons Javanese war-bands 
consist out of few actual warriors; less than twenty percent usually. The fighters, who initiate the 
battles, wear ”one or two krisses and a pike… the rest, and the bulk, are carriers, some equipped 
with a kris or a knife, or often a parrying dagger”.404 While “the provinces tax one on every one [to 
eight] thousand men, to serve the lord when the need arrives … from that number no more than 100 
out of 1.000 men are counted as armed soldiers”. Sometimes, warlords will even “provide them with 
more guns, to feign larger numbers”. This tendency can be catastrophic, as the admiral point out by 
recalling Amangkurat II’s defeat at Grobogan.405 
The “disastrous” army of 150.000 had no more than 15.000 armed warriors. “At the first 
rumour of approaching enemies”, they were all “brought into confusion and put to flight” because 
“of the large number of carriers and attachments” and “the lacking experience of the commanders”. 
The “long lasting peace in this realm [made] all military discipline unusual”. “In the previous old times” 
-Speelman must have been told by the court-historian Surawikrama- “the cluster of carriers were put 
two miles back whenever a fight or encounter lay ahead, to avoid such confusion”. Luckily, neither 
allies nor enemies manage to bring such order to their forces today; to the competitive advantage of 
VOC interventions.406 
                                                          
402 The quote are translated from "veel advantagie verloren" and "de opgerese rebellie die zoo voorspoedig is geweest”. Ibid.: 774-775. 
403 The quotes derive from: “"zijn U Edele zoo wel als ik van gevoelens dat het aanden bijval van Javanen niet gebreken zal, en dat de 
Compagnie met het voorselijke vermogen al hier, magt genoeg op de been zal hebben“; and “op dat wantrouwende , en bijgelovige volk te 
sien, en soo doende te beter geloven tegen, dat de Compagnie niet voor haar zelve maar tot zijn herstellinge zoo groote kosten, en arbeijd 
doet.” Ibid.: 775. 
404The ‘parrying dagger’ probably refers to less luxerious krisses 
405 The quotes are translated from: “in een of twee cridssen en een pieck”; “de resterenden hoop, die dat gros uijt maken, zijn dragers, 
eenige met een crids of een mes, maar wel meest met een parring verzien”; “want of schoon de gouvernementen d’eene op duijsent, 2,3, 
tot, 5, 6, 8000 man toe, getaxeert staan, om des noots ten dienste van den heer, te moeten imploijeeren etcra, zoo werd uijt dat getal in 
effect niet meer, als 100 uijt 1000 man voor gewapende soldaten gerekent”; and “haar zelfs van meer geweeren versagen, om grooter 
getal te komen monteeren”. Ibid.: 876-877.  
406 The quotes are translated from: “het rampsalige leger”; “op het eerste gerugt, van vijanden zonder datze nog ijemant sagen”; “in 
confusie en aan’t vlugten gebragt wierden”; “door het groote getal dragers en bijloopers”; “door puer gebrek van ervarentheijd der 
bevelhebbers”; “door de lang beleefde ruste in dit rijk, alle oorlogs discepline ongewoon”; and “in de oude voorgaande tijden, te 
practiseeren dat tros dragers, wanneer eenig gevegt en rencontre voorhanden was, ten minsten een of twee mijl agteruijt gelaten wierden, 
om dergelijke confucie te voorkomen”. Ibid.: 876-877. 
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 Even though some assumptions on the preserved discipline are made, the ways in which 
Trunajaya and Kajoran gather their men remains obscure to Speelman. Yet, he reports how the half-
brother of Kajoran, Kabaijang, suddenly appeared in Japara and gave several insights into the hostile 
war-bands. From him came to “most certain and probable” account on the enemy received thus far. 
Besides information on fortifications and armouries, it contains the number, origin, and leadership of 
the warriors in Kediri.407 
On Trunajaya, Kabaijang states that “he was beloved among the general people, because he 
was inspiring to them” and was able to keep prices low.408 The charm of the Madurese warlord 
equally pulled in several courtiers from Mataram, who were seen walking around in Kediri. Marriage 
and entitlements tended to be used to tie in these nobles. As Speelman concludes: the warlords 
“credit and status will improve over time” while, at the same time, he is enjoying life and alcohol in 
his new headquarter.409 Earlier accounts on the warlord were exaggerated here.  
The VOC delegate Moor Piero visited Trunajaya in a Surabayan “little bamboo house” half a 
year earlier. He reported on the warlord’s inability to bring tribute to the Sunan and his clash with 
the Makassarese. Both clues of stubbornness and cruelty prevail. Trunajaya kept the embassy waiting 
for many days, and is offended by the demanding VOC letter that does not pay due respect to ‘a ruler 
descending from Majapahit kings’. The warlords explains how he cannot leave “since I have no-one 
to whom I can trust my realm to, at which moment ... two cut-off Makassarese heads were brought 
in, which [Trunajaya] beheld, saying: these heads belong to folk, whom I provided and cared for, 
because they are people of my brother, still since they resisted and dishonoured my aids, I was 
forced to treat them in this manner”.410 One of Trunajaya’s former lords illustrates his vicious nature 
further. Trunajaya had murdered his stepson and molested his grandchild.  His daughter -wife and 
mother of both victims- speaks to Speelman for revenge. The Admiral is struck by the ‘salient hatred’ 
reflected in “her eyes when his name is mentioned”.411  
Religious fervour was added to the list when Couper met the warlord near Surabaya two 
months later. The VOC man ensured the admiral ”would offer him so many benefits as justice and 
capability could allow” in case he would recognize the Sunan as “his just lord and sovereign” and 
return to Madura. Trunajaya would consider leaving Java, but refuses to recognize a lord who is not 
                                                          
407 Ibid.: 779-780. 
408 The quote is roughly translated from: ““bij dat geheele volk niet onbemint te wezen, omdat hij over deselve wildadig was”. Ibid.: 780 
409Ibid.: 781- 782. 
410 The quotes are translated  from : “bamboes huysje”; and “mynen broeder onbiet my by hem te comen, en hoe kan ick by myn broeder 
gaan, daar ick niemant hebbe aen wie ick myne negryen toevertrouwen kan; onder welcke samenspraack aldaar in hunne 
tegenwoordicheyt twee affgekappte Macassaerse hoofden gebracht wierden, welcke de Panembaban aenschouwende, seyde by: dit syn 
hoofden van volckeren, die ick onderhout gegeven en goet gedaen hebbe, omdat sy volckeren van mynen broeder zyn, doch zy solcx 
verwerpende en myne weldaden met de voeten tredende, ben ick genootsaackt gewerden haar soo te laeten onthaelen.” Moor Piero, 
“Letter XIV”:  83-93.  
411 The quote derives from:  “men dien haat uit hare oogen, wanneer se synen naem noemt, merckelyk kan sien". Speelman, “Letter XXI”: 
122. 
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entitled Sultan by Mecca. With a touch of irony, Couper pens down “similar discourses” followed 
“while three to four glasses of brandy were consumed”. The warlord’s religious claims were 
demeaned.412 No surprise then, that both his title of Panembahan and Sultan are ridiculed and the 
prophecies of praise objected. He might have been foretold to found a wealthy empire in Kediri, but 
has no personal control over Mataram, did not attract a lot of people to Kediri and cannot keep the 
Makassarese in check.413 
In his final report, Speelman collects bad impressions of his delegates to denounce Trunajaya’s 
trustworthiness in support of a hinterland campaign instead of lingering negotiations. Regret is 
expressed on the failed assassination attempts conducted thusfar by insiders, for the death of the 
warlord would have made the campaign “very easy”.414 With the leader alive, Amangkurat II fears the 
people on Madura and in Kediri would “without doubts” allow him “to be an independent lord, 
without giving [the Sunan] recognition.415 The very attempts on his life brought out the worst of 
Trunajaya. The admiral’s tells how he krissed three of his concubines and all his six till twenty-three 
servants and exiled his family near the Southern Sea of Java.416 
Luckily, an attack on Kediri will most likely result in the capture of the warlord and his treasures. 
The Sunan promises to use these spoils of war to pay off his war-debts to the VOC. Speelman figures 
this will encourage his troops “with the hope of bringing the loot home.417 Even if Trunajaya manages 
to flee again, benefits will be gained. He will never be able to take the bulk of the treasury and, more 
importantly, will have to leave his esteem behind too. Speelman predicts that due to such 
cowardness “his primary power will lose its appeal, nor [will he] retain any noticeable group of 
followers”. Either way, “bravery” and ‘God’s blessing’ will thus surely ‘crown’ the campaign with a 
“successful end”. 418 
                                                          
412 The quotes derive from: “hem zooveel gunst zou betoonen, als de regtmatigheid en billykheid kon toelaten”; and “diergelyke discoursen 
meer, onder welken een glaasje brandewyn drie a vier weder gedronken werd” . His drunken talk is suggested to lead to a false promise to 
meet Speelman that afternoon. But the warlord does not show up; keeping the admiral standing in the cold. See Speelman, “Letter XIX”: 
118-119. 
413 Speelman, “Letter XXIX”: 135-136. 
414 On the execution he states: “Een groot jammer; en waarlijk te beklagen zijnde dat de aanslagen door zijn Compangeran Sampan, tegens 
zijn leven gemaakt telkens of het tipje van de executie mislukt waren”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 782-783. 
415 The quote is derived from: “indien gevalle het gantsche eijland Madura , en al het volk dat van het zelve of Caderij waren zonder twijffel, 
hun bij hem zouden hebben gevoegt, en schijnt zijn hoogheijd onfeijlbaar vast, en zeker te stellen, dat hij hem al te getrouw is om zig van 
hem ’t ontrekken, en een heer op zijn zelven te wezen, zonder hem te willen erkennen”. Ibid.: 782-783 
416 The death of his son and the concubinage of his daughter is mentioned too. Ibid.: 782. 
417 Speelman is slightly skeptical about the offer of the Sunan: “’t gunt wel schijnt de huijt te willen verkoopen, eer de beer gevangen is”. 
The quote is translated from: “op hope van goede buijt te maken". Ibid.: 783-784. 
418 The quotes derives from: “dat hij zig door deze tweede vlugt van zijn voorneemste kragt zoude komen t’ ontzenuwen, nog eenige 
bijzonderen aanhank blijven behouwden, vermits buijten twijffel dan inzonderheijd het gemeene volk alle ontzag en vreese zouden 
verliesen, zullende dan onzes eragtens zijn retraicte naar Madoura zoeken te maken, alwaar hij ook niet buijten de werelt, en wel te vinden 
zal zijn”; and “men verkrijgt geen groote dingen zonder dapperheijd en arbeijd, en mag men vrijelijk gelooven, zoo God de Heere  
s'Compagnies wapenen genadelijk belieft te zeegenen, en zulke dit onderhandse werk, met een voorspoedig victorieus eijnde te kronen, 
dat de Compagnie daar bij niet weijnig zal komen te gewinnen". Ibid.: 784-785. 
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The Makassarese war-bands are a second concern. Although Speelman does not want to 
elaborate too much on them, regret is expressed on the failed attempt to work together.419 The 
Makassarese “acknowledge to be the Company’s subjects, and happily want to abide to its orders”, 
but “requested not to be persuaded to leave from Java to Makassar… before taking revenge on 
Trunajaya.” Speelman found the Sulawesians in the middle of a major conflict with the Madurese. 
Trunajaya had even kidnapped and likely poisoned Galesong’s wife and child, who were his own 
daughter and grandchild.420 
But to the admiral these conditions are just excuses. Their promises of good behaviour “are not 
sincere”; even though they ceased bothering the VOC, plunder follows wherever “they reach or 
travel to” and inconsiderate on whether their victims belong to the Madurese or Amangkurat.421 The 
warlord Galesong corresponded that “this happens without his awareness” and promises to punish 
the perpetrators.422 Moreover, surveillance is very difficult due to his “small troop units … who are 
always ready to drive off on their horses” and “who do not only need to take care of themselves, but 
also of their wives and children who were there with them”.423 
These confessions, however, strike Speelman as “untruthful”. Reports of Sergeant Couper, the 
translator Annaihoda Subu and the informant Moor Husseijn all demonstrate “that there is no other 
aim among this people, as to settle on this island…”. The admiral prefers to see the Makassarese as 
unwanted conquerors instead of a decentralized warforce, thereby disregarding the contrasting army 
structures of both parties.424 Speelman was certainly aware of the divergent warlords commanding 
the Makassarese, but he nonetheless insisted on their unity.425 It appears Speelman still treats them 
as the single army of Sultan Hassanudin faced a decade earlier. He complains about their half-
                                                          
419 He does discuss the informant send out to enquire on them. Ibid.: 785. 
420 Ibid.: 786-787; and Speelman, “Letter XXX”: 143-144. 
421 The quote is taken from: “het geheele land dat zij maar bereijken en bereijsen konden, te berooven , en ’t volk te schatten en te 
scheeren, zonder onderscheijt te maken of se onder Troenadjaaija nog sorteerden dan of ze haar weder aan de zijde des Sousouhoenans 
gevolgt hadden”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 786. Similar complaints would later be made by Couper on the Buginese fighting on 
Java. This time, ironically, the VOC themselves had brought them there, but their warlord Raja Boni appears to have lost control over them. 
See J. Couper, “Letter LXI (13 November, 1679).”In De Opkomst Van: 278-279. 
422 The quote derives from: “hoewel Glisson, en d’andere bevelhebbers altijt verklaart hebben dat dit buijten haar voorweten door het 
gemeene volk quam te geschieden”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 786. Similar statements were made in De Saint-Martin, “Letter 
XLV”: 208-209.  
423 The quote derives from: “dat het zoo wel volkomen in haar vermogen niet was, hun onderhorig volk onder behoorlijke tugt en 
disciplune te houden nadien dezelve niet alleen haar eijgen onderhoud mosten verzorgen, maar ook mede vrouwen en kinderen die zij bij 
haar hadden.” Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 786. He made a similar comment in a letter in August 1677, see C. Speelman, “Letter 
XXVIII (4/5 August, 1677).” In De Opkomst Van: 135. 
424 It is only during the previously mentioned attempt to exploit their internal discords that the military structure of the Makassarese is 
underlined. The quote is translated from:  “datter bij dit volk in effecte geen andere opzigt is, als om haar zelven op dit eijland ... te 
vestigen”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 786. 
425 Moor Piero reports, for instance, the sum up of Makassarese warlords given by Trunajaya. These were  Karaëng Galesong, Bongon, 
Rupa, Lumu, Intje Hassan, Mupu, Tellolo and Datu Louadin. Further warlords of Malayan or Makassarese origin are: Dain Mainu, Aru Sium, 
Hadjie Bulubaulu and Intje Ladin. Some warlords are said not to cooperate with the other, as Intje Ladin whose only ally is Intje Soleman 
and his 60 followers. De Saint-Martin was aware of these schisms too. See Moor Piero,  “Letter XIV”: 83-93; and I. De Saint-Martin,  “Letter 
XLVII (12 June, 1678).” In De Opkomst Van: 211-212. 
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hearted attempts to fight the Madurese and their suppression of local lords. At the same time, he 
discovers how the Sunan bestows the Sulawesians with “grand titles” and promises of land lease.426 
Apparently, Amangkurat did appreciate the promises of cooperation. The vision of alliance 
evidently contrasts between the VOC and many Mataram royals and courtiers. The Memorie exposes 
incommensurability between European expectations of definitive submission and Javanese 
acceptance of fragile and partial military support. Even Trunajaya was formally accepted as governor 
over half of Madura after his surrender and a few days before his death. The entitlement is not 
meaningless, for the warlord might have been murdered in rage not with aim. The intention to 
position him as local ruler fits the tradition of picking vassals and allies among the defeated 
enemy.427  
Traditions of the VOC differed, and confused the Javanese. One of the Mataramese princes was, 
for instance, amazed at the VOC’s command to send all Makassarese back to Sulawesi; doubting 
whether such itinerant troops could be controlled. The admiral, however, had all intention to submit 
them: “the roving and robbing, of these enemies, that is but a packed together tractable and 
intractable people, divided into multiple parties, [that will] not cease nor stop… before we take our 
power to commit to a campaign, because even if we will chase them today, and not pursue them 
further than that, or guard our position, they will return the day after”.428 
One warlord that keeps returning time and time again is Trunajaya’s right hand: Kajoran.  
Kabaijang reveals that he resides in the mountains of Totombo; “two days travelling from Kediri, 
where he has about 200 men with him, without involving or being concerned with anything but 
agriculture”.429 Kabaijang also heard Trunajaya and Kajoran divided the realm between the two, but 
this he judges unlikely since “Trunajaya obtained the entire treasury of Mataram for himself”; having 
brought the regalia to Kediri. This possibly made Speelman more willing to seek alliance with Kajoran. 
In support of this pursuit, he stressed the interest Amangkurat I had in taking Kajoran into his court, 
                                                          
426 Correspondance between Japara and Galesong was taken hold of, In it, the Makassarese warlord was allowed “tot permanente 
ingezetenen van zijn land ..., jaa ook daar en boven keuze van land streeken tot zijne bezittinge”. In other letters, requests were made to 
please to not attack villages belonging to the Sunan. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek, 787-789 and 794 
427 Think of Sultan Agung sending submitted local lords to the court. See H. J. de Graaf, De regering van Sultan Agung, vorst van Mataram 
1613-1645, en die van zijn voorganger Panembahan Seda-ing-Krapjak 1601-1613 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1958). Couper, “Letter LXVI”: 295-
296. 
428 The quote is roughly translated from: “het loopen en stroopen, van dees genoemde vijanden, dat maar een t'saamgeraapt willig en 
onwillig volk is, in verscheijde parthijen verdeelt, niet en zal cessereb big ophouden, gelijk hier voren ter materie al geallegueert is, voor en 
aleer wij met onze magt ten principalen in campanje komen, want of wij schoon haar van daag weg jagen, en niet voort vervolgen, of 
posthouden, zoo keerense morgen wederom”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 810. Notice that Speelman’s reference to “multiple 
parties” does not preclude his presumption of facing a single minded force. See also Couper, “Letter XVI”: 106; and Speelman, “Letter XLI”: 
180-182. Couper, “Letter XVI”: 106. 
429 The quote is translated from: “twee dag reijsen van Cadierij, daar hij ontrent 200 man bij hem hadden, sonder zig ergens met te 
moeijen, of met te bekommeren, als met de landbouw”. Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 780. 
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which he declined back then due to “suspicion” and “fear [that] it was not [a] sincere [offer]”. This 
misunderstanding led to his rebellion, but could surely be rectified. 430 
In other parts of the text, however, the admiral is hypothesizing how Kajoran is ordering his 
troops from afar and seeks to empower his younger brother, not himself, though conquering the 
Pasisir so the rest of Java “will follow”. Religious deception is used to reach this aim. The admiral 
writes that they believe “God and his Prophet will never bless the Javanese land again, as long as the 
kaffers or unbelievers, the … Company’s power and servants, will be accepted there”. It is a message 
“which can be easily taught to this foolish people, especially when it is told by a person that is … 
renowned throughout the land as being so much holy as this Raden Kajoran” and his “creatures and 
temple priests, that continuously roam through the entire country”.431 
Still, the people “already start to see and recognize that [Kajoran’s] promise of invincibility 
does not suffice for the Dutch guns” and that his stooges are “immediately abusing the women and 
the daughters”. This shows they are all “the biggest thugs of the world”, no matter whether Kajoran 
falsely rejects the rapists as rotten apples that lacked “rigid trust in their prophet”.432 All in all, 
Speelman can thus not make his mind up about the man, but moves from tempting forgiveness to 
full rejection and back again. As an opponent, Kajoran remains depicted as a devilish figure; usually 
purely evil but at the same time hard to grasp hold of. 
The reader gets the impression Speelman thought similarly about the Javanese in general. He 
complains “how great his care has continuously been, to, wherever possible, take away the distrust 
of these suspicious people … but this has not been as fruitful inlands as I had wished”.433 No wonder, 
given the “enormous greed and avarice, which is a perfectly familiar Javanese deficit”.434 Tasks are 
not completed due to “lollygagging in the Javanese fashion”, showing “how little one can or may 
expect of the execution by these Javanese, for no presumptions can be made on it.435 Nor can their 
                                                          
430 The quote is translated from: “Troenadjaaija, den gantschen Mattaramsen buijt alleen genooten”. Ibid.: 780. See also Speelman’s 
skepticism on this devision on folio 874 and 845.  
431 Notice how Speelman uses the word kaffers not kāfirs. The quotes are translated from: “Godt en haren propheet, het Javaanse land 
nooijt weder zeegenen zal, zoo lang de caffers of ongeloovige, de nooteerende s'Compagnies magt en dienaren, daar in gedoogt komen te 
werden”; “dit slegte volk zeer ligt is wijs te maken, bijzonderlijk als het afkomt van een persoon die door dit gantsche land, nu nog meer als 
voor heenen gereputeert wert voor zoo grooten heijlig, als dezen Radeen Cadjoran of Panambahan Rama”; and “creaturen en 
tempelpriesters, die continueel het gantsche land door, en weer doorloopen”. Ibid.: 874-876. 
432 The quotes are translated from: “dog zij beginnen nu al te zien en te bevinden dat zijn verzeekeringe van de kragteloosheijd der 
Nederlantse geweeren zoo vast niet gaan”; “misbruijkende al meteen de vrouwen en de dogters”; “de grootste fielten van de werelt zijn”; 
and “dat zij geen vast vertrouwen op hare propheet gehad hebben”. Ibid.: 875-876. 
433 The quote derives from: “zijnde u Edelen alle andere officieren, die kennisse van zaken hebben volkomen bekent, hoe grootelijke het 
van mijne zorge continueel geweest is, om waar ’t mogelijk uijt dit wantrouwige volk alles diffidentie weg te nemen, en inplaatse, een goed 
vertouwen te stabileeren, maar het en is egter binnen s’lands nog van zoo veel vrugt niet geweest , als ik wel hadde gewenscht, en zulke 
moet nog al door u Edele met alle kragt gearbeijd werden, om naar uijtterste vermogen daar in te avanceren, als zijnde een zake van 
groote consideratie, en importantie...”. Ibid.: 754. 
434 The quote is translated from: “groote gierigheijd, en hebzugt,  ‘t gunt genoegsaam een familiaar Javaanse gebrek is”” . Ibid.:, 765. 
435 The quotes ar translated from: "lanterfanten na de Javaense wijze"; and “hoe weijnig men zig van ‘t onderigt deze Javanen kan, en mag 
dienen, want daar op gantsche weijnig staat te maken zij”. The latter complaint was made after ambiguous Javanese promises on supplying 
horses turned out of little value. Ibid.: 774-775. 
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rulers be trusted: for good leadership “is not regarded” and “ministers” constantly challenge the 
sovereign.436 
 All in all, the narratives in the Memorie focus much on alliances, legitimacies and the 
preparations for campaigning. The stress authors as Ricklefs put on contracts and profit motives 
takes up only a small part of the content. Contracts do certainly feature within the Memorie and 
interest in their long-term benefits is uttered. After the war is settled, a bustling trade and 
reimbursing taxes are believed to lie ahead. Whole sections of the text are reserved for the trade 
potential of the island. The delivery of money, rice and wood all spring to attention, as does the 
recognition of state borders, trade posts and Batavian subjects; especially the non-Javanese 
traders.437 Protest against growing autonomy of VOC commerce by certain courtiers and regional 
leaders is not overlooked, but the Sunan is just expected to settle such matters.438 
The attention for contracts is only natural; it was one of the most basic developments that 
needed to be conveyed to Batavia. Any march to Kediri was expected to eventually yield treasuries, 
taxes and higher commerce. Still, Speelman is not left daydreaming about such bright futures. He 
cares about the military operation itself too. For that very reason, most of the document is reserved 
for the ways and means to muster the required troops, keep them under surveillance and make them 
submit to Amangkurat. These enquiries go much further into unravelling the Javanese military labour 
market than the efforts to resolve the ‘Dutch dilemma’ described by Ricklefs. 
 
 
b. Anthonio Hurdt 
On the second May of 1678, Hurdt was asked to lead the VOC army in East Java. Two months later, 
two resolutions were accepted. One added 1.400 men to the total force of 1.100. The other selected 
Hurdt as the new admiral, backed up by Tack, Muller and Wesdorp as chief military officers. Initially a 
short march from Surabaya was planned, yet the Sunan wanted a long one to reconquer Mataram’s 
hinterland and thereby bolster his forces. This strategy of winning back former subordinates indeed 
worked.439 
 After a tumultuous advance filled with desertions, alignments and battles, Kediri fell on the 
25th of November. In the aftermath, the motley troops immediately ransacked the town. As Kediri lay 
pillaged, so did the army fall to pieces. A dreadful return was to await the remaining forces, hindered 
by disease, swamps and bad weather. Hurdt’s campaign certainly was a tough one. Surprisingly, his 
                                                          
436 The quote is derived from: “maar daar op en wert bij deze vorsten, int minst geen agt geslagen”. Ibid.: 777 and  805 
437 Ibid.: 799, 808. 810-814, 814- 825, 827, 842-843, 852-860, 880-881, 884-889 and 892-902. 
438 All other issues are naturally left to the VOC to resolve. See ibid.: 816-817. 
439 Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 34, 40, 41; and A. Hurdt, “Letter LII (2 September, 1678).” In De Opkomst Van: 217-218. At arrival Hurdt 
requested additional troops from Batavia, see I. De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLVIII (25 June 1678).” In De Opkomst Van: 214; and A. Hurdt, 
“Letter LI (11 August, 1678).” In De Opkomst Van: 216. 
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previous career did hardly tie in with the difficulties faced here. In fact, he neither operated on Java 
or with warriors.440 Why, then, was he selected for hunting down Trunajaya?  
 A significant reason is the rejection of this post by De Saint-Martin. Speelman had already 
penned down the ‘Memorie’ for this officer when it turned out leading the campaign did not fit his 
agenda. Other high officials like Willem van Outhoorn, Facob Camphuys and Jacob Pits, equally 
refused the offer. Hurdt thus was the last resort for a mission aimed to “increase the Company’s 
honourable reputation, recover the Susuhunan, tranquillity of the unrest and troubled lands, [and 
the] silencing and eradication of the insurgent rebels”.441 He was granted autonomy in dealing with 
the Sunan and obtained command over all “chief merchants, captains, merchants, ship captains, 
lieutenants, lower merchants, fenriks, postmen, lesser officers, soldiers, sailors, Javanese, Malayans, 
Balinese and all other indigenous servants and subjects of the Company”.442 
A collection of sources on Hurdt’s campaign is available. Central is the 240 page account 
written by his secretary Johan Jurgen Briel. Other material consists out of letters and resolutions. 
Even though merely an assistant, Briel himself was an interesting figure too. He, in fact, served the 
subsequent two admirals as well, and even took over when admiral Couper fell ill and could no 
longer supervise the capture of Trunajaya. In the next two years, he participated in the campaigns 
against Pangéran Puger and the ‘bandit’ Namrud, during which he himself diseased.443 
Despites Briel’s activities afterwards, he appeared to be unknown while penning down 
Hurdt’s offensive. No record of him can be found preceding 1678 and he left few personal marks in 
the campaign narration. His texts hence seem to reflect Hurdt’s view on the war, while Briel remains 
the silent scribe. Sometimes Hurdt is quoted directly; at others his impressions are paraphrased. But 
the general perspective on troop alliances and events seems his most of the time.  Other important 
assistants were taken over from Speelman -like Couper or several translators- and again mainly 
provided information rather than explicitly shaping the admiral’s reports.444 
Hurdt himself is first mentioned when arriving in Batavia on the 22th of July 1652. Soon after, 
he was send to Ambon to work as a secretary. From 1657 till 1661, the man functioned as the head 
of Lontor.445 In subsequent years, he would take position in Ambon, Banjarmasin, Timor and Banda. 
                                                          
440After receiving the position of ‘admiral’, complaints were heard about his civil background and him “equally being not so strategic”. 
Notice, however, that Speelman and Van Goens equally lacked these experiences during their first campaigns. The quotes are translated 
from “en ook zoo krygskundig niet” . See De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: 37.  
441 The quote derives from the VOC authorisation presented on the ship ‘Zilversteyn’ that would take Hurdt to East Java. It is translated 
from Dutch: “tot vermeerderingh van Comps. loffelycke reputatie, herstellingh van den Sousouhounangh, tranquilliteyt van d' ontruste 
ende getroubleerde landen, demping ende uytroeyinge van de ruutinerende rebellen”. See Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 36 and 93-96. 
442 The quote derives from Van Goens mission statement and is translated from Dutch: “oppercooplieden, Capitaijns, cooplieden, 
schippers,lieutts., ondercooplieden, vaendrigs, stierlieden, mindere officieren, zoldaten, matroosen, Ja vanen, Maleijers, Balijers en 
alleandere Inlandse onderdanen en subjecten van de Compe.” Ibid.: 95. 
443 De Graaf, De Expeditie Hurdt: VIII; and idem., “Gevangenneming”. 
444 Some commanders were also known as “fluent among the Javanese”; Willem van Buitengem was one of them. See Briel, De Expeditie 
Hurdt: 51 and 148. 
445 And the end of his service, Hurdt’s wife passed away, but he remarried sometime after. 
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Hurdt was thus attached to the Eastern archipelago, not the western one. De Graaf stresses how he 
managed to overcome his limited knowledge on Java through “a cautious, controlled and wise 
generalship”.446 
Earlier negotiations with the Moluccan lords and residents might have prepared him more 
than De Graaf expects, however. Judged from the cover, his regent accounts are mainly about 
agriculture, commerce and construction. But underneath lay deeper interest in local hierarchies or 
the remains of them. He discusses the surveillance of orang kaya (‘rich men’) to avoid them doing 
damage wandering around.447 Or he stresses to his sergeant to find “experienced natives” to occupy 
a forest of “large and ripe” bael or maja trees.448 These comments illustrate more extended 
associations with the Moluccan denizens aimed to use their brawn and control potential rebels. 
Similar associations were apparent during his campaign in Central and East Java. Not the 
least, they occurred among the fractions of the VOC army itself. Four branches of infantry marched: 
those of Captain Tack, Van Renesse and Mulder, Bastinck and Hurdt himself. Their routes are shown 
on picture nine. The first started with 385 men, amongst whom 147 Europeans, 70 Mardijkers, 116 
Balinese and 52 special troops with no ethnic moniker. Van Renesse and Mulder operated 308 
soldiers: 103 Europeans, 24 Mardijkers, 97 Balinese, and 48 Batavian Javanese.449 
Hurdt headed 158 Europeans, 58 Mardijkers, 105 Balinese, 28 “Ambonese and Makassarese”, 
288 Batavian Javanese, 45 Makassarese450, 12 “indigenous soldiers” and 12 additional staff members. 
Under his command, several European subordinate officers led the European VOC legion and a small 
part of the Asian one: Isaac De Saint-Martin, Aernout Wesdorp, Martinus van Ingen, Andries Hartman 
and Pieter Craan.451 The other columns depended more on Asian lords. 
The indigenous commanders stood shoulder to shoulder with the European officers. During 
the reorganization of the army the following lieutenants were counted: van Zeelst (58 Mardijkers), 
Marcus Mendonza (107 Mardijkers), Bagus (47 Ambonese), Alexander Maquelijn (54 Ambonese), 
Care Montoelij452 (73 Makassarese). Next to them were the captains: Captain Tiben (105 Balinese), 
Captain Kago Mataram (118 Batavian Javanese), Captain Wisa Praija (87 Javanese), Captain Naija 
                                                          
446 Ibid.: 52. 
447  As Hurdt says: “om voor geen quade treck van die landt laten bedugt te wesen”. A. Hurdt, “Memorie door den gouverneur Hurdt van 
Banda op sijn afscheid aen sijner vervanger de heer gouverneur Willem Maetsuijker ter handen gestalt, in dato 16 April 1672.” Nationaal 
Archief; 1.04.02; 1287: 909-910.  As Hurdt says: “om voor geen quade treck van die landt laten bedugt te wesen”. 
448 In this case only two natives were needed, but the request is exemplary.  A. Hurdt, “Ordre en Instructie voor Cornelis van Dijck sergeant 
in de redout overburgh op Loeloe militerende omme hen in de administratie van sagou bosch aldaerna te reguleren dato 15 Julij 1672.” 
Nationaal Archief 1.04.02 1286: 592.  
449 Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 76-77. Van Renesse and Mulder arrmy grew over time, as can be seen by the figures collected halfway the 
campaign; see ibid.: 170. For the difficulties see ibid.: 176. 
450 Who are seen as part of the “Christian militia”.  Ibid.: 115. 
451 Wesdorp would be killed in battle on the 15th of October. Ibid.: 115; and J.J. Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister gehouden in den optogt na 
Cadiety met Comps. Uijtgesette crijgsmagt, onder d’E. Heer Antonio Hurdt: “Hebbendeden Commandeur ooq na gedane monsteringe de 
volgende  compen. geformeerd en opgebragt. ” National Archive, 1.04.02, 1351: 30-36. 
452 Also written as Corramansoelij. 
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Gattij (83 Batavian Javanese). 453 All these Ambonese, Balinese, Mardijkers, Makassarese and 
Javanese warriors were part of the Asian legion, commanded by warlords settled in Batavia. 
 
 
Picture 9 the marches of the four columns during Hurdt’s campaign. See Ricklefs, War, Culture and Economy, 51. 
Similar to the Batavian kampungs in which these troops resided, the ethnic composition of 
the military units was much more diverse than suggested in the Company’s tables. A similar 
homogenizing description was given of the warriors joining the army later on or led by the Sunan. 
The latter, in fact, constituted the bulk of the fighting force. The VOC merely conscripted 683 soldiers, 
whereas Amangkurat II brought 4.000 men of whom 3.000 were armed with pikes. For those he 
selected four commanders: Tumĕnggung Narapaxa, Tumĕnggung Zitsianapura, Tumĕnggung Madura 
and Kjai Ranga. Together they were taken as the commanders of ‘the Javanese’.454 
In due time, the number of ‘Javanese’ would surge and implode. Only 1.000 “armed heads” 
were counted in the first week of campaigning, this rose to 13.220 just before invading Kediri. Round 
harvest, it would drop to 1.000 again. For the VOC, high aggregates appeared to fully determine the 
Javanese military potential. The depiction of the Mataram army often stresses their lack of weaponry 
or lacklustre involvement. Tumĕnggung Suranata’s “Javanese army” from Demak is, for example, 
described as standing “orderly arranged with their pikes. Many guns were not to be found amongst 
                                                          
453 Notice that the troops were divided by their military titles; the 47 Ambonese of Lieutenant Bagus consisted out of 4 sergeants, 4 
corporals, 38 soldiers and the lieutenant himself. See  Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister: “Hebbendeden Commandeur ooq na gedane 
monsteringe de volgende  compen. geformeerd en opgebragt , als.” and “Vrijdagh 25e November 1978.”: 30-36 and 186-187. 
454 Notice that the numbers Of VOC troops mentioned earlier do include unarmed troops too, hence the amount of soldiers being under 
706. See Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 78-80 and 98-101. 
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them, but all the more standards, pennons, and flags of all kinds of colours”.455 Keeping up sizeable 
numbers was thus judged important, for Hurdt mainly defined his or the hostile armed force by its 
quantity not its quality. Dutch soldiers lacked short, so numbers should be boosted with local allies 
and care should be taken to remain successful to ensure these allies will hold by.456 
More than with the Asian legion, the uncertainties on the pejuang support riveted attention 
in the daghregisters. The texts describe how their alignment was offered, how Hurdt’s column 
formation was changed due to their presence and how the warriors behaved during the campaign. 
New alliances of the other columns are equally reported whenever the separate convoys meet again. 
Usually numbers and leaders are listed to show how the army was reorganized.457 The anxiety on 
fluctuating and divergent troop compositions, however, comes across most clearly in the accounts of 
the fourth column. This army section was only called to action at the end of the campaign and 
needed to be gathered together by Bastinck. 
Bastinck was asked to prepare an attack from the East. Unlike the other columns he had to 
muster his troops in the midst of war. What is more, he was assembling them in eastern Java and not 
in the safe haven of Batavia. Since he already was “in commission to the Makassarese in Képer”, 
Hurdt requested him to join the campaign on the 26th of September. Several orders were given “to 
make the [Javanese] regents of Surabaya, Giri and Grisik bring together a separate army, as to tear 
down the enemy as much as possible”.458 
Bastinck, moreover, was to ”animate the Makassarese to live up to their promises, to do 
their best against Trunajaya (…)”.459 The 1667 contract of Bongaja was re-enacted, but uncertainties 
of support remained. At the last minute, unison was reached when Mas Tumapel -governor of 
Surabaya and stepson of the Giri priest- joined the column in front of Kediri. The appeal of this 
Walisanga descendant must have been notable. Multiple groups combined forces, including several 
Makassarese lords led by Karaëng Galesong plus the ‘Malayan’ Entjik Subu, and Buginese and 
Towadjos ones under ‘Aru Tsiong’. In total they numbered: 380 armed Javanese, 200 ‘Surabayan’ 
                                                          
455 The quote is translated from Dutch: “Het Javaanse leger van Souranata stond mede in ordre gerangeerd met pijken gewapent. Veel 
schietgeweer sag men onder haar niet, maar des te meer standaerden, wimpels, en vaendels van alderhande coleuren.” Ibid.: 87, 120 and 
235-26. 
456 Supreme Government, “25 November 1678.” In Dagh-register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over 
geheel Nederlandts-India Anno 1678, ed F. De Haan (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1907): 681-682. 
457 Throughout the campaign, the officers would alter the formation of their troops. Tack reunited with Hurdt on the 21st of September in 
Grompol and Van Renesse and Mulder and Bastinck would join near Kediri on the 31 of October. Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 91, 120 and 191. 
458 This scheme also involved Jan d’Harde; “chief of Surabaya”. The original quotes are: “sijn twee missiven afgesonden, d'een aan den 
coopman Jan d'Harde, opperhoofd tot Sourabaija, en d'ander aan den coopman Willem Basting in commissie aan de Makkassaren tot 
Cappar wesende” and “eenige ordres, ten eijnde de regenten tot Surobaija Gierij en Grisse, een apart leger  op de been zouden brengen, 
om de vijand daermede soo veel afbreuk te doen, als eenigsints geschieden konde, en bijsondedijk in de districten van Zidaijoe en Toeban.” 
In addition, it was stated how “Item rakende de Makkassaren en Boegijs,  in cas deselve op Surobaija magten verschijnen". Willem Bastinck 
was known to speak Malay well. Ibid.: 57, 129 and 169. 
459 The quote is taken from: "dat voornd. Bastink de Makkassaren tot volbrenging van haare beloften animeeren moeste, om van gindse 
kant tegens Troenadjaja hun best te doen.” Ibid.: 143. 
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carriers, 390 Makassarese and Buginese, 14 Dutch, 38 unidentified servants and Subu with his three 
guards.460 
The army was not too stable, however. As I mentioned in chapter two, the Makassarese were 
soon to desert “without goodbyes”. Hurdt still made a final attempt to retrieve their support by 
sending a letter. Emphasis was put on the unfairness of breaking deals. Such a “sudden change of 
retreating ones dispatched people” must have been caused by “the malicious inductions of several 
vile men”; that is, the Bantenese and their peers. Hurdt asked Galesong to come back and “fulfil his 
promises”, so he can “welcome them as good friends”.461 
The futility of this request might have been inherent to Hurdt’s misunderstanding on the 
‘Makassarese’ attaching mainly to contracts rather than leadership. Karaëng Galesong even appears 
to have realized this himself. After Trunajaya fled from Kediri to Malang, he made all kinds of false 
promises to deceive the VOC in assuming him to operate on their behalf. On paper he pledged to 
hunt down Trunajaya and return to Sulawesi, but in reality he was realigning with the Madurese 
warlord. Robberies and attacks secretly continued. Hurdt had learned his lesson and saw through the 
‘deceptive’ letters.462 Yet, his earlier surprise at the sudden Makassarese desertion shows this to 
have been a change of mind-set. Initially, the admiral was more inclined to take allies for granted and 
depend to them as ‘conscribed’ sections of his warforce.  
The admiral‘s flawed notion of supervising conscribed army units reflected on the 
nominators used to identify the pejuang troops. The administration of clearly demarked groups 
allowed a sense of control over them. Yet, the ethnic categories distinguishing sections of the army 
could be arbitrary. Tack’s men changed from Europeans, Mardijkers, Balinese and some unidentified 
servants mentioned above to 232 Europeans, 59 Mardijkers, 114 Malayans, and 84 Ambonese and 
Makassarese during the regrouping with Hurdt. The difference in numbers is due to temporary 
backings, desertion and disease. The transformation of the moniker “Balinese” into “Malayans” 
raises some questions, however. More of these conflicting descriptions are found in the reports.463 In 
such cases, the labels used might tell more about the bureaucracy behind them rather than the war-
bands they mark. It appears Hurdt was satisfied as long as supposed homogenous units of pejuang 
                                                          
460 Ibid.:  69-70, 135, 138, 188-190, 191-193 and 196. 
461 The quote derives from”Daeruijt soo schielijke veranderinge en het aftrekken uwer medegesondene volkeren voortgecomen zij, dan 
eenelijk dat ghij door quade inductien  van eenige boose menschen daartoe misleijd zijt”. Ibid.: 135, 138, 188-190, 191-193, 196 and 214-
217. For the attempts of the Bantenese to blacken the image of the VOC, see De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLVIII”: 214. 
462 After failing to notice the intentions of eight Bantenese ships” himself, Hurdt was informed on the attempt of the Sultan of Banten to 
reunite Galesong with Trunajaya. Yet, he was equally told that Galesong “de Sulthans begeeren buijten kennisse van de Edele Compagnie 
en zijn broeder der Craijn Bitteij niet accepteeren, nog eenigsints daerin consenderen conde, dewijl het sijne heeren waren, want hij deze 
maaninge van sijn broeder om de Compagnie getrouwe te blijven, beloofd had,  neerhalven geen leugenaar woude wesen”. Hurdt 
responded: “zoodat uijt allen desen wij zouden mogen besluijten, dat ghij lieden de compagnie slegts met goede beloften soekt te stillen, 
en in de slaep te wiegen tot ter tijd toe ghij uw wagtig hoopt te vinden, omdeselvete wederstaan, en een eijgen Conickrijke in Java op te 
regten”. Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister: 261-262, 282-287 and 289-304. 
463 The sudden “Ambonese and Makassarese” presence was likely a new alliance. Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 76- 81, 91, 98-101, 120, and 
191. 
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troops could be emplaced in his military strategy. A classification of leaders and broad ethnic 
designations suited that purpose best.  
Leaders and warlords are accentuated throughout the text. Be it to appellate specific war-
bands or show esteem. When Suradikara perishes he is remembered for “his good services on 
Rembang”. Similarly the passing of Adipati Mandaraka -Amangkurat II’s right hand- is considered a 
‘great loss’ for the Sunan. Even the Babad chronicles mention how the “admiral…. was deeply 
impressed” by his death.464 Respected names as these are generally used to distinguish the 
“Javanese” aids. Examples are “Mangononang’s people” or “Tumĕnggung Mankojuda with his 
Javanese cavalry”.465 Names of warlords serve as adjectives to sections of troops and thereby imply 
certain origins of warrior units.  
Similar categories can be found when opposing warriors are described.466 The elaborate story 
of Patrajuda illustrates the attention for the trajectories of warlords rather than war-bands. 
Biographical information functions to explain the troops mustered and attacks delivered. The journal 
refers to his birth in Grobogan, the former obedience of his father to Amangkurat I, how Patrajuda 
joined Trunajaya after the fall of the kraton, his “friendships” with other war lords, his flight to the 
mountains and his capture. In this narrative, the warlord’s troops are merely stated to be assigned to 
him, and to consist out of a certain amount of ‘men’. Apparently, Hurdt had no interest in 
questioning the captured Patrajuda on where his men came from or for what reason they were 
following him.467 
 Usually, most attention is paid to the names of the warlords and their origins. The retelling 
of the fall of Mataram is, for instance, filled with names of nobles. The information on the troops is 
vaguer. The forces of the Madurese commanders Wassingattij and Wiramenggala are described 
differently over time: be it “mixed people”, “1.000 men” or simply “hostile troops”.468 In his own 
words, Wiramenggala claimed: “we only have 1.000 men that can fight, 300 from Pangurit, 300 from 
Wira Baajja, and 400 from Raxa Baajja, all ready to run amok. The remaining force consists out of 
varying negori people [villagers] that do not know how to fight.”469 Even though the data might be 
                                                          
464 As is written down by the VOC: “waeraan sijn Hooghd. nae de presente gelegentheijd veel verliest, als zijnde geweest een goede 
raadsman, en van tamelijk ontsag”.  Ibid.: 177, 195 and Babad Tanah Jawi in proza, ed. J.H. Meinsma and W.L. Olthof (The Hague: KITLV, 
1874/1941): 197. This contradicts Speelman’s earlier complaints about his cowardness; but a change of heart might have occured. See 
Speelman, “Letter XL”: 176. 
465 Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 65 and 175-176. 
466 These descriptions were partly based on informants but chiefly shaped by Hurdt’s discourse. Ibid.: 90- 91 and 109;  Briel, Vervolgh 
Dagregister: 309-310. 
467 Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister: “Relaas van een gevangen mantri  van Troenadjaya gen(aam)d Patra Joeda”:  87-90. 
468 The quoted words were translated from: “gedeelte volk”. Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 91, 112 and 194. 
469 The quote derives from the following letter written by Wira-Menggala and translated by the VOC: "Desen brief comt van Wiera Mangala, 
en alle andere Madurese hoofden alhier aan Mangononaug en verdere Javaanse bevelhebbers met twee gevangens, die wij niet hebben 
willen dooden, maer met dese brief terugsenden. Soo ghijlieden lust hebt met mij twee à 3 dagen te speelen, 't is goed, wij sullen bij u 
comen. Wij hebben maar 1000 man, die vegten konnen, 300 van Pangoerit, 300 van Wira Baaija, en 400 van Raxa Baaija, alle 
amokspeelders. De verdere magt is divers negorijsvolk, dat niet weet te vegten. Komt maar ooq met een gelijk getal van 1000 koppen aan! 
Wij willen met de geheele magt nu niet vegten, want al ons ander volk verlopen soude, maar wij sullen ons best doen, om al 't volq onder 
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skewed since the warlord was challenging the VOC, it does show an internal heterogeneity only 
hinted at by the Company’s informants. 
In the daghregisters, lesser known war-bands are simply distinguished as “Madurese 
enemies”, “roaming gangs” or ‘Javanese forces’ be it with or without alliances with some 
“Makassarese”.470 Contrasting to them are the “Kajorans”. To all likelihood these forces were more 
‘Javanese’ than those of the Madurese commanders. But the usage of the term for mystical warriors 
fifteen years after Kajoran’s death, suggests an association with religiously motivated ‘rebels’ rather 
than ethnicities.471 In either case, the labels carry wider expectations on the behaviour of the 
warriors.  
When it comes to numbering these troops, similar broad strokes are drawn. The numerical 
indications are rounded off suspiciously for information usually based on rough guesses. Data on 
other phenomena -demographical, agricultural- suffer the same fate. The quantitative errors are thus 
not that particular. Yet, as far as war-bands are concerned, the figures do suggest a strong 
homogeneity due to single adjectives attached to them. References to a “Javanese force” of “6.000 
heads”, implies a uniform body of troops.472 The VOC appears to consider them much more kindred 
than was the case. The 6.000 Javanese referred to above, for instance, likely belonged to 
Tumĕnggung Mankojuda from Kegu who commanded miscellaneous forces from Semarang, Wates, 
Kegu and Pajang. 
A similar bias is found in the description of Trunajaya’s troops. It is only after the fall of Kediri, 
that Hurdt lays his hands on an extensive list of Trunajaya’s forces. These were given to him by the 
defected Madurese Pangéran Sampang, and contain the surveyed size of the total army shortly 
before the attack on Kediri. No simplified division along the lines of ‘Javanese’ and ‘Madurese’ was 
present; instead ten kinds of Javanese and seven kinds of non-Javanese troops are distinguished.473 
This list discloses a strict grouping of regional fractions: the Javanese are therefore not one, but many. 
Up till that point, the VOC intelligence had not truly grasped this diversity. 
Beyond numbers, central characteristics of military units are discussed too. Certain attributes 
are usually ascribed to distinguished warrior groups. Pastimes and traits particular to certain ‘ethnic’ 
groups are mentioned every so often. The “free Makassarese [i.e. those without a Karaëng warlord] 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Troenadjaja's gehoorsaamheijd te doen houden. Wanneer d'Hollanders met hun schietgeweer op ons  aankomen, soo doen se geen groote 
schade; of se schoon nu en dan een quetsen of dooden, daar en is niet veel aan gelegen. Ratou Troenadjaja sal evenwel d'overhand 
houden, en die tegens hem vegt, sal tegenspoed en ongeluk te verwagten hebben". Ibid.: 153. 
470 Ethnicity is thus taken as a binding force. Ibid.: 115, 116, 121 and 203. 
471 The quote is translated from: “Cadjorangers”. Ibid.: 101.  
472 Ibid.: 116. 
473 14.547 heads were counted: 7.600 Madurese, 2.000 Panaraga Javanese, 1.000 Kertasana Javanese, 200 Ngandjuk Javanese, 100 Patjeh 
Javanese, 250 Berbek Javanese, 1.000 Blitar Javanese, 500 Kalangbret Javanese, 1000 Rawa Javanese, 500 Nirmala Javanese associated 
with Kajoran. The additional troops were even more diverse: 200 men of Wira Saba, 40 Malayans, 50 Makassarese under Galesong, 70 
Balinese delegates form Buleleng, 30 Bantenese and 7 European “deserters”. Ibid.: 252-253. 
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did not rarely hunt for deer and animals while sitting on their horses with their assegais”.474 The 
“Demak people” are called for building boats.475 And “our Javanese” are observed to “gain 
entertainment” from “burning emptied villages”.476 Specified characterizations like these contrasted 
with the condemnation of gambling done by “Europeans or natives” alike or the drinking of arak by 
the ‘Asians’.477 But such general references are never as abundant as those to ‘ethnic’ traits. It can be 
wondered whether these behaviours were chiefly shaped by ethnicity, rather than military 
fraternization.  
Despites the prejudices behind VOC characterizations, ‘ethnic’ ties were certainly present; 
even across frontiers. A warning of one of Trunajaya’s Malayan soldier to his peers illustrates this. He 
was calling two acquainted Malayans serving the VOC “that they should be beware, as there will be 
an attempt to raid [the VOC camp], with amok games and fires”.478 In this case, concerns for the 
safety of associates hindered tactical ones; Hurdt came to know about the assault and could take the 
appropriate measures. Both the strength and weakness of ethnic ties is demonstrated here. 
Trunajaya’s Malayans cared more about their ethnic peers than their warlord, Hurdt’s Malayans the 
opposite. Ethnic rivalries were observed too: Hurdt had to keep the Makassarese and the Buginese 
apart.479 What, in the end, mattered most to the Company was performance not ethnicity. 
Besides the ethnic labels, the Company also categorized their troops according to reliability. 
Two kind of allies existed: the “engaged” and the “non-engaged” ones. A distinctive treatment of 
these groups applied. Whereas the first were free to roam, the latter were kept under strict 
surveillance. It was a contrast between respect and suspect that determined both trust and tactical 
treatment.480 Sometimes the Asian soldiers could evade wary eyes. When the “free Makassarese” 
were caught looting Javanese horses, for instance, their leaders promised “to carry responsibility like 
all the [other troops]”.481 Repercussions and close observation was thereby avoided through 
confirming recognition of the VOC rules. 
 Later during the campaign, similar agitations did lead to action. A ban was emplaced due to 
“the multiple complaints, uttered by Mandaraka and others about the Balinese, Makassarese etc. 
                                                          
474 The quote is translated from “De vrije Macassaren maakten niet weijnig jagt op de hertebeesten en varkens met hunne hassegaijen te 
paerd sittende.” See also Hurdt, 232. Hassagaijen is an unusual spelling of Assagaaien or assegais in English. This word usually refers to slim 
hardwood spears or javelins with an iron tip. Ibid.: 134. 
475 The quote is translated from “Damackse volk”. Ibid.: 206. 
476 The quote is derived from “hebbende I onse Ja vanen ondertusschen met het verbranden van de ledige dorpen hun vermaek  genomen.”  
Ibid.: 214. 
477 The quote is translated from “Europiaen ofte Inlander”.  Ibid.: 264; and Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister: 263. 
478 The quote derives from: “Den treijnmeester van Vliet, mede present zijnde, verhaald dat een Maleijer van d'oversijde der rivier aan 
twee van onse Maleijse zoldaten, die van sijne kennis waren, toegeroepen hadde: dat wel op hoede mogten wesen, alsoo onderstaan 
zoude werden, ons bij nagt te overvallen, met amock speel en en branden." Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 177. 
479 Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister: 268-271. 
480 The trusted Mardijkers were, for instance, applied as a direct back up for Dutch soldiers, where the Batavian Javanese were kept at bay. 
See Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 210. 
481 The quote is translated from Dutch : “zoo wel als andere gehoorsamlijk te dragen.” Ibid.: 83-84. 
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‘because of stealing Javanese horses by day and night, which led to several disputes’”. All groups 
were demanded to stick to their section, be it on march or in camp; and their chiefs were to prohibit 
their warriors to pass further than a musket shot from their respective flag standard.482 From the 
22nd of September on, more care was thus taken to segregate the army in subsections, as to avoid 
bad blood between the motley gangs of fighters with different loyalties.  
 The distinction between dedicated and less dedicated soldiers comes to the fore in the 
descriptions of battle scenes. Troops standing firm are praised as “magnanimous” and “brave” 
whereas defeat is often associated with chaotic battle formations and lacking discipline. Warriors in 
retreat are similarly depicted as unreliable. And carriers are bemoaned for throwing off their baggage 
and shiftily disappearing. In contrast, the indigenous themselves explain how chaos sprang from 
wounded or even killed commanders.483 
Most fight were skirmishes, only the traverse over the river Brantas and the attack on Kediri 
involved large amounts of troops and artillery.484 Still, similar narratives are used for small and big 
battles. They usually start with a description of the opposite troops, the men hurt or fled during 
battle and the pursuit of withdrawing enemies. At times, particularities of the opposing forces are 
noticed. The colourful banners waving in the air, the gongs rang to commence the encounters and 
the crescent shape of the battle lines all illustrate the attacks. Leadership and tactics are also 
commented upon. Yet, they are not scrutinized. When it comes down to it, the depiction of battles 
concerned what was won and who was brave.485 
The appearance of enemy warlords caught the eye too. Once, Trunajaya himself was seen on 
the battlefield wearing his ‘priestly’ black clothes and a white pajong.486 Particular offensive tricks are 
equally noticed. Madurese assailants on horseback could be recognized by the “way they wore their 
long hair” while storming through the rear guards like “wild people, the hair hanging in their face, 
and protecting the heads with a lance carried by hand”. A captured Madurese even identified one of 
the assailants as Antadersana of Arosbaja, simply by recognizing his kris.487 
Religion could be just as characteristic and cutting as krisses, but that was hardly recognized 
by the VOC. Admiral Poolman’s warning on the Makassarese attempt to win over the Buginese 
                                                          
482 The quote is translated from: “Op de veelvuldige klagten, die door Mandaraka als andere gedaan wierden over de Baliërs, Maccassaren 
&a., wegens het steelen van der Javanen paerden bij dag ende nagt, waeruijt eenige onlusten stonden te rijsen’”. Ibid.: 122-124. 
483 The quotes are taken from the account of the battle near Tukum on page 166-167 refering to the “standvastigheid” and “dapper” repel 
of the “Captain of the Balinese” and the carriers who were attacked on the 10th of November “en ‘t hasenpad gekoosen hebben” 
(philogically this could also mean just fleeing in itself but since Briel stresses their complete disappearance it appears to mean fleeing 
cowardly). Brave conduct is even awarded with medals and promotions in the case if the Mardijker and soldier whi measured the water 
level of the Brantas under heavy fire. See ibid.: 161, 166-168, 176, 184-185, 198-199, 204, 211-212, 223-226, and 237-239. 
484 Ibid.: 223-226 and 237-239. 
485 Ibid.: 212.  
486 Ibid.: 232 
487 The quotes are translated from: „dragt van haar lange hajir” and “als dolle menschen, 't hair in 't aangesigt hangende, en d'hoofden 
schuttende.“ Ibid.: 160-161. 
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warriors comes closest. They prayed that “He will strengthen your and our hearts, so we will stand 
together with all out power that derives from our religion; for God’s words in the book of our 
prophets [tell] the pagans (Kāfirs) should be rejected [and killed] by us”.488 To Hurdt, the religion of 
the Makassarese is insignificant. He limits himself to observing certain troops having ties with Kudus 
and Giri, without giving further comment.  
The most explicit remark on spiritual devotion of these war-bands merely stresses how they 
would flee to Panembahan Giri in dire straits. Panembahan Giri’s role as an arbiter is stressed, 
however: it is mentioned how Arua Cartasan wanted to subject to the lord for refuge and how 
Trunajaya send money to him to march through his lands.489 Hurdt and his colleagues seemingly 
found more ease in identifying troops by their origins than their creed. Whereas only the secular 
actions of the Islamic lords are discussed.  
The accounted correspondence between Amangkurat II and the Bantenese forms the 
exception. The letter of Sultan Ageng reminds “his young brother” the Sunan “that God grants you 
life and made you; strength derives from one’s own God, as does weakness”. Sultan Ageng saw a 
Sunan ‘obedient’ to the VOC, who did not follow the path of his ancestors “because your life and 
religion as well as your realm contradict each other”.490 The Sultan can only pray he would realign 
with his Muslim brothers so “God will bless and support you and retrieve your thrown”.  
Although this letter was left uncommented in the VOC’s administration, the personal 
religious struggle of Amangkurat II did surface later on. At first, the Sunan appears to reject Ageng’s 
appeals as attempts to vassalize him and raise hostility towards him among the Makassarese and 
Madurese.491 Yet, soon after, he suddenly “loses trust and says, among other things, that after 
restoring his realms, he wants to hand over governance to his son, to end his life in Mecca”.492 The 
image of a secular overlord shattered. But only for a moment, for the VOC forced his way back to 
power; their ideal leader was anything but a Hajji, nor were the desired warriors ghazis.  
 Having treated the identification of warriors, it is time to consider how the Hurdt perceived 
their alliances and desertions. After all, the temporality of Asian alliances comes through most clearly 
while these topics are treated. One returning theme in Briel’s reports is the abasement of local 
                                                          
488 C. Poolman, “Letter LIV (27 March, 1679).” In De Opkomst Van: 265-266. 
489 The quote derives from: “Seggen was, dat de vijandelijke troepen, indien se quamen onder te leggen, van sin waren hun onder den 
panambahan Gierij te begeven.”  Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 150 and 193-194. 
490 The quotes derive from: “gy gedenkt dat Godt u in de weerelt het leeven verleent en u heeft laten voorteomen; de sterckte komt van 
dien eygen Godt zo ook de zwackheyt” “omdat uw leeven en geloof als ook uw staat nu tusschen beyde sehynt te staan”; and “Soo sal 
Godt u ook zeegenen en byetaan en uw troon bestendigh”. Sultan Ageng, “Letter XLVI (22 April, 1678): Translaat van den brief, dien de 
Banthamse Sultban Agon, geschreven heeft aan den Sousouhounangh Amancourat Siunepatty Ingalaga.” In De Opkomst Van: 209-211. 
Ageng’s son Haji avoided this religious language, as can be expected from his support of the VOC, see Sultan Haji, “Letter XXXIX (around 
November, 1677): Translaatbrief van den Sulthan Abou Nazar tot Bantam aan den Zousouhounan Amangh Courat Senopatti Ingalaga.” In 
De Opkomst Van: 170-171 and 173. 
491 J.J. Briel, “Letter LIII (3 April, 1679).” In De Opkomst Van: 263-264. 
492 The editor quote is translated from: “geheel ontmoedigd en zegt o. a.  dat na de herstelling van zijn rijk, hij afstand wil doen van de 
regering ten behoeve van zijn zoon, om zelf zijn leven te Mocha te eindigen.” Couper, “Letter LXI”: 278-279.  
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leaders to the Susuhunan, sometimes after battles or breakthroughs.493 Two hundred seventy village 
heads (patinggis) would, for example, submit after the successful traverse over the Brantas river. 
Many more followed when Kediri fell.494 One can find these submissions throughout the campaign, 
however.  
Local allies assisted in multiple ways; from clearing roads to laying sieges.495 From time to 
time, Hurdt makes explicit requests for pejuang forces to join his column.496 Most often, however, 
the approaches came from the warlords or rulers themselves; be it to offer warriors or show 
gratitude. Already at the third day of the campaign, Hurdt is told how Jagaputra, “a subaltern leader 
of Kudus”, desires to again swear “faithfulness to his nobleness” Amangkurat II and his “great 
governor” Martapura. A year earlier, he had submitted to Speelman after a short desertion to the 
Madurese side.497 The presence of the new Sunan, however, urged a reaffirmation. Subjection to the 
marching king had a character of its own. But affiliations were not only reached at his appearance.498 
Striking is the letter received from Ngabéhi Dipanegara, who swore loyalty to the Sunan, but 
could not escape Kediri. It “was impossible, that I would get out of Kediri, because the Madurese 
guards are all around me”.499 Dipanegara conveys details on the hostilities between the Makassarese 
and the Madurese as to show he does not have “two lords, but one, the Susuhunan”.500 Still it is to 
be doubted whether his dedication was all-conveying. The higher nobility often bet on two horses. 
Even Trunajaya’s own uncle did so.  
Exiled to a forest of predators and evil spirits (Lodaja), he was hoping to “get out of his 
banishment”. Since the Sunan was not yet able to bridge the river Brantas, he would wait for him to 
“cross over” before “joining his Majesty”. The occasion was there since “the Madurese, that were 
otherwise around him all the time, are now roaming here and there.” In the meantime, he planned 
to send his 200 men to plunder and loot “to the detriment of Trunajaya’s followers”.501 But his 
proposal only bore fruit after the fall of Kediri. Again, the conditional abasement was a very 
                                                          
493 At the end of the campaign the soldiers of different backgrounds  shortly abuse several abasing villagers or victims of gambling as their 
slaves. Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 85-86, 127, 129, 143-145, 153, 155, 164, 187, 193, 213-214, 218, 226-227, 230, 247-251, 265-268 and 273; 
and idem., Vervolgh Dagregister: 304-305.. 
494 Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 230, 242. 
495 Arja Sindu-Redja, the governor of Keçlu, was assisting Tack to clear roads. Aroe Palakka -Speelman’s main ally during the attack on 
Makassar- jumped in as a back up after the fall of Kediri. His Buginese raised their krisses on the alun-alun of Japara as “oath of trust”. See 
Ibid.: 113, 117, 257 and 271-272.. 
496 Ibid.: 156. 
497 The quote is translated from Dutch: “hebbende sig doenmaels voor gem. sijn Edle. en den groot gouvr. Martapoera verootmoedigt, van 
dewelke ooq wegens zijne begane faute gepardonneerd was, weshalven nu bij sijn E. sig liet aandienen, om niet onbekend te wesen, 
presenterende, indien sulx begeerd wierde, den Eed van getrouwigheijd noghmalen voor sijn E. af te leggen.” Ibid.: 85-86. 
498 Due to the word ‘nobleness’ (in two abbreviations: Edle and E.) instead of Sunan this quote might refer to both Hurdt and Amangkurat II; 
it is quite plausible both were addressed by Jagaputra. Ibid.: 85-86. 
499 The quote is translated from: “Het is onmogel[ijk], dat ik buijten Cadierij can geraeken, want de Madurese wagten sijn rondom mij .” 
Ibid.: 175.  
500 The quote is translated from “Ik heb geen twee heeren, maar één, den Soesoehoenan. Het is onmogel[ijk], dat ik buijten Cadierij”. Ibid.: 
175.  
501 The quote is derived from: “nu hoopte eens uijt sijn bannissement te sullen konnen geraeken”; “over de rivier soude comen”; “bij sijn 
Hooghd. Vervoegen”; “mitsgaders Troenadjaja allen afbreuk toe te brengen”; and “to the detriment of Troenajaya’s  followers”. Ibid.: 178. 
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ambiguous one, leaving Hurdt to call the exiled royal a “good man” yet deceiving any expectation of 
direct assistance.502 
Even whole communities opted for equivocal alliances. The Tubanese were well-known for it, 
having pulled the same trick with Sultan Agung. Before Hurdt crossed the river Brantas, the 
“residents of Tuban and its surroundings did not yet pick a side, not knowing, what kind of lord they 
will choose; it is not possible to rely on their reasoning”. It is only after traversing Brantas, that Hurdt 
obtained their support.503 This illustrates that local leaders expected achievements and advances 
before tying their people to an army.   
If possible, spiritual agents could serve to negotiate requirements of alliance. Mas 
Wargadalem sent four “Javanese popes” after the Sunan failed to travel over the river Brantas. They 
stated “that they had 1.000 men under their guidance, with whom they were inclined to be with the 
Susuhunan, but that as long as the river was not crossed, it could not be expected to happen”.504 
Such flexible pragmatism could be troublesome for the VOC. Still, Company sources were much less 
suspicious about the alignment of noblemen than those of their messengers: the “devil worshippers” 
and “priests”; the devils and saints. 
  Holy men would equally submit themselves. Five delegates from the sacred place 
Wanasalam announced their priest’s compliance which Amangkurat II accepted. The tomb guards of 
Kjai Ageng Séla -the proclaimed godfather of Majapahit- acted similarly.505 Briel’s descriptions of 
political and spirited concords differ slightly. The former are looked at pragmatically, the latter rather 
curiously. The chief of Wanasalam is, for instance, “deemed very holy [like most of his peers], which 
was shown by [the five delegates’] appearance, as the merely wore old patches on the body, the hair 
on the head was washed by each other, living so the Javanese say, a strict life”.506 Having said this, 
the arrival of “two sons of the Panembahan Giri with 400 armed Javanese and 100 carriers” was 
connected to the surrender of two major opponents. With a religious man so powerful as 
Panembahan Giri, recognition for political influences was much more pronounced.507 
 Another man respected for his political capabilities was Amangkurat II’s brother: Pangéran 
Puger. As mentioned earlier, Speelman even believed the union of both brothers’ forces would entail 
                                                          
502 Ibid.:  178 and 198. 
503 The quote is translated from: “De inwoonders van Toeban en daaromtrent staan nog tussen beijde, niet wetende, wat voor een heer dat 
se kiesen sullen, konnende op hare redenen geen de minste staat gemaakt werden”. Ibid.: 190.  
504 The quote is derived from a lontor to “Dat 1000 man onder hem hadde, met dewelke seer inclineerdebij den Zoesoehoenan te wesen, 
maer dat soo lang niet over de rivier en waren, het beswaarlijk konde geschieden.” Ibid.: 213. 
505 Ibid.: 112.   
506 The quote is roughly translated from: “Tuan Ban bang  die voor seer heijlig gehouden werd, gelijk meest alle deselve inwoonders de 
naem soadanig  voeren, zulx aan dese lieden wel uijterlijk bleek, alsoo maar oude lappen om 't lijff dragen, 't hair op haar hoofd was door 
malcanderen gewassen, voerende volgens 't seggen der Javanen, een streng leven.” Ibid.: 109. 
507 The quote is translated from: “twee soonen van den panambahan Gierij met 400 gewapende Javanen en 100 dragers aangecomen 
waren”. Ibid.: 232-233. 
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a rapid victory.508 Puger was reported as wanting to assist his disliked brother with 10.000 men. 
What is more, in a letter to Hurdt he expressed: “I shall humble myself and greet my brother like a 
poor beggar from Mataram” when “the Susuhunan Amangkurat would arrive in Logendèr”. Yet, he 
likely knew his sibling would not be able to reach the town.509 
In reverse, Amangkurat II would request Puger for “500 horses, which are required for this 
army” and “his elephant” that had likely belonged to his father. Never would he get them.510 
Ironically enough, the only time Puger would send forces in the direction of the VOC army, was when 
he mistook his brother to have died and feared the Company would head to his capital.511 This makes 
it all too clear that his courtesy towards Amangkurat II was a mask of mere self-interest.  
 Puger’s correspondence with Hurdt shows he himself was equally tempting warriors. He 
explains how his Dipati Mangkuburni was heading to Bagelèn “to bring several rebels to devotion”.512 
Likely, these belonged to the Makassarese warlord Namrud, who posed a threat to his capital. 
Puger’s mask of self-interest was discerned over time. Captain Tack would later tell Hurdt “that 
Pangéran Puger was not sincere towards his brother the Susuhunan; in case he wanted to he was 
powerful enough to ruin Kajoran’s forces”. Hurdt even started fearing an alliance between the 
two.513 
 Whenever alliances occurred, so did desertions. Even warlords needed to be replaced at 
times due to their betrayal.514 Soldiers deserted most frequently, however.515 After one week, six 
Europeans, four Balinese and one Javanese were already found absent. Around the same time, De 
Saint-Martin reports six deserters present in Trunajaya’s court, one of whom receiving the title 
Captain Agrajuda.516 Not long after, Hurdt would express his concern on “the collapse of our militia, 
(...), which lacks people”.517 Even the carriers appear to have regularly abandoned their position.518 
                                                          
508 Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister: 752.  
509 The quote is translated from: “Soo den Zoesoehoenan Amancoerat tot Lagoudeer aankomt, om na Cadierij te trekken, soo sal ik als een 
arm bedelaar van Mataram mij comen vernederen en mijn broeder begroeten.” The letter on its turn was translated from Javanese to 
Dutch by a VOC servant. Pugur equally underlines his trust in Hurdt stating: “Heer Admirael en sal de beloofte van mijn overleden vader 
aan sijn Edele gedaan naekomen, soo waer als son en maen staan.”The coming decades would show shifting relations between the two, 
ranging from war to induction as the new Sunan. Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 102 and 106. 
510 Quote is translated from ”500 paerden, waeromme dit leger benoodigt was. Vorderende daerbeneffens zijnen oliphant". Ibid.: 128. 
511 Pangéran Panular spread this rumour, after which Puger decided to protect his border against a possible VOC invasion: “Poegar hadde 
1000 gewapende Bagaleenders nevens 3500 Mataramse volkeren bij hem, waermede hij de Hollanders, zoo se in de Mataram wouden 
komen, en die plaats innemen, dewijl sijn broeder niet meer in 't leven was, woude tegengaan, en verslaan. Sij hadden weijnig 
schietgeweer.” See Ibid.: 138. 
512 The quote is translated from: “naer 't land van Bagaleen was vertrokken, om eenige rebellen tot devotie te brengen.” Ibid.: 105. 
513 The quote is translated from: “Capn. Tack was van sentiment, "dat pangeran Poegar geen opregt hart tegens zijnen broeder den 
Zoesoehoenan droege; indien hij wilde, was magtig genoeg de Cadjoranse vijanden te ruïneeren”. Ibid.: 118-119, 184. 
514 Leadership over separate companies were changed too. Vacancy was often the reason; officers were missing, had died or could even 
have betrayed the VOC army.  See ibid.: 96, 98-101, 177.   
515 Ibid.: 98, 115, 122, 127, 141, 144, 201-202, 206, 213-215, 219, 222, 229, 256 and 262-263.  
516 Captain Agrajuda is said to have resided in Batavia, have French origins and carried the name Lesage. See also Briel,  De Expeditie Hurdt: 
98 and 115. De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLIX”: 215. 
517 The quote is translated from: “het invallen van onse militie, die bij 't voortmarcheeren moesten gedragen werden, waertoe volck 
ontbrack". Ibid.: 122. 
518 This is indicated by Adipati Manda-Raka being asked by Hurdt to find “genoegsame dragers” where there were sufficient earlier on. 
Ibid.: 127, 141 and 144. 
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Amangkurat II shared the admiral’s worries, especially when the campaign haltered in front 
of the river Brantas.519 Deep and wide, the waterway posed difficult to traverse; certainly under 
heavy enemy fire from the eastern bank. Due to lack of food, casualties and the mere impasse; the 
Sunan feared “that his people would desert and abandon him”.520 Indeed they did, but matters did 
not run out of hand. The campaign had not yet foundered so much as to cause massive 
abandonment. The VOC Sergeant De Saint-Martin warns for inactivity, however, for it will embolden 
the enemy and enable him “to draw in the general people”.521   
A raft bridge would hopefully break the distrust. Yet, until it was constructed, temptation 
from the opposite shore easily undermined the Sunan’s authority, although only for a small number 
of soldiers.522 Europeans were seen walking in the hostile camp, probably the fugitives mentioned at 
the beginning of the campaign. Switching army could be a dangerous move, as the soldier Christiaan 
Muller experienced when he reached the opposite bank and was “beaten and stabbed off his horse 
with a pike, that [horse] fell on its back, and [he] was carried away by the stream”.523 
Still, other deserters did survive and tried pulling their peers along while fooling with the VOC 
officers. So soldiers were tempted by their ‘comrades’ to swim across and switch sides. “There is 
enough money and food, and no lack of womenfolk”; it was cried out.524 One VOC sergeant screamed 
to a deserter that he would pay for his deeds. The reply ran: “come over, I shall pay you double (…) 
Do you also want to go to Kediri? You first have to face this”; at which point another deserter 
grabbed a gun to shoot at the sergeant.525 The fact that such stories are frequently discussed in 
Briel’s journal proves the VOC’s anxiety about being cast aside by its service men.  
Another fear was losing contact with the other columns. Not surprisingly, a large part of the 
reports is dedicated to the correspondence between the army fractions. A constant notification of 
hostile advances was crucial for setting up proper tactics.526 Not even a week after the campaign 
started, Hurdt already grew nervous over the columns of Renesse and Muller, requesting them to 
“send daily expresses on the enemies’ activities, where they hide, how strong and all the other 
                                                          
519 Notice that the name ‘Palabaan’ is used which can either refer to the Majapahit Tjanggu or Kediri. Both, however, are located near the 
Brantas. See ibid.: 155. 
520 Ibid.: 173. 
521 This is a general statement on the campaign, not referring to the Brantas episode specifically. De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLIX”: 215. 
522 Hurdt writes :"Nu waren er vijf van die schelmen aan de overzijde". Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 187, 
523 The quote is translated from: “van de vijand aangeranst en met een piek van 't paerd gestoaten was, dat agterover vallende, in de 
stroom wegdreef". Ibid.: 187 and 218. 
524 The quotes are translated from “Camerrath” and “Geld en kost isser genoeg, en geen gebrek aan vrouwlieden." Ibid.: 183. 
525 The quote is derived from: "Kom over, ik sal U dobbel betalen", en verders: ‘Gij wild ook mede na Cadierij? Ghij moet eerst dit hagje 
hebben, en dan sien hoe ghij in Cadierij comt’.” Ibid.: 174. 
526 Ibid.: 80, 101-102, 104-105, 108, 113, 117, 130, 136-137, 142, 144-146, 148, 150-151, 152, 154,156-157, 162-166, 168-170, 194-198, 
233-234, 255-256 and 270 . 
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occurrences, so our measures concerning our subsequent march can be adapted to it, and especially 
whenever it is necessary for us to travel thither with our troops”.527 
To travel and find directions, communication with the Javanese colleagues was crucial.528 
Initially, misunderstandings arrived on both the routes and travel time.529 Already during the first day 
after departure, Hurdt was annoyed by the Sunan advancing so much that no track was left for them 
to follow. The admiral hence requested some Javanese guides for the VOC army to keep them from 
losing their way. Two Mantris were assigned to “stay near the Lord Admiral at all times, and point at 
the straight paths”.530 But more was asked from the indigenous troops and residents. 
Surveillance demands similar to those of Renesse and Muller were made on the Javanese and 
Makassarese. The former tended to be used as spies that could equally serve to recruit villagers.531 
The Sunan, for instance, sent four “distinctive Javanese” together with “some followers” to eye the 
enemy and gather men for Renesse’s column in Grobogan. The Madurese did the same, judged from 
the caught spy Sutagati. While conversing with the free Makassarese of the VOC he accidently 
admitted his Madurese origins. The troops immediately arrested him. He confessed being send 
together with five others by his namesake Sutagati; an Ombol from Surabaya. More information 
could not be gotten from him, since he claimed to just be a “simple person” that “never went to 
Kediri”.532 
Local rulers usually had better connections and would inform Hurdt about matters as the 
realignment between Trunajaya and Galesong.533 Captured bupatis that had escaped Trunajaya were 
also called upon. Tjiptaradja, for one, describes the impression he got from Kediri while detained 
there: only “16 to 1.800 Madurese” could be found in the city; “the rest are Javanese”. The emphasis, 
however, was on how to conquer the town, causing a focus on defensive works and the amount of 
cannons.534 
A more intricate story was received from a submitted Javanese that had just returned from 
Kediri. He has counted “7.000 armed men, among whom effectively 3.000 Madurese. He only saw 
                                                          
527 The quote is a rough translation from: “dagelijcx pr. expresse boden berigt moesten toesenden van des vijands gedoente, waer sig 
onthoud, hoe sterq en van 't geene anders meer passeerd, opdat men de messures aangaande onsen verderen optogt daerna aanstellen 
mogte, en specialijk of het de nood sal  vereijschen, dat wij selfs met onse magt derwaarts comen". These expresses are sent using 
suruhans. Ibid.: 89. 
528 At times, warning on dangerous routes would also be ignored, for instance Manda-Raka insistence on the tricky passage to Grompol. 
Ibid.: 82-83, 107 and 113. 
529 Hurdt’s Kalangan assistants, for example, would tell him the journey from Grompol to Kediri would last 26 rather than 16 days. Ibid.: 124 
and 148 . 
530 The Mantris were Nitijpraija and Cartanagara. The quote is translated from Dutch: “om altijdt bij d'heer Admirael te blijven en de regte 
wegen aan te wijsen.” Ibid.: 82-83. 
531 Ibid.: 97, 109-110,114, 121, 128-129, 131, 142, 149, 170-171, 180, 183-184, 187, 195-196, 201, 228, 231, 249 and 264; and Briel, 
Vervolgh Dagregister “Recommendatie aan Capitein van Vliet aangaande de messagie van d’provisie”: 268-269. Apparently, even a 
recruitment tradition of human branding existed; see idem., De Expeditie Van: 142.  
532 Another spy was caught on the 21st of October. See ibid.: 114, 149-150.and 180-181. 
533 Ibid.: 213; and Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister: 269, 301 and 305-306. 
534 Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 116. 
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one Dutch, and one Ternaten inside”. This is confirmed by Dipanegara -a nobleman loyal to 
Amangkurat II but stuck in Kediri- who saw “about 4.000 Madurese”.535 A captured Madurese, who 
claimed “he was send, to fracture our power”, has something else to tell: “only 1.000 Madurese and 
100 Makassarese as well as Malayans, but no Javanese were inside Kediri”. The Madurese defector 
Walliingattij accounted the troops roaming outside the city walls.536 
Even more interesting than these numbers, was the message by Najatjitra received while 
camped at the Brantas. After abandoning his governorship of Semarang, he joined the Madurese in 
December 1676. Now, he decided to return to the Sunan, which eventually would bring him back his 
old post. Najatjitra advises Hurdt to attack Kediri soon. “All the Javanese heads currently led by 
Trunajaya, and whose wives are in Kediri, longed for our arrival, hoping that success would deliver 
them from Trunajaya. They were planning to change sides, but saw no occasion to do so with their 
children and wives, and needed therefore to wait for a better opportunity. In Kediri, there were 
many qualms, so we would conquer it quickly during an assault, since varying Javanese heads that 
were inside would favour us.”537 
When Hurdt and the Sunan did make it to the eastern riverside, Najatjitra again contacted 
the admiral on the “great tumult” in Kediri; “Trunajaya being shaken and having lost his tongue, at 
one moment wanting to live and die in Kediri, and at another wanting to flee when the Dutch come; 
however, being asked where, he is astonished, and does not know”.538 It almost appears as if 
Trunajaya himself was becoming the target of rebellions. 
That Trunajaya was not betrayed during the attack on Kediri, shows that Najatjitra was either 
overly optimistic or deceptive. The latter did not appear to be the case given the additional entrusted 
information send by this lord. He offered a complete list of “both Madurese and Javanese heads” 
that were stationed “down or at the river”.539 The amounts of troops was very high and Trunajaya 
                                                          
535 Ibid.: 155 and 176. 
536 The quote derives from: ”Den gevangen Madurees beleed, ’dat hij was uijtgesonden, om onse magt te verspieden, seggende dat maar 
1000 Maduresen en 100 soo Maccassaren als Maleijers, maer geene Javanen in Cadierij waren. Aan dese kant sworven 50 Madurese 
ruijters’, dog welk relaes voor absolute leugens en flatterije gehouden wierd, doordien 't contrarie reeds hier bevonden hebben”. The VOC 
men hence show sceptisism towards his latter claim, yet do not judge upon the first. See ibid.: 161; and Briel, Vervolgh 
Dagregister  ”Walliingattij verschijnd aan boord en doet ’t volgende relaas”: 272-280. 
537The quote is derived from: “Hij relateerd, ‘hoe alle de Javaanse hoofden jegenwoordig onder Troenadjaja, en  welckers wijven in Cadierij 
waren, verlangden na onse overkomste, in hoope bij goed succes van Troenadjaja verlost te sullen werden. Zij waren wel van sins om over 
te komen, maar en sagen met haare vrouwen en kinderen geen kans, en moesten dierhalven beter gelegentheijd verwagten. In Cadierij 
was veel murmuratie, twijffelden niet, off wij zouden bij een assaut in korten meester daervan wesen, want diverse Javaanse hoofden, die 
binnen waren, hun in ons faveur aanstellen souden’.” Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 219-220 
538 The quote is derived from:  “Daar was groote murmuratie, zijnde Troenadjaja in sijn gemoet  kennelijk geturbeert, en in sijne concepten 
vacillant,   willende dan in Cadierij leven en sterven, en dan eens weder, soo haest d'Hollanders quamen, vlugten, dogh gevraegd 
werdende, waarheen, staat hij versteld, en weet het niet". Ibid.: 227. 
539 The quotes is translated from “nederwaarts of aan de rivier”. The soldiers are described as 200 largely Madurese ones near Tukum, 500 
Madurese in front of Tukum, 100 Makassarese and Malayans opposite the pagar, and 40 Madurese, 50 Javanese (Madr.), 60 Madurese 
collection of Javanese”, 50 Madurese and 30 Madurese in front of it. Additionally there were “about 1200” “forced Javanese” who were 
under surveillance. Ibid.: 220-221 
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appeared to have gathered many forces along the river, although not as much as he kept in Kediri. 
Through disclosures as these, an impression of enemy war-bands near and far could be formed.  
Intelligence on the enemy at close quarters was gathered frequently.540 The same Madurese 
prisoner mentioned above named all leaders of his camp. Albeit he could not provide numbers, he 
did stress that “the enemy consisted out of Madurese, a small amount of Javanese, Makassarese and 
Malayans”.541 Others captives equally conveyed internal disagreements between Trunajaya and 
various warlords. So the VOC came to hear about Trunajaya repelling the warriors of Tumĕnggung 
Dermajuda, whom the Babad Tanah Jawi describes as a supporter of the Madurese.542 Likely, the 
trust between the two had been broken. Loyalty for other fallen commanders was more long-lasting 
and stronger. 
Two Javanese boys even mentioned Trunajaya approached the frontier in search for revenge 
over the death of his two main field officers; Arja Singasari and Suradipa. He “wanted to run amok, 
still was retained from doing so by much prayer, screaming and begging of his mother and wives”.  So 
much noise was produced by them that Mardijkers on guard at the other side of river Brantas could 
hear it.543 After losing Kediri, Trunajaya’s search for refuge was again traced by the VOC. Now the 
loyalty was offered to not by the fallen overlord. Three-thousand Sampanese, likely an exaggeration, 
were claimed to follow him. Escaping from Blitar to Malang, the warlord was assumed to seek 
consolidation with the Makassarese there.544 
Locals are equally questioned on the movements of the enemy, although such informants 
tend to be briefed on fleeing opponents rather than offensive ones.545 Only in rare circumstances do 
the hostile troops attack the VOC army.546 More frequent are the raids on surrounding villages to 
scare the provincial communities; a likely means to avoid them aiding the advancing Sunan.547 In fact, 
letters of pardon were spread along the villages by harbingers of the Sunan’s army to gain back their 
trust.548 Other traces indicated a large-scale provisioning of Kediri: wheel tracks became abundant 
while closing in to the city. 549 
                                                          
540 Ibid.: 162, 181, 184, 219, 249-250, 263. 
541 The quote is translated from: “De vijand bestond meest uijt Maduresen, weijnige Javanen, Maccassaren en Maleijers".  Ibid.: 162. 
542 Derma-Juda used to be the governor of Pasuruhan and was ordered by Amangkurat I to fight the Makassarese. After a military defeat, 
he would however retreat to the Tengger mountains to suppose a neutral stand.  Ibid.: 181; and Babad Tanah Jawa, ed. Meinsma: 163 and 
191. 
543 The quotes derives from the confession of the boys: “Item dat Troenadjaja twee etmael hier tegenover sig hadde opgehouden, en ons 
leger besigtigt en, om de dood van de twee bovengenoemde Reeren te vreeken, had selfs amock willen speelen, dog was daarin door veel 
bidden, schreuwen en smeeken van  sijn moeder en wijven verhinderd geworden". Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 191. 
544 Ibid.: 253-255. 
545 Ibid.: 90- 91, 109, 112, 136, 151, 195 and 270.  
546 Ibid.: 112. 
547 Ibid.: 233-234 
548 It is mentioned how “Sij hadden diverse pardonbriefjes uijt de naam van sijn Hooghd. ende hr. Admirael aan de inwoonders, die hun 
mede in de bossen waaren onthoudende, verleent; en wanneer den Zoesoehoenan die streke quam op te trekken, zouden zig al 
d'inwoonders komen vernederen, hadden nog allerwegen kost genoeg gevonden." Ibid.: 102 and 228. 
549 Already on the second of October, Briel notices that the “de weg was goed en bequam, en van karrens sterk gefrequenteerd, die 
gepresumeerd wierden na Cadierij gegaan te sijn.” Ibid.: 139. 
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Clearly, provision was crucial for the VOC too. Baggage train leaders as Jeremias van Vliet 
continuously notified Hurdt on food supplies and resting places.550 Friction could emerge on the 
division of foodstuffs. Hurdt expected the Javanese to hurdle together supplies, and could be 
angered when this did not happen. So he demurs Adipati Mandaraka “that more rice for the people 
would be delivered, as there isn’t half enough, and that even needs to be eaten without any 
extras”.551 The Sunan suggests drastic measures to improve delivery. He recommends to “stante 
pede kris” his servants that were supposed to supply the army, but did not.552 On other days, brief 
mentions are made of deliveries that did succeed.553 
Gradually, sickness would spread fervently and wagons for food were rolling next those 
transporting the ill and deceased.554 These transportation tasks were again assigned to indigenous 
troops, as were additional ones like building bridges and shelters or carrying loot. At times, this led to 
frustration among the VOC men, certainly during the Brantas river episode. The requested raft bridge 
took days to finish, by which time it lost its purpose since the river already ebbed.555 At other 
moments, encampments needed to be constructed. In cities and villages, shelter appears to have 
been built or restored on the spot “in Javanese fashion” and lofty when possible. On the field, 
pondoks or huts were constructed.556 Abandoned houses offered protection too. Villages, towns, and 
even temples are often deserted: a common tactic on Java when fearing upcoming forces.557 The 
surrounding forests served as refuge.558 So the Sunan was brought to “an old Javanese house” by one 
of his Mantris in Godong.559 
Houses like those in Godong were both sites of accommodation and negotiation. The mutual 
visits between Hurdt and Amangkurat II in these camps are described frequently; Briel states they 
occurred “habitually”.560 Ceremonies surrounded them, like the “3 charges and several cannon shots” 
that accompanied the Sunan’s entry of Hurdt’s house.561 The meetings usually served to discuss 
                                                          
550 Ibid.:, 86-87, 91,110-111, 119 and 135; and Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister: 310. 
551 This is directly said by Hurdt and put between quotes in the text, in Dutch it reads: "dat meerder rijs voor het volq zoude doen 
aanbrengen, alsoo niet d'helft genoegh hadden, en die se nogh sonder eenige toespijsemoesten nuttigen &a." Briel, De Expeditie Van: 87. 
See also ibid.: 133, 134, 147 and 276. 
552 The quote is a translation from: “stante pede krissen”. Ibid.: 107. 
553 Ibid.: 88, 91, 97, 107-108, 110, 114, 116, 119, 127, 130, 142, 182, 218 and 231; and Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister:, 260. Examples are: 
“Tumĕnggung Zoeranata liet eenige koebeesten brengen, die aan 't volk verdeeld wierden”. A hint is given on ties with Giri, when salt from 
that region is expected to be delivered. See Briel, De Expeditie Van: 173.  
554 The request for medical transits already grew noticeably two weeks after the start of the campaign. Ibid.: 117-118, 124-126, 165, 172, 
229, 252, 257-258, 268, and 273 . 
555 Ibid.: 186. 
556 Ibid.: 88-89, 121, 131-132, 158, 168, 202, 241 and 276. 
557 Even though Reid’s theory on military labour scarcity is contested, his reference to fleeing villagers appeard less controversial. See A. 
Reid, ”Low Population Growth and Its Causes in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia.” in Death Disease in Southeast Asia: Exploration in Social, 
Medical and Demographic History, ed. N. G. Owen  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).  
558 Near Kalang, metnion is made of a temple “the priests have abandoned” (“een tempel,  waeruijt de papen verlaopen waren”). Briel, De 
Expeditie Hurdt:  83, 87, 114, 119 and 139-141..   
559 Ibid.: 82-83. 
560 The quote is translated from “volgens gewoonte”. Ibid.: 110.  
561 The quote is translated from: “3 chargies en eenige canonschoten”. This is the only time this particular ceremony is metioned. Ibid.: 88. 
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tactics. Be it to support the other columns, occupy cities, choose routes, arrange provision and 
troops, avoid overlooking enemy troops, send letters to local rulers, or even build bridges.562 
Amangkurat’s reliance on Hurdt shines through in his constant abidance to negotiations and VOC 
tactics.  
The Sunan equally makes his efforts to please Hurdt. He sends his “gandex”, or servants, to 
bring fresh fish and fruits, and gives water deriving from a source used by “Susuhunans of old times 
on”.563 Respect was mutual. When the princess Ratu Woh expires in Japara, Hurdt shows his 
sympathy through camping down “because [the Sunan] will call together all his Mantris, to conduct 
the customary mourning”. The wait did happen to suit his military scheme too, revealing how 
utilitarian and compassionate reasoning were often two sides of the same coin. When anger about 
Ratu Who’s death reared up again two years later, it was not the Company but the Javanese 
caretakers that were blamed and even hunted down. It appears the VOC remained understood as a 
protector of Mataram.564 
Nonetheless, shortly after victory distrust lingered. When Kediri fell, the Sunan attempted to 
shed off his dependence. Correspondence between the parties declined. Hurdt complained to the 
Sunan about the lack of “decent communication (…) even though that was very necessary”. The 
transport of sick soldiers was thereby delayed. Amangkurat claimed he “did not want to bother his 
father, the admiral, with nonsense”. Moreover, he was not to be blamed for the slow process since 
he did “order his Mantris to do their best”. Yet, now the delay had become evident, he would 
“immediately bring things in order”.565 
That was a promise hard to keep, however. The Sunan might have been able to obey, but 
could not always command to live up to it. Amangkurat held a fragile authority and bewailed his own 
lack of control. Most bothersome was “the slowness of the Mantris in diligently following his 
commands, contrary to the old habit of his ancestors’ times, that made women conduct most of [the 
Sunan’s] orders, so they would be done well and accurately. But now he was calling the shots, [they] 
were not listened to”.566 Hurdt did not fall for this and remained dissatisfied over the lacking 
organization of the Sunan and his Mantris, accusing them on several points.567 
                                                          
562 Ibid.: 88, 92, 102-103, 107-108, 122, 125-126, 128, 130, 170, 172-174, 202, 207, 212-213, 228-229 and 266-267. Mantris were usually 
present too. The heads of the army are generally shortly referred to, mentioning their names and negotiations –not the topics of 
negotiation- with them. See ibid.: 96, 120 and 133. 
563 Ibid.: 86, and 131.  
564 The quote is translated from: “stilleggen, want hij alle zijne mantri's soude bij malcanderen laten roepen, om de gewoonlijke rouw te 
bedrijven". It derives drom a letter sent by Marchier halfway 1680. Ibid.: 113 and 186. 
565 The quotes are translated from: “had hij sijn vader, den Admirael, met beuselingen niet lastig willen vallen”; “want hij zijn mantri's gelast 
hadde haar best te doen”; and “Hij soude aanstonds ordre daerin stellen". Ibid.: 214. 
566 The quote is translated from: ”Soesoehoenan klaegt "over de traegheijd van de mantri's in 't vlijtig naekomen van sijne bevelen, 
contrarie d'oude gewoonte sijner voorouders tijden, die haar meeste bevelen door wijven lieten doen, en egter wel en accuraat 
geobserveerd wierden. Maar nu hij self alles gelaste, wierde niet verrigt.” Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 214. 
567 De Saint-Martin did spread a similar message earlier, however; emphasizing the hostility towards the Sunan amongst his courtiers. I. De 
Saint-Martin, “Letter  L (29 July, 1678).” In De Opkomst Van: 215. 
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Picture 10 Illustration of the attack on Kediri from a nineteenth century children’s novel: only European soldiers can be 
seen, chanting “hurray, long live the Company!” The authors based their story on the Briel reports and took the 
denunciations in it to depict the ‘Javanese soldiers’ as lazy-no goods of no significance to the VOC’s victory.568  
 
Prior discussions were not as heated. Amangkurat II often expresses his anxieties towards 
Hurdt.569 The admiral certainly considers these, apparently taking the Sunan’s insights as valuable. 
The whole strategy of the campaign was, after all, shaped by Amangkurat II’s preference for a ‘long 
march’. The ‘listening ear’ is detectable in more passages. At the start of the campaign, the Sunan, 
for instance, asks “whether it will not be necessary to keep the post of Selimbi and Logendèr 
occupied as to make sure no hostile invasion will occur there, because he does not trust his brother 
Pangéran Puger”. Hurdt promises to keep this in mind, even though this would impede his plan to 
bring all forces together.570 
The day after, the Sunan’s call is partly discarded due to concerns that “our general army will 
thus be weakened too much by it.”571 Even then, an attempt is made to expound the motivations 
                                                          
568 H. van Balen, De kroon van Mataram. Historisch verhaal van den eersten krijgstocht der Nederlanders in de binnenlanden van Java met 
illustraties van Willem Steelink (Amsterdam: Jan Leendertz & Zoon, 1890): 169. 
569 Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt:  89-90, 144, 163 and 172-174. 
570 The quote, which might be citing Amangkurat II directly, is translated from Dutch: “of het niet noodig zoude wesen dat de post op 
Chelimbij ofte Lagondeer beset bleef ten eijnde daar ontrent geen vijandige invasie quame te geschieden, want hij sijnen broeder pangeran 
Poegar niet betrouwde; 't welk d'heer Admirael zeijde in opmerkinge te sullen houden, om verder daervan te spreken.” Ibid.: 89. 
571 The quote is translated from “dat men onse generaele magt daermede al te veel verswacken zoude.” Ibid.: 90. Notice that Couper did 
urge earlier to only send commanders eastwards that were popular in those lands, which stirred up the courtiers and led to other to insist 
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behind the Javanese demands. So the feuds between Amangkurat II and his brother Puger are 
elaborated upon. Interestingly, Puger’s mythical claims on kingship are set out specifically. The Sunan 
apparently told Hurdt and his colleagues about the Sunan Kudus or possibly the Raden Patah, the 
‘conqueror from Demak’, and his fears for his brother re-enacting this story. The description of the 
Sunan’s angst does not show any scepticism, besides the nominator of “pagan” for the pre-Islamic 
Javanese.572 
Puger is residing “in a desolated place southwards of Mataram named Gambauwa while 
praying and doing sembahyang [conducting salat], living ascetically, to obtain from heaven, that he 
may retain the rule over Java, like in old times, when the Javanese were still pagans, a certain Sultan 
of Demak [who was] very much longing to take control and aspiring to take over the government of 
Majapahit, abstaining himself in a hole not far from this pager, for fourty days with regular fasting 
and sembahyang, to, as stated, thereby obtain the region of Java, which he succeeded to do, 
becoming a master over Majapahit and conquering the land through violence. This the Susuhunan 
feared, his brother would also attempt to do.”573 
This statement shows us Hurdt certainly had some concern for the intricacies of Javanese 
kingship, including its mystic sides. But the degree to which this influenced his tactics is hard to tell. 
The next day, Hurdt and Amangkurat II would inspect this famed ‘hole’ of asceticism; likely the Watu 
Bethek at Kayangan where the first Mataramese king retreated to meditate.574 Hurdt’s account of it 
is very descriptive, attending to the material shape rather than spiritual significances.575 At other 
moments, the Sunan’s advice on his brother’s spiritual capacities makes a more concrete mark on 
Hurdt’s operational plans.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
on their East Javanese followers too. This to the dismay of the princes. The kraton thus was careful not sending commander that could be 
too powerful. See Couper, “Letter XVI”: 112. 
572 Although the Sunan apparently used that very same word for describing ofther practices preceding Islam. See Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt:  
144.  
573 The quote is a rough translation from: “Den Zoesoehoenan heeft een quaad gevoelen van sijn broeder Poegar, niettegenstaande 
denselven alle vriendschap scheen te willen doen blijken en sustinerende, dat Pougar's voorgeven op een quaade moer lag, tot confirmatie 
van dat sijn gevoelen alleguerende, hoe denselven present in een afgelegen plaats zuijdwaard van de Mataram gend. Gambauwa met 
bidden en sombaijen  sig was onthoudende, omme van den Hemel te verkrijgen, dat de heerschappij van Java bij hem mogte blijven, gelijk 
in oude tijden, wanneer de Javaanen nog heijdenen waren, zekeren Sultan van Damak seer regeersugtig en na de regeringe van Madjapaijd 
aspererende, gepractiseerd had, onthoudende sig in een kuijl niet ver van dese pagger gesitueerd, veertig dagen met vasten en sombaijen, 
om, als gesegt, daardoor 't gebied van Java te verkrijgen, 't welk hem oock soadanig geluckt was, dat in korten tijt meester van Madjapaijd 
wierd, en alsoo dit land onder sijn geweld bequam. Zulx was den Zoesoehoenan van gevoelen, dat sijn broeder Poegar van gelijken soude 
voor hebben &a.“ Ibid.: 90. 
574 The area was named Kahyangan or heaven by Panembahan Senopati, who founded Mataram. It is located at Daleph. J. Miksic, ed. 
Karaton Surakarta (Jakarta: Yayasan Pawiyatan Kabudayan Karaton Surakarta, 2004): 230-231.  
575 Briel writes: “d'Heer Admirael bevond de voorm. kuijl te bestaan uijt twee hooien in steenrotsen, die van binnen tot malcanderen 
komen, zijnde tamelijk ruijm en wijd, hebbende van buijten een nauwen ingang ; beneden in de groote revier vloeijde uijt deselve een 
spruijt seer schoonfonteijnwater, daar den Zoesoehoenan en onse officieren uijt dronken, omdat dito revier al meede moderagtig was, 
egter wat hooger op hier en daar een santplaatsjen hebbende, daar men aan de oevers klaar water uijt kuijlen konde scheppen.” Briel, De 
Expeditie Hurdt: 91. 
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Picture 11 Watu Bethek at Kayangan576 
On the 23th of September, Hurdt asked him whether the rising sickness and decreasing 
provision should not prompt them “to advance to Mataram, as to place his Excellency on the thrown, 
as to clean the lands of Bagelèn, Wates, Kedu and others of enemies etc.” To which he responded: 
“no, and that one should pursue the path straight to Kediri, assuming, that the conquest of that place 
or city Mataram could not profit him; because his brother would flee to Bagelèn, and establish new 
followers there, to keep him in worries and rupture”. What is more, “when Kediri will be conquered, 
everything on this side [i.e. Central Java] will work out”.577 
 Amangkurat’s advice comprises insights into the manner his brother rallied men, the fleeting 
significance of the Mataramese kraton and the absolute need to smother the voice of the rebels’ 
warlord before emplacing a new hierarchy in Central Java. Hurdt took notice of them and carried on 
the march to East Java. Clues of sincere trust in Amangkurat’s judgements are hence clearly present.  
Nonetheless, the suspicion rising after Kediri’s fall could be distinguished during the march too.  
 Especially the authority of the Sunan among his own people was occasionally doubted by 
Hurdt. At the public reading of the contract with the VOC, one Javanese regent jumped up and 
screamed “with much fervour” “that the Susuhunan was mad, that he simply gave away his country,” 
indebted his people and turned them into slaves. Punishment ensued.578 Military initiative was 
                                                          
576 Miksic, Karaton Surakarta: 230. 
577 The quotes are translated from: “na de Mataram te trekken, om sijn Hooghd. aldaar op den throon te stellen, mitsgaders de landen van 
Bagaleen, Wattas, Kadoe en andere van de vijanden te suijveren &a"; “Van neen, en dat men moest de cours regt op Cadirij aansetten, 
sustineerende, dat souder die veroveringe van die plaatse ofte stadt de Mataram hem niet voordeelig wesen konde; want sijn broeder de 
vlugt na Bagalen soude neemen, ende daar een nieuwen aanhang maeken, om hem steets in bekommeringe en rupture te houden”; and 
"dat wanneer Cadierij vermeesterd was, alles aen dese cant wel gaan soude". Ibid.: 125. 
578 The quote derives from: “dat de Sousouhounangh krankzinnig was, dat hy zyn land maar weg gaf en daarenboven aan de Compagnie 
beloofd hadde 300,000 realen en nogh 2000 eoyangh rys jaarl. en daarenboven wilde men se hier nog tot slaaveu maeeken en diergelycke 
praatjes meer.” De Saint-Martin, “Letter L”: 215-216. 
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supported, however, even when undermining royal power. The Mantris sometimes simply went their 
own way, as it evident from the request for VOC officers to join their military expeditions or the 
Buginese offer to attack Madura.579  
Amangkurat II lacked control over his own army. The failure to cross the river Brantas with 
rafts made this painfully clear. Even when Amangkurat II had urged his Mantris to “do their utter best, 
and assist in a truthful matter, because it concerned the Susuhunan and themselves”, the operation 
was hindered by Javanese truancy.580 Hurdt was deeply angered, exclaiming to the Sunan “that his 
highness can now see himself, how no claim can be made on his people, as their slowness and 
cowardness was the principal cause, for the fruitless results of our attack”. He now took it to himself, 
to warn the Mantris not to make the same mistake again, to which they obediently answered “that it 
would not fail due to their fault, and if it will [they] preferred to lose their lives”.581 
A week later, a new attempt was made. But luck struck. The water level turned out to have 
decreased dramatically overnight, and a passage on horseback was doable. The Babad Tanah Jawa 
took this as feat of the Sunan’s supernatural power, claiming two-thirds of the water level dropped 
when Amangkurat II drove his horse into the river. Hurdt instead names it a grace of God. In fact, the 
minister Manteau was called in “to conduct a prayer for all our people, and asking the Lord God for a 
blessing and victory” while the “Javanese force” was waiting by.582 This time, the Javanese did fight 
fervently; chasing the enemy and being praised for it. 
For the next days, obedience was all present. Yet, at the very moment Kediri was conquered, 
ransacking urges destroyed the indigenous compliance. As the daghregister states: “the plundering 
spread through Kediri, at which the Javanese showed to be brave masters, thereby missing the 
occasion to continue chasing the fleeing Trunajaya, like they had promised in advance”.583 The 
                                                          
579 “De Boegijse groote comt aan boord”.  Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 185; and idem., Vervolgh Dagregister: 271-272. A possible reason for 
Amangkurat II’s lacking authority might be his limited bravery. Renesse en Muller complained about the Sunan not being heroic: “Het was 
te wenschen den Soesoehoenan veel van diergelijke stof hadde". See Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 112. 
580 The quote is derived from: “zijnde, heeft zijn E. den Zoesoehoenan en desselfs mantries ofte rijxraden wel serieuselijk geëxhorteerd, 
"dat se haare hulp en uijterste best nu moesten contribueeren, en de zake trouwelijk helpen bevorderen, want het den Zoesoehoenan en 
baarselven aanging. Anders, indien se soodaanig wilden doen, als meermalen geschied was, dat wij dan ooq 't werk op zijn beloop zouden 
laten,wanneer dan sien mogten, hoe sij het stelden &a". While needed the Javanese were not to be found: “dat niet ééne onser Javanen 
daar ontrent was te sien geweest, om bij de vaertuijgen te konnen gebruijckt werden, want se door het schieten in 't afdrijven alle daarvan 
verloopen waren”. Ibid.: 133-134, 173, 207 and 210 . 
581 The quotes derive from “dat sijn Hooghd.nu selfs genoegsam konde sien, hoe geen de minste staad op sijn volk te rnaeken was, alsoo 
hunne tragheijd en lafhertigheijd ten principalen oorsaek was, dat onsen aanslag nu weder vrugteloos uijtgevallen zij, ende dat wij dus 
doende zoude bedwongen werden,'t werk op sijn beloop te laten"; and “Waerop zij te samen zeer hoge beloften deden, "dat het aan haar 
niet haperen soude, ofte anderssints gaarne de  dood wilden sterven &a''.  Ibid.:  212, 218 and 222. They stated their devotion again on the 
day after and the Susuhuan was asked "om zijn volq bijeen te roepen" mitsgaders tot het werk en hare pligt aan te seggen, opdat men niet 
weder, gelijk dickwijls geschiet is, van hare hulpe.” "mogte verstoken blijven". Hurdt would make a similar warning before sieging Kediri. 
See ibid.: 235.  
582 The quote is derived from:  “De Javaanse magt stondt doen mede gereed, ende wierd door den predikant Manteau onder den bloten 
hemel voor al ons volk een gebed gedaen en God de Heere om zegen en goed succes aangeroepen”. Ibid.: 223. While this was a common 
initiation of an attack in Dutch warfare, Hurdt has not applied it earlier in the campaign. A pastor travelled along and conducted some 
services for time to time. See ibid.: 92, 128. See also Babad Tanah Jawi, ed. Meinsma: 198. 
583 The quotes derives from: “'t Plunderen ging door heel Cadierij,  waerin de Ja vanen bethoonden dappere meesters te sijn, versnijmende 
hierdoor d'occasie aan den vlugtenden Troenadjaja te vervolgen na te jagen,  gelijk zij te vooren belooft hadden.” Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 
240-241. 
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Sunan’s initial concern was with the regalia: hearing about “the Majapahit crown and other 
Mataramese court goods, like gongs, costly clothing and the like” he requested that those “will be 
returned, as they belonged to his ancestors, and [he would] prefer keeping them as a memory for his 
offspring.” Possibly realizing the royal authority gained by these objects, Hurdt promised to return 
everything that could be retrieved and even issued a notice on it.584 
When the admiral as well criticized Amangkurat II’s lack of control over his forces, he replied: 
“it was difficult to tell who had hidden or taken [the treasures] away, suspecting our indigenous 
militia as much as his” and stressing “that a great part of his force had advanced, to hunt down the 
enemy”.585 Indeed some men seemed to have continued the chase.586 It is likely, however, that a 
large part of these were running to their fields instead; as the farmland called now the martial aim 
had been reached. Yet, the VOC sources do not consider this. 
What the Company men do notice is money. One of Amangkurat II’s main means to control 
his servants was cash. He seems anxious to tell Hurdt not much of it had remained after paying his 
subordinate leaders and losing some Spanish reals through theft. The admiral appeases him, 
however, by stating that “he had not come for money, but to reclaim the charges of his Highness in 
time and according to capability”.587 Similarly, the fleeing Trunajaya was reported to have taken 
10.000 Spanish reals with him, of which he offered 1.000 as an honorary gift to Karaëng Galesong 
while requesting his assistance. He likely made a similar appeal to Kajoran, who however refused.588 
Holy matters were also used to claim abidance. De Graaf already briefly consulted Hurdt’s 
report in search of holy centres. Blitar, Kaluwang, Kalang, Prawata, Singkal and the mountains of 
Tegal plus Lawu are mentioned.589 Some of the sites abased to the Sunan, other denounced him. 
Mandaraka, for instance, informs how he has captured the insurgent Tédjalaku, the likely ascetic 
from the Babad Tanah Jawi that hid on the volcano Kelud together with forty students. Similar hostile 
ascetics were encountered throughout the campaign, getting rid of them proved Mataram’s 
power.590 
                                                          
584 The quote derives from: “Sijn Hooghd., van de Madjapaijtse croon en andere Mataramse hofgoederen, als gommen, kostel kleederen 
&a. gehoord hebbende, versogt, ‘dat hem die mogten gerestitueerd werden,  alsoo van sijne voorouders herquamen, en gaern tot een 
memorie op sijne naekomelingen bewaren wilde’”. Ibid.: 242 and 247-248. 
585 The quote is derived from:  “Waerop sijn Hooghd. diende, ‘dat hij mede wel wiste, dat er meer ligt geschut van bassen &a. alomme zij 
geweest, ooq konden qualijk raden, wie 't selve verscholen ofte weggevoerd hadde, suspecterende onse Inlandse militie soo wel als de 
zijne; ende wierd aangenomen, hierop bij den aftogt te letten’. Zijde voorts, ‘dat een goed gedeelte van sijne magt was uijtgetogen, om 
den vijand na te jagen, verhopende van deselve wat goeds’”. Ibid.: 223-224. 
586 Ibid.: 250. 
587 The quote serives from: “dat niet gecomen was, om geld [ tehaelen, maer de zaeken van sijn Hooghd. na tijds gelegentheijd en 
vermogen te redresseren”.  Ibid.: 246. 
588 The old governor of Trunajaya, Suta Pattij of Rawa, told this to Hurdt. Ibid.: 253. 
589 Singkal is merely refered to in the Javanese chronicle, but was encountered during Hurdt’s campaign. De Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-
vraagstuk”: 320-321. 
590 Ibid.: 109, 132, 133 and 134. 
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Just as effective was paying respect to holy sites. The old centres of the Walisanga are passed 
by; however the accounts on the visits differ between the Babads and VOC sources. While in Kudus, 
Briel only pens down the destruction of the city and the beauty of its mosque, or “Temple”. The 
Babad Tanah Jawa tells how the Sunan prays at Sunan Kudus’ grave and how his personal scribe and 
Wali descendant Panembahan Natapraja is called from Demak to “pray for him”.591 
Briel’s description of Kediri merely refers to an “Islamic temple” with “some old royal graves” 
standing on the west side of the alun-alun “that is not as graceful as Gunonsari [the residential 
quarters]”. It was used as ammunition storage and almost blew up as a consequence.592 Judging from 
the Sunan’s visit to the Kudus graveyard and his interest in the Kediri regalia, he must have brought 
tribute to this site. Yet, such visits are not discussed by Briel. But towns were not the only localities of 
spiritual importance; shrines figure more clearly in the sources. For instance, gravesides that are 
“considered very holy by their priests” were visited by soldiers to offer tjempaka flowers.593 
Eventually, Hurdt started to grasp the influence of religious authority. After Kediri fell, he 
makes an effort to resurrect the Sunan as an emblematic figure venerated by the realm at large. In a 
scene of cultural misunderstanding, Hurdt hands the Susuhunan a royal crown while he is sitting 
underneath a tree surrounded by “all his lords”. Briel happily writes how it “was received with great 
pleasure and soon many people came to submit to the Susuhunan”. Even the esteemed Madurese 
Pangéran Sampang fell “in front of his feet, and congratulated his majesty with tears in his eyes”.594 
Yet, the significance of the ornamental head covering was not all that great.595 A more 
important step to dominance was taken by selecting the right men to govern Kediri, dismantling the 
city’s defences, and redeeming the abidance of the local population. At least, this was first on the 
Sunan’s agenda. Possibly he felt his spiritual status had already been established on march and did 
not need any newly imposed regalia. Care was taken to choose kin of the old Kediri dynasty, send 
men to Wates and even Madura to becharm its residents, and to retreat the European soldiers to the 
nearby Zinkal as to relief the fears of the Kediri city dwellers. Still, all this did not prevent 
Amangkurat’s great difficulties in mobilizing his Mantris and troops.596 
The pillaging, gambling and even enslaving warriors could hardly be maintained. The Sunan 
asked Hurdt to post an edict against the misbehaviours and organized a tournament as a seeming 
                                                          
591 As explained in footnote 33, Panembahan Natapraja was a direct descent of Sunan Kalijaga. Ibid.: 84; and Babad Tanah Jawi, ed. 
Meinsma: 196. 
592. The quote is derived from  “Aan de westzijde van 't pleijn staat den tempel, die niet soo cierlijk is als die van Goenonsarij 
bovengenoemd, waernevens eenige oude koninglijke graven gesien worden”. Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 245, 251 
593 The quote refers to the first graveside visited by Hurdt’s column: ”Hier was ter zijden een oude grafstede, op een verheven plaats,die de 
Javanen zeijden van hare papen voor seer heijlig gehouden wierde, Alle morgen wierden offerhanden op dit graf gedaan van seker kruijt, 't 
welk de Javanen om te offeren op alle graven gebruijken.” Ibid.: 82. Still today, Tjempaka flowers are used for this purpose. See E. M. 
Beekman, Fugitive Dreams: An Anthology of Dutch Colonial Literature (University of Massachusetts Press, 1988): 304. 
594 The quote derives from: “desselfs voeten nedervallende, en met wenendeoogen sijn Hooghd. gratulerende.”  Ibid.: 247. 
595 H.J. De Graaf, “Over de kroon van Madja-Pait.” Bijdragen tot Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde 104 (1948): 573-603. 
596 Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 249, 251, 253-256 and 261. 
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attempt to restrain and appease the crowds.597 Although he succeeded to some degree, disorder still 
reigned. So the Sunan decided to isolate himself on the return voyage; to not sleep “in his prepared 
resting-place, but rest in the forest out of disfavour against his Mantris.” Concurrently, food shares 
delivered by the king to the soldiers decreased. Hurdt had no time for these affairs. In the wake of 
the next day, his patience ended. After “waiting a long time for the Susuhunan and the carriers of 
ammunition… we marched on without his presence and followers”. The campaign had lasted two 
months.598 
Trunajaya was defeated yet still alive. Soon after settling in Madura he informed the VOC 
he ”would be inclined to visit the Susuhunan, but the general people refuse help, because Madura 
was given to Pangéran Sampang”. The latter prince had sought to oust Trunajaya from Madura for a 
long time already, and was now dominating the island with his followers.599 Trunajaya apparently felt 
stuck in the shadow of his competitor were he to submit to Mataram. An anxiety bolstered by 
receiving no replies from the Sunan to his letters requesting “that I would supervise Madura 
according to the right of my ancestors”. Therefore he “could not appear” “out of fear for the 
Susuhunan”. Instead, he promised “that I and all my people will abase” to Amangkurat if they were 
left in peace to grow rice around Malang.600 
Ambiguous as this message might be, it did show Hurdt how the status of Amangkurat II had 
become of much significance after the fall of Kediri. No matter the recalcitrant troops and massive 
looting, the Sunan was referred to as a landowner by the biggest enemy he had faced. Still, by now 
the admiral had learned that all that glitters is not gold. The ‘feudal’ relationship suggested by 
Trunajaya would be emplaced in a fragile state system. While his people might not have been “more 
than a 1.000 souls strong”, Malang could soon become a second Kediri. Hence, Trunajaya was not left 
in peace.601 
Nor was a massive campaign against Madura set up. The limited control over pejuang as well 
as the threat from Banten brought too many risks. Amangkurat’s appeal to send new forces to 
Madura was rejected and the Javanese were asked to just convince the Madurese to subject. Sending 
“one or two trusted Madurese” to “peacefully dispose” the “leaders and elites” to “accept” the rule 
                                                          
597 Ibid.: 264-266 and 274.  
598 The quotes are derived from:  “ging niet in sijn geprepareerde rustplaats, maar in 't bosch logieren uijt misnoegen tegen sijne mantri's”;  
“naar langen tijd op den Soesoehoenau  en de dragers tot d'amunitie van oorlog gewagt hadden, zijn wij sonder sijn persoon ende gevolg 
met Comps. dienaars voortgemarcheerd”. Ibid.: 275-276. 
599 Pangéran Sampang had been requesting to return from the kraton to Madura for many months already; “versoeckende mede naar 
d'oost, beneffens Keay Wangsa Diepa mocht vertrecken, als wanneer hy sich verseeckerde, dat er veel van de Maduresen Troenajaja 
verlaeten, en by hem over comen zouden”. For a brief moment after the fall of the Mataramese kraton, he did serve Trunajaya: “ Pangeran 
Sampan had by Troenadjaja, na 5 dagen wachtens, weder zitplaats en aanspraak gekregen.” He soon abandoned Trunajaya, however, 
giving classified information to the Sunan and joining his side. Most Madurese did not favour him, but after the fall of Kediri, Mataram 
again dictated local rule. See Couper, “Letter XVI”: 112; and  Speelman, “Letter XXX”: 139. 
600 Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister “Brief van Troenadjaja, aanTumĕnggung Suranata gesonden”:  264-265. 
601 Ibid.: 265. 
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of the Susuhunan would supposedly suffice. Thereby, no war of attrition would have to be fought 
against the “stubborn people”. Only immediate threats as, for example, the Makassarese in Kakappar 
were to be dealt with.602 
The campaign to Kediri had seemingly worn down the VOC forces. Judging from the reports, 
Hurdt’s weariness appears mostly rooted in administrative hurdles instead of combat. The sources on 
his campaign are not so much about battles as the gathering of intelligence. Since Javanese contacts 
were crucial for collecting it, the associations with allies, prisoners, enemies, villagers and warlords 
gain more attention than bloodshed and tactical concerns. The campaign reports become a looking-
glass for cross-cultural networks, cosmopolitan awareness and contrasting acumens. Kediri fell due 
to pejuangs. The pejuangs fought since Hurdt could draw them in his VOC army. 
Intelligence was necessary to bridge pejuang warfare with that of the Company. The reports 
show the incommensurability between two different ways of warring. The Sulawesian plan to attack 
Madura typifies this divergence. Whereas they wanted to “ravage” the island and make its residents 
and lords “oppose Trunajaya more out of remorse”, the VOC men warned them that ‘catching birds’ 
should not be done by ‘throwing stones at them’.603 Pillage mismatched ploy. As is shown in the 
conclusion, the manner in which this incommensurability is framed tells a lot about the extent to 
which VOC men could comprehend the mandala and military market in which they operated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
602 Notice that the VOC was also stained by possible attacks of Banten and Hurdt wanted to wait for the response of the Supreme 
Government before persuading further. Still his main argument remains: “onse Europische en Boegijse magt niet derwaarts oversonden 
maar verwagten dat de opperhoofden van selfs haar gemoedelijk den Soesoehoenan komen submitteeren”. The quotes in the running text 
are derived from Dutch: “Madurees of twee derwaarts moeste senden”; “met sagtsinnigheijd daar toe te disponeren” and “sij vermits het 
een hartneckig volk is”. Briel, Vervolgh Dagregister “Voornoemde Pangeran moet self zijn best doen,om de inwoonders van Madura  aan 
hem te verbinden”: 259;  and idem, Vervolgh Dagregister “Voorstel hoe men best Madura zoude tot redelijkheyd brengen”: 280-281. On 
the negotiations with the Makassarese as well as the plans to attack them, see:  J. Couper, “Letter LVII (6 September, 1679).” In De 
Opkomst Van: 270-271; idem., “Letter LX (15 October, 1679)” In De Opkomst Van: 276-278, idem., “Letter LXI”: 278-279; and J. van Vliet, 
“Letter LVI (3 August, 1679).” In De Opkomst Van: 269- 270. For the capture and murder of Kajoran see Marchier, “Letter LVIX”: 274-276; 
and Sloot and Taalbeecq, “Letter LVIII”: 271-274. 
603 I am paraphrasing here, hence the single quotes. Briel, De Expeditie Hurdt: 185; and idem., Vervolgh Dagregister “De Boegijse groote 
comt aan boord”: 271-272. 
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5. Conclusion: Traces of the military labour market 
 
Can Trunajaya’s mystical impact be revived? The debate on historiography has shown us the 
tendencies of De Graaf’s ‘relational objectivity’ and Berg’s ‘syntypical method’. The former produced 
chronological narratives stretching over long periods and interpreting the thoughts of actors based 
on the events surrounding them. Less appealing were explanations centred on the community or 
organizations of which the actor was part. The syntypical methods did take such factors into account 
and tried to dissect ‘specific complexes of myths’ by analysing the intrinsic interests of authors or 
societies. Yet, neither research approach did justice to Trunajaya.  
Relational objectivity ignored how he amassed his men through cults and charisma. And 
the syntypical method trapped itself in a reciprocal circle in search of the real meaning of myths; 
were they described explicitly or rather hidden under figurative speech? The central book on 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Javanese warfare adopted the discursive choices of ‘relational 
objectivity’. Ricklefs’ War, Culture and Economy treats the impacts of half a century of violence. The 
kraton collapsed, rebellions were suppressed, and exploitative contracts were signed with the VOC. 
In the heat of these events, both the desperate cling to royal power and the increasing Company 
debts come to the fore as the central concerns of the historic actors. Again, the particular 
perspectives of the contemporaries end up as side-matters. 
Both De Graaf and Ricklefs sifted through the VOC sources to find information on contracts, 
battles and warlords. That these sources constitute windows from which VOC officers beheld the 
Javanese warfare was no direct concern. ’Dates, ‘names’ and ‘regions’ are valuable facts, but the 
context in which they were scribed down proves ‘interests’ too. Those very interests -expressed in 
the selection of issues, layout, remarks and writing style- are yet to be fully appreciated. While these 
historians conducted seminal research on the materials, the personal perspectives within them were 
left tangled. Bertrand would not stand for this, and sought to retrieve motives and interests 
embedded into the cultures of both the Asian and European authors. The influence of warfare on the 
late seventeenth court is slighted by him, however. Only Ricklefs’ recent work has given full due to 
the martial influence on long-term Islamization. 
 In the end, the conflicting strands of historians reveal the difficulties in describing the 
mystical impact of warlords. Such an aim begs a specific inquiry. What war is to whom is the question. 
Cultures of conflict contrast and can be concealed across the breach of communities. What is obvious 
to the Javanese is often odd to the VOC, lest they cooperate so intensely that commensurability 
among the parties is produced. This is exactly what happened during the chaos of the late 1670s. 
Times of disarray called for new alliances. Soon the Europeans and Javanese would no longer quarrel 
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at court, but march shoulder to shoulder. A continuum of sorts was achieved between a world of 
privatised state armies and one of fragmented fraternizations that segmented mandalas. 
‘Strange’ parallels exist between the military enterprises of seventeenth century Europe and 
Java. On the one hand, the use of an Asian legion by the VOC and the use of the VOC by the Mataram 
Sunans, mirror the “public-private partnerships” shaping Swiss, German and Dutch armies in the 
same era. Warlords were to enact the wars intended by their governors; signing agreements and 
gathering provisions, arms and men for profit or benefits.604 On the other hand, the elaborate 
alliance system intrinsic to mandalas required a military approach different from the one uniting, for 
instance, the Dutch States Army. Not so strangely, the VOC had to adapt its intelligence to capture 
the dynamics of Javanese warfare fraternization. Most warlords in the archipelago could not be 
contracted and their war-bands were united ad hoc.  
Yet, the continuity of upheaval, rebellion and war evoked the need for local warriors to settle 
lingering inland issues. Speelman’s adage of eradicating the enemy, inclined towards gathering as 
many troops as possible to bring resistance to a close. Next to the Batavian ‘Asian legion’ arose a new 
much more improvised form of Asian alliance.605 The military reputation established in the last few 
decades, allowed the VOC to access a ‘stable flow’ of itinerant war-bands in Java, Timor, Sulawesi 
and the Moluccas.606 The ways of war bended before the breeze. The Asian legion composed of 
strictly administrated groups like the Mardijkers, were complemented by the temporary assistance of 
pejuangs charged by autonomous war lords.607 Warrior charisma slowly became one of the pillars of 
the VOC’s army. The Company field reports reflect these changes. 
The Company men had to craft agility in a military labour market that was unconventional to 
European standards. Commensurating Javanese notions of hierarchy and struggle proved a crucial 
step to do so. Mataram and the VOC were each situated in their own ‘cosmopolis’ or understanding 
of government and warfare; of hierarchies and their dissolution. The case study on Van Goens 
demonstrated how the impression of Oriental despotism derived from incomprehension of the court 
hierarchies and diplomacy. The frustration of dealing with capricious court fractions drafted the 
rejection of the polity or mandala at large. In consequence, Amangkurat I was spurned as an 
oppressor. 
 
                                                          
604 The military enterpriser was less visible in Java, although that might be a natural outcome of the more restricted monetary economy. In 
some ways, the ‘fiscal-military’ state was never founded there, and the military boom after the 1670s in Europe did not find a direct 
parallel along the likes of Mataram, even if the Sunan tried to achieve it. Of course, the VOC itself equally “represented a huge level of 
delegated military authority by European states”. Still, that is not of interest if one restricts the analysis to how VOC men on Java dealt with 
Javanese warfare (p.321). See Parrott, The Business of War: 13, 19-23, and 307-317. 
605 De Iongh, Het Krijgswezen: 53- 56 and  61-78; and Raben, “Het Aziatisch legioen”: 181, 185 and 197. 
606 Hägerdal, Lords of the Land; Andaya, The Heritage of Palakka; and Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku: 1-46. 
607 Notice that the Mardijkers also appeared to be a strictly administrative group; only existing in unity on paper. 
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The description of warlords and war-bands followed patterns similar to that of the autocrat.  
In the reports of Speelman and Hurdt, four warlords stand in the limelight: Raden Trunajaya, Raden 
Kajoran, Karaëng Galesong and Sunan Amangkurat II. Each gained labels and all were judged on their 
leading capabilities. What is more, their followers were scrutinized to see how compliant and alike 
they were. Just as Van Goens rejected the “slavish” court subjects, so did Speelman dismiss the 
stubborn Madurese, ‘deceptive’ Makassarese and Kajoran’s “creatures and temple priests”.608 
To examine how the VOC sources described and comprehended fraternizations of these war-
bands demands recognizing the biases reflected on them. Hence before continuing on mystical 
impacts, it is to be wondered what image was produced of men like Trunajaya. How was his charisma 
demeaned to that of a culprit? In one way, failed diplomacy was at the root of rejection. Speelman’s 
attempt to find a docile heir urged elimination of the rousing Madurese warlord for the sake of 
tranquillity and profits. Yet, the peaceful submission of Trunajaya was still strived for. It was realized 
that his adherents were numerable, and his ‘credit and status’ rising.609 
Securing Amangkurat II’s power required breaking the esteem held by his opponent, be it in 
fight or consent. Even after war was declared. Showing off brawn while marching to Kediri turned out 
a good way of winning regard and reducing that of the enemy. But brawn went with brains; new 
alliances were not only fought for in physical encounters, but also through the appeal of ones 
warlords. Troops were attracted to their charismas. Demands of subordination were easier to make 
with their presence. Hence, the enemies remained partners of negotiation. Their charismas could not 
be denied, no matter whether they were used for hostile means or not. Kajoran, Galesong and 
Trunajaya might have been despised, but they were equally urged to lay down their arms and join 
the new Mataram. All would add strength to the mixed army the VOC had gathered and stabilize the 
mandala for which it was fighting. 
The comments on Kajoran and Galesong illustrate this best. Kajoran’s ‘devilish prophecies’ 
and religious deception “distracted the common population from their required obedience”.610 The 
admiral is wary of his schemes to subject the Pasisir and strike deals with elites and royals. Yet, 
informants conveyed that Trunajaya was the real overlord. Even through a diarchy was planned, 
Trunajaya draws all regalia and Kajoran himself to his headquarter. Speelman smells the opportunity 
to offer Kajoran a better alternative. He stresses how the warlord deserted Mataram due to 
misgivings, and could be “be brought back to friendship” as a state minister.611 The devil was loathed 
and craved for.  
                                                          
608 Speelman, Inscriptie Edele Vertrek: 875-876. 
609 Ibid.: 781- 782. 
610 Ibid.: 746. 
611 Ibid.: 845.  
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The Makassarese are approached in the same way, especially because their rupture with 
Trunajaya was more evident. From the start on, Speelman notices their internal fractures and 
attempts to split them apart. At the same time, he is unreceptive towards Galesong’s difficulties on 
keeping his “small troop units” in order. Whenever the VOC admirals complains to Galesong for not 
respecting treaties between them, the warlord’s lacking control over his roaming war-bands is 
dismissed as an excuse. The VOC men accuse him of either seeking to establish his own Javanese 
realm or join hands with Trunajaya.  
As a potential threat, the Makassarese are rejected as a deceptive group of unwanted 
conquerors. As a potential partner, Hurdt seemed to keep faith of ‘conscribing’ them as units of his 
army. Deception taught him, however, not to expect too much. But the Sunan teaches a different 
lesson. He keeps addressing Galesong and other Makassarese lords as potential warlords and 
governors in his service. Despite his dismay, Hurdt finds himself in need to keep approaching the 
Makassarese for cooperation. 
Like his subordinates, the overlord was not strictly an adversary. Alliance was sought with 
Trunajaya. The reports of Miero and Couper prepared ground for maligning the warlord as stubborn, 
vicious and Islamic; however devout. The rumours on dissent within Kediri and assassination 
attempts confirmed his malicious intentions. Yet, the ultimate aim remains incorporation, not to 
bring defeat. Trunajaya keeps being asked to acknowledge the Sunan as “his just lord and sovereign” 
and return to Madura.612 Disappointments followed disappointment for Trunajaya had no intention 
to do so. He wanted a Sultan not a Sunan; he wanted a natural war, not one involving the VOC; he 
wanted to cultivate East Java in peace, but not send an embassy to Amangkurat.  
Throughout the insurgence, the warlord cherished his autonomy. Naturally, all his bids for 
the throne were ridiculed by the admirals. Any pretention for becoming a Ratu Adil or just prince 
needed to be nipped in the bud. Panembahan or Sultan; he remained a scoundrel till he was either 
dead or a vassal. Preference went to the latter, however. Not only would costs of conquest be 
avoided, capable warlords would equally increase the might of the Company or Mataram. His 
Madurese followers, however diverse they actually were, would provide a valuable addition to any 
realm or mandala. That is probably why Amangkurat II offered him half of Madura after his capture, 
despites the personal hatred between the two. His death likely followed in deny of his requested 
service. 
 The previous warlords were both ‘devils and saints’ depending on the situation, the military 
fractions exposed to and the kind of informants providing intelligence. While Kajoran, Galesong and 
Trunajaya were never purely treated as enemies, Amangkurat II’s pretensions to sovereignty were 
                                                          
612 Speelman, “Letter XXIX”: 135-136. 
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supported through thick and thin. And thin it could get. Coastal towns were lost, the kraton fell, 
Brantas could not be crossed, sickness struck; these were all events troubling his resumption. But the 
biggest issue was often he himself. The admirals are bothered by his womanizing, neglect of the 
campaign and his inability to control his own lords and manpower. And while Speelman considered 
him the legitimate heir, the Sunan’s allure appeared to fall short next to that of the insurgents.  
 But an interesting dynamic arose between the VOC and the Sunan. The latter asked the 
Company’s assistance in reconquering territory “so many may follow me” again.613 The former 
insisted that Amangkurat joined on march to win over from local rulers. The king sought to derive 
power from the mercenary, and the mercenary sought to achieve power through the king. Warlord 
and warrior alike were requested to join, either out of respect for the sovereign or out of awe for the 
European military. To Amangkurat, Speelman and Hurdt were powerful warlords capable of turning 
the tide. When the tide did turn, they could be dismissed. Not only because of having retrieved the 
Sunan’s followers, but also because the newly acquired cult would be strongest without the 
continued interference of outsiders. As the Bantenese Sultan Ageng had warned Amangkurat II; life, 
religion and realm were to be on one line. 
The sources discussed here prove they were not for both Amangkurats. Van Goens describes 
a Sunan on its throne, Speelman one in exile, and Hurdt one on rampage. These are scenes of 
diplomacy, despair and combat; all starring a monarch that showed more sympathy towards women 
than holy men. The ‘long march’ to Kediri can be taken as a desperate effort to change the royal 
image. This thesis is really about marches rather than battles. Javanese politics centred on soft power 
not hard one, and as the Javanese adage goes: “soft power always prevails over hard power”. The 
walk of warriors is altogether different from their assaults. Their function was to impress as much as 
fight. At times, military advances even resembled ritual processions.  
The VOC men wilfully participated in them for the sake of bringing inland stability and thus 
money to their pockets. However, intricacies of fraternizations, submissions, and legitimacy could 
not be ignored by them. More than spilling blood, the campaign revolved around these issues. Hence, 
the Company needed to recognize martial networks. Like any procession, symbolic values became 
expressed in social ties. One is reminded of the Garebeg Muludan -the celebration of the Birth of the 
Prophet- where rice-mountains (gunungan) are carried around the kraton under the protection of 
“royal soldiers in battle dress”. The gunungan came to stand for the wealth of the realm, eaten by 
the people and courtiers at the end of the procession.614 
                                                          
613 Amangkurat II, “Letter XVII“: 130-132. 
614 This is, at least, how it developed nowadays; during the seventeenth century different traditions were likely in use. L.F. Brakel, “Islam 
and local traditions: syncretic ideas and practices.” Indonesia and the Malay World 32, No. 92 (2004): 13. 
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The masses of men gathered during campaigns symbolize power and wealth as well. They 
tempted onlookers to submit to its commander; to be provided by his leadership as a bowl of rice to 
the hungry. Even if large parts of the army consisted out of porters, their mere presence still 
demonstrated abasement to the warlords. Marches turned into analogies of the network a ruler had 
expanded; quite alike the kraton rituals. Not soldiers, but their lords formed the hubs of it. The VOC 
men were part of these networks, and were delving out their own connections through 
correspondence with certain fractions within it.  
During those interactions and through those associations, the Europeans found their ‘devils 
and saints’. As mentioned, the support given or refused strongly determined the portrayal of 
courtiers, rulers and warlords. Troops were of less interest. After all, most of the VOC commanders 
used to be diplomats; and politic negotiations are made with rulers and their delegates, not 
subordinates. The diplomatic system of the VOC naturally zoomed in on the leaders not the warriors. 
They were the ones addressed in diplomatic letters, and the ones replying. This gave a platform for 
expounding their concerns and motivations whereas those of the common warriors remained 
unheard. 
Scarcely do the leaders mention lineages, Walis or Islam. Their statements were hardly ever 
spiritual. Yet, when considered as part of a military labour market, the implicit religious sides of them 
are revealed. ‘Intensified identities’ -coined by Ricklefs- can be distinguished in the manner 
recognition is given to Amangkurat II and different war-bands are joining the march to Kediri. 
Speelman’s fears derive from the rising Islamic appeal of men like Kajoran, and Hurdt’s weariness is 
caused by fundamental disagreements on commanding troops with distinct ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. Yet, all these groups hurdled under the Sunan’s banner; showing his allure was finally 
matching those of insurgents like Kajoran.  
The VOC men did notice this. The socio-religious identification among martial gangs became 
most evident during the campaign. Surely, Hurdt does account fragmentation among the pejuang; all 
war-bands appear to have a mind-set shaped by specific localities and particular believes not shared 
with the indigenous army at large. But they affiliated with each other too. Hence the distribution of 
Mataramese offices among the warlords after the fall of Kediri; they were positioned in a new 
common hierarchy. Next to such state power existed a religious one. Both united the Sunan’s 
subordinates. Hurdt’s attempt to crown the Sunan, reveals he too grasped the potential of spiritual 
authority. Clues on it were given whenever pilgrimage sites like Watu Bethek -the ‘hole’ of 
asceticism- were passed by. Religion is never addressed directly; not a single author mentions 
the Walisanga. Nonetheless, traces persist of the warrior charismas and even some of the myths that 
seem to underpin these martial groups. 
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The realm we wandered through in this thesis was one of mandalas, warlords and Sunans but 
above all else Walis, asceticism, and Islam. Traces in babads and VOC sources show Trunajaya relied 
on these factors to construct his warrior charisma. Hurdt and Speelman never explicitly realized this, 
but their endeavour to win him over underlines how they did grasp part of his reputation. His refusal 
to comply immediately made clear Trunajaya was no just one of the warlords but held pretensions to 
the ‘Majapahit crown’. The competition between the two overlords -Amangkurat II and Trunajaya- 
resembles the contest for warriors on the Indian subcontinent. The two opponents mirrored the 
millennial sovereigns and ascetic warriors overseas. A military labour market spanned between the 
two leaders. The VOC was caught in the middle.  
The manner in which the Company arranged alliances demonstrates how similar the 
Indonesian archipelago and the Indian subcontinent were when it came to reaching alliances. The 
martial continuum is as evident as the other ‘strange’ parallels drawn over the Indian Ocean or in 
Southeast Asia.615 Military demand and supply fluctuated strongly in both cases, and both areas were 
characterized by itinerant troops shortly sticking to overlords whenever the opportunity arrived. 
Hence, the ease of ‘Afghan’ warriors to settle in the Mughal Empire, and the opportunity for the 
Makassarese fighters to roam around Java for a long time. Both troops suddenly supplied skilful 
warriors in great demand. This allowed a convenient position; negotiating with multiple lords plus 
states and making requests proportional to the degree to which their brawn was desired.  
Those impulses of warriors shaped the reports looked at here. The dynamics discussed above 
thereby determined the epistemic value of these sources. The endeavours of the authors did not 
resound ‘veni, vidi, vici’, but rather the Arabic ‘keep your friends close; hold your enemies closer’. 
Complicated alliances were reported, not simple victory marches. In other words, the knowledge 
sought for was different from that expected by De Graaf and Ricklefs. Their chronologies describing 
opposing dichotomous forces tend to deceive the many links connecting the armies. These links were 
the warriors themselves; war-bands and pejuang moving from one overlord to another. 
Next to contracts and commerce, all VOC eyes were on the mobility patterns, fraternizations 
and leaderships of allies and potential partners in war. Clues of a larger Javanese military market thus 
scattered over the pages written to the Supreme Government in Batavia. The aggressive nature of 
the Javanese realm was hence underlined, and an image of the Javanese was constructed that 
contradicted with the serene romantics of the Tempo Doeloe (i.e. Good Old Times) two hundred 
                                                          
615 A. Azra, Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2004); K.N. Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe: 
Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); V. Lieberman, 
Strange Parallels: Volume 2, Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800-
1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); D. Lombard, Le Carrefour Javanais: Essai d’histoire globale, vol. I, II, and III (Paris: 
Editions de l'Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociale, 1990); and A. Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, vol. I and 
II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). 
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years later. The way in which the seventeenth century image of warrior charismas contrasts with that 
of the colonial times, enables a claim of reviving Trunajaya’s mystical impact.616 It is simply a matter 
of denying the stereotypes of indifferent and immobile natives that developed afterwards. 
The portrayal of Javanese warriors became a shadow if its former self in the nineteenth 
century. Under the Pax Neerlandica, the Bupati clung to their image of warlords or satriya (refined 
knight) and celebrated their own Mataramese Tempo Doeloe by maintaining jagos (‘fighting cock’) 
and henchmen.617 That those jagos turned from respected warriors to thugs only underlines the 
words of the VOC soldier Schmalkalden used in the motto: “[b]iß Java ruhig steht und füs sein Zulist 
[list] gestillt.” During war, men as Speelman might have sought close cooperation, but their 
ideologies founded the colonial state and its complete suppression. While depending on charismatic 
warriors, the VOC equally ushered in their decline. Of this, the death of Trunajaya was just a token. 
Nineteenth century literature illustrates the demise. The 1890 children’s novel ‘The Crown of 
Mataram’ figures brave Dutch soldiers fighting thievish foes on quest for the lost regalia of their 
unfaithful ally the Sunan. Camped in Japara, a telling depiction is given on the European conquerors 
and their Asian dupes. The “sturdy [VOC] fellows … with tanned faces, iron fists, and sparkling eyes … 
stood in great contrast with the dreamy and apathetic Javanese … who showed no sign of the zeal 
that gleamed in the eyes of the Dutch soldiers”.618  
No surprise; whatever the outcome they will “win nothing” for all the “mean and inhumane” 
Javanese leaders would mistreat them alike. In the VOC sources consulted, these warriors certainly 
were not dull and apathetic, nor were their lords disinterested in their faith. Two-hundred years 
before the Tempo Doeloe, those very troops were the lifeblood of a campaign struggling to muster an 
army of all shapes and sizes. The only reason the ‘brave Dutch’ managed to do so was through the 
help of local warlords. But decades of colonization made the Europeans forget. Warriors once 
hallowed were now shallowed to obscurity.619 
 
 
  
                                                          
616 The colonial times are here taken as the period after the Giyanti treaty of 1755. 
617 Nordholt mentions the “colonial ideology” of “closed, more or less harmonious communities of farmers and non-agrarian specialists 
within which internal conflicts were controlled by the village councils”. This caused ignorance on the aggressive role of village heads and 
jagos, leaving the latter to live “in the shadow of the colonial state”. The legacy of warlords might still have led to some attention for the 
jagos, however. But this is to be further investigated. H.S. Nordholt, “The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and ‘Order’ in the Colonial State in 
Java.” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 25, no.1 (1991): 77-78; and Houben and Kolff, “Between Empire Building”: 186. 
618 The quote derives from: “Het waren kloeke knapen, die soldaten van de Compagnie. Stevige kerels met gebruinde gezichten, ijzeren 
vuisten en fonkeldende oogen, dier er niet naar uitzagen, alsof zij voor een troepje Javanen bevreesed zouden zijn. Zij vormden dan ook 
eene groote tegenstelling met de droomerig en lusteloos uitziende Javanen, die voor het meerendeel met lansen gewapend en, op den 
heupdoek en den hoofddoek na, naakt, geen zier van de geestdrift vertoonden, welke uit de oogen der Hollandsche soldaten schitterde”. 
Van Balen, De kroon van Mataram: 6.   
619 The quote derives from: “wonnen er niets bij” and “leelijk en onmenschelijk”. Ibid.: 6. 
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Notes on the foot- and endnotes 
 
I. In the cases of edited primary sources, the writing of the editor and the original author 
are distinguished through separate references: one credited to the former, the other to 
the latter. Hence these book appearing in both the primary and secondary literature list. 
The editors usually add essays at the beginning or end of their books hence the need for 
this measure.  
II. Repeated footnotes and endnotes referring to De Jonge et al., De Opkomst van het 
Nederlansch gezag in Oost-Indie abbreviate the title to De Opkomst Van without the 
authors for the sake of saving space. Reference to letters in ‘De Opkomst Van’ do not 
include the addressed institution or person for this is almost always the Supreme 
Government in Batavia. In exceptional cases, alternative addressees are indicated 
through quoting the heading of the letter. For the other letters the heading is left out 
since they are identical and do not convey important information other than the author 
and date.    
III. KITLV : Uitgeverij van het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde. 
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Appendix I: Index of royal titles and other terms 620 
 
Arja (Madurese) High nobility  
Adipati/dipati Lord 
Bupati Regent 
Kjai Saint (usage does not appear restricted to holy men) 
Karaëng Makassarese prince by blood 
Mantri Royal servant/ dignitaries 
Mas Nobleman 
Nebey Lord 
Ngabéhi Public servant of intermediate rank 
Ombol County Regent 
Panembahan Very high nobility, saint 
Pangéran Javanese prince by blood 
Patih Royal Minister 
Prabu King 
Priyayi Nobles of the robe/ royal administrators 
Radèn Intermediate nobility 
Sunan Honoured person621 
Susuhunan (abbr. Sunan) Lord of lords; the central king 
Tumĕnggung Public servant of high rank or warlord622 
 
Further Definitions: 
 
Daghregisters Daily journals of the VOC 
Fitna Drive to secession and upheaval 
Ghazi Honorific and mythical title for warlords; or the myth 
of such lords (Middle East and India) 
ghazi Warriors who fought for Islam but were not devout 
per se (Middle East and India) 
Kraton Javanese royal palace 
Kris Asymmetrical dagger associated with the Indonesian 
archipelago 
Mandala Realms with diffuse political power defined by their 
centre 
Military labour market The total demand and supply of warriors; often 
shaped by itinerant war-bands 
(Military) march This term usually refers to regular, ordered and 
synchronized walking of military formations. Here, 
however, it has the looser connotation of army 
sections moving to a particular locations led by a 
warlord 
Pasisir  Northern coastal region of Java 
Pejuang Itinerant warriors following warlords 
Prajurit  Soldiers; or more specifically royal soldiers 
Walisanga The nine saints or literally the nine representatives; 
the revered saints of Islam in Indonesia 
Warlord A territorial ruler, aristocrat or town representative 
raising troops he can allocate to military enterprisers 
War-band Groups of warriors following warlords 
                                                          
620 These definitions are partly based on Van Goens, De Expeditie Hurdt: xii. 
621 The meaning changed over time; see the introduction. 
622 Other royals and public servants could function as warlords too, hence the preference for the term warlord rather than Tumĕnggung in 
this thesis.  
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Appendix II: Chronology of Trunajaya’s uprise623 
 
1624 Sultan Agung takes Prasena of Madura to Mataram and grants him the title Cakraningrat (I). 
1647 Raden Demang Mlaja, son of Cakraningrat I, dies on the alun-alun of the Mataramese kraton 
while fighting Pangéran Alit. 
1656 Apparent death of Cakraningrat I.  Raden Trunajaya, son of Demang Mlaja, is now raised by 
his uncle Pangéran Ad Sampang, or Cakraningrat II. 
1667 Death of Amangkurat I’s wife Ratu Mtilang. 
1668 Capture of Raden Oji, the lover of Pangéran Adipati Anom. 
1669 Pangéran Adipati Anom (Amangkurat II as prince)’s dalam takes fire in July. 
1670 Death of Pangéran Wiramenggala. Temporary exile of Pangéran Adipati Anom to Lipury, 
shortly after he is positioned as the leader of Surabaya. 
1672 The Merapi volcano explodes at the 4th of August; resulting into thousands of deaths. 
Dhobras accident caused by Ratu Singasari. 
1673 Apparent treaty signed between Pangéran Adipati Anom and Raden Trunajaya, as mediated 
by Raden Kajoran. Trunajaya conquers Madura. 
1674 De Makassarese are welcomed at Madura (before 2th of December). 
1674 
/1675 
Turn of the year: attack of the Makassarese. They plunder harbours in East Java with the 
assistance of some Mataramese regents and Pangéran Adipati Anom. The latter is send back 
to the court. 
1675- 
1677 
Large famines on Java caused by drought. 
1675 Shortly before December the alliance between Raden Trunajaya and Karaëng Galesong is 
secured through the marriage of Galesong with Trunajaya’s daughter Suretna. In December, 
a second Makassarese attack on the East Javanese harbours initiates. Surabaya is burned 
through the help of Pangéran Adipati Anom. 
1676 In April and September: Dutch-Javanese expeditions against the Makassarese take place 
 On the 24th of May: Raden Prawiratarun passes away near Demung. 
 On or just after the 25th of May: defeat of Kjai Pandji Karfula on land. 
 Early June: Galesong flees back to Madura. 
 19th of June: Destruction of Mataramese fleet near Sidapaksa. 
 In August: All of East Java again occupied by the insurgents 
 In September: VOC admiral Poolman destroys part of the Makassarese fleet and 
subsequently visits Trunajaya on Madura. After his departure, the Makassarese and 
Madurese traverse the Madurese Strait to Java.  
 On 13th of October: Battle at Gegodog. Lords like Pangéran Purbaja get killed. Pangéran 
Adipati Anom is betrayed; he expected a feigned battle. 
 On the 20th of November: The Madurese forces reach the alun-alun of Japara, where they are 
countered by Javanese and Dutch troops. 
 On the 29th of December: Speelman leaves Batavia to start a new Campaign in Central and 
East Java. 
1677 In January: Trunajaya moves to Surabaya to make it his stronghold 
 Between the 27th of January and the 10th of February: VOC delegate Moor Piero visits 
Trunajaya in Surabaya. At the same time, Kajoran makes his first attempt to conquer the 
Mataramese kraton. In retaliation, his town Kajoran is burned.  
  
 On the 26th of March: Council of war between Kajoran and Trunajaya. It is decided to attack 
                                                          
623 Largely based on the overview provided by De Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-Vraagstuk”: 324-325. 
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the Mataramese kraton from two directions 
 In early March: Pangéran Martasana reconquers Semarang, allowing VOC delegates to be 
send to the Mataramese kraton 
 Between the 12th and 20th of March: the VOC delegate Couper signs a treaty in Mataram with 
the Sunan and his four most important sons. 
 Between April and June: Double offence of the rebels against the Mataramese kraton 
 Halfway April: Semarang retaken by rebels: the connection with the Mataramese kraton is 
broken 
 End of June: Kajoran takes the Mataramese kraton.  
       On the 2nd of June: Amangkurat I flees from the kraton 
       In July: Amangkurat I dies of disease. His son Pangéran Adipati Anom succeeds him as   
       Amangkurat II, while his brother Pangéran Puger crowns himself Sunan Ingalaga. The  
       succession struggle starts.  
 Between 27th of March and 29th of August: Expedition of Speelman to reconquer Surabaya. 
      On the 13th of May: Speelman reconquers Surabaya; Trunajaya flees to Kediri. 
      On the 19th of September: Amangkurat II reaches Japara, in search for support of the   
      VOC. 
 In September: The rebels abandon the Mataramese kraton and Trunajaya temporally flees  
                          Kediri due to the Madurese. 
 In October: Puger moves into the Mataramese kraton. Trunajaya reconquers Kediri.  
 On the 19th and 20th of October: Amangkurat II signs several contracts with the VOC. 
 In November: Offensive of Kajoran’s followers at the Pasisir. 
1678 On the 17th of January: Death of Martapura and Martalaja 
 On the 23th of March: Speelman completes his Missive to his successor. 
 Between June and July: Second offensive of Kajoran’s followers at the Pasisir. 
 Between the 5th of September and 25th of November: Hurdt’s campaign against Trunajaya in 
Kediri. 
 On the 17th of November: Hurdt’s forces cross over the Brantas. 
 On the 25th of November: Kediri is taken, Trunajaya flees to Malang; Hurdt’s forces occupy 
the area and return to Surabaya. 
 Around the 1st of November: Kajoran moves back to Central Java. 
1679 Between April and August: The Makassarese warlord Namrud has several victories in Central 
Java under the supervision of Kajoran 
 On the 14th of September: Captain Sloot captures Kajoran’s stronghold Melambang, captures 
the warlords and orders his assassination. Some of his followers -Kartapada, Kartanadi and 
Kartanagara- continue his struggle. 
 
 On the 13th of November: The headquarter of the Makassarese, Kakappar, is taken by captain 
Poleman. 
 On the 25th of December: Captain Jonker captures Trunajaya and his few remaining followers 
1680 On the 2th of January: Amangkurat II gives the order to assassinate Trunajaya. 
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Appendix III: Map of Couper’s march  
 
 
Picture 12 Map showing the Southeast Javanese regions Couper marched through while seeking to capture or kill 
Trunajaya. Names of places and rivers are written down. Drawn around 1695, but likely based on expeditions drafts from 
1679.624 
                                                          
624 I. de Graaf, “Aftekeningh van de Mars van den Commandeur Couper, met het leger van de Ed. Comp. door de Provincien Mataram, 
Bagil, Leer en Loeretenga, in het Zuidoostelyke gedeelte van Java.” In  Atlas Amsterdam, ed. Isaac de Graaff (Amsterdam: De Verenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie, circa 1695, completed in 1705). Nationaal Archief, VEL1164. (accessed via 
http://proxy.handle.net/10648/af9926d8-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84, on 23-03-2014). 
